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THE ONTOLOGICAL BASIS OF LEGAL HERMENEUTICS:
A PROPOSED MODEL OF INQUIRY BASED ON THE WORK
OF GADAMER, HABERMAS, AND RICOEURt
FRANCIS J. MOOTZ, III*

PREFACE

This book, once begun, is not a certain set of ideas; it constitutes for me
an open situation, for which I could not possibly provide any complex
formula, and in which I struggle blindly on until, miraculously, thoughts
and words become organized by themselves.
-Maurice Merleau-Ponty'
This Article is an example of its thesis. What I do with the texts that I have
gathered in support of my argument reveals the ontological basis of legal
interpretation. What follows is not only an exposition of what happens when
a reader interprets legal texts, but also an actual case of a reader seeking to
solve a legal problem by interpreting both legal and non-legal texts. I believe
that this strategy of searching for the truth of legal hermeneutics by way of
exegesis is appropriate: if my thesis is to be taken seriously, it must
:exemplify the hermeneutical activity that I am attempting to explain.
This Article is also a contradiction of its thesis. The ontological basis of
legal hermeneutics is obscured by the second-order account that follows.
That is, my hermeneutical activity is conceptualized into a hermeneutical
theory; action is replaced by contemplation, reality by abstraction. I do not
believe, however, that abstraction results from simply talking about action,
because talking in particular, and the development and use of language in
general, are also activities. Instead, abstraction results from thinking about
action. More precisely, abstraction is thinking about action. This Article is
an abstraction from the underlying hermeneutical activity, despite my attempts to write an article that embodied the act of interpretation without
explaining my thoughts on interpretation.
t Copyright 1988 by Francis J. Mootz, IlI.
* Associate, Halloran, Sage, Phelon & Hagarty, Hartford, Connecticut. B.A.,
University of Notre Dame; A.M., J.D., Duke University. I would like to thank Rick
Roderick of Duke University and Guy Haarsher of the Universit6 Libre de Bruxelles
for their kind attention to earlier drafts of this Article. For the ideas expressed in this
Article, I owe a great deal to two outstanding professors, Fred Dallmayr of the
University of Notre Dame and William Poteat of Duke University. I hope they
recognize in.these pages their lasting influence on me, although the reader should not
impute my failings to them. Finally, my wife Caren has been indispensable during the
writing of this Article, providing both editorial suggestions and moral support.
' M. MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 369 (C. Smith trans.
1962).
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Unfortunately, the strictures of academia conspire against those who
prefer not to be abstract.' It is my hope that the exemplificative nature of this
Article is sufficiently strong to counteract the abstract "noise" of my theoretical argument. If so, then you, the reader, might see in these pages how
much fun I had "playing" this Article, in addition to benefiting from your
own playful encounter with the printed residue of what was once mine.
Art is not so confining. Cezanne shows us something about the activity of
perception, just as James Joyce shows us something about the activity of language.
2
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Because there is something simple to be thought in this thinking it seems
quite difficult to the representational thought that has been transmitted
as philosophy. But the difficulty is not a matter of indulging in a special
sort of profundity and of building complicated concepts; rather, it is
concealed in the step back that lets thinking enter into a questioning that

experiences-and lets the habitual opining of philosophy fall away.
-Martin Heidegger3
I.

WHAT IS HERMENEUTICS?

The Western legal tradition is composed of written artifacts. As a result,
any attempt to formulate a legal theory is inherently parasitical upon presup-

positions about the interpretation of texts. One cannot theorize about the
meaning of a legal document-whether it be a statute, constitution, or
judicial opinion-without at least implicitly invoking a theory of interpretation, for interpretation precedes and makes possible the recognition of
meaning in a written work. Legal hermeneutics is the exploration of this
interpretive reality, which is always anterior to the conceptual formulations
used in making any legal argument or rendering any legal judgment.

Yet hermeneutics is not exclusively concerned with legal interpretation.
Indeed, hermeneutics embraces all scientific, humanistic, and artistic endeavors, and entails a general philosophical attitude about the way in which
4
a meaningful world is lived through. For post-Heideggerian philosophers,
3 M.
1977).

HEIDEGGER, Letter on Humanism,

in

BASIC WRITINGS

222 (D. Krell ed.

4 The Heideggerian tradition is not dominant in America, but scholars are increas-
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hermeneutics is an inquiry into the modalities of "being-in-the-world" that
allow all meaning to emerge, and is thus ontological. In this Article, I argue
that legal theorists must remain attentive to this hermeneutical reality if they
are to provide a satisfactory account of the legal system.
The failure of legal theorists to admit or remember this reality is the reason
for much of the confusion now plaguing their attempts to critically analyze
the coherence of what judges do. This confusion has grown into a crisis of
confidence among the scholars who attempt to demonstrate the rationality of
the legal order as it is interpreted and applied by judges, a crisis that is, at
least implicitly, a reaction to the troubling proposition that a given legal text
may be as "unknowable" as a literary work, that legal interpretation may be
as "unscientific" and "subjective" as literary criticism. Considering the
elementary identity of both novels and constitutions as written texts, this
suggestion is by no means without merit. Nor is it unimportant in the wake of
the Warren Court's alleged judicial activism. Critics increasingly tend to
view constitutional adjudication as a freewheeling activity that can endow a
text with any meaning whenever the (political) need arises.
Countering this pessimistic retreat into subjectivism is the equally improbable view that the words of a legal document have an objective, univocal
meaning that is not to be found in the contrived ambiguity of a novel or
poem. Under this view, a legal text has one clear and precise meaning that is
conveyed "on its face," rather than several "competing" meanings. That
the President must be thirty-five years of age is a proposition that admits of
no interpretation, but is it not equally clear that Raskolnikov lives in small
quarters, or that Ahab is a one-legged whaler? The fact remains that the
textual whole is not merely a composition of discrete parts with unambiguous meE.ings; it is not at all clear why Raskolnikov commits the murder, nor
is it clear what due process of law means.
In order to resolve this conflict, to explicate the manner in which the
meaning of a text is encountered, it is necessary to move beyond the
simplistic dichotomy between "objectivity" and "subjectivity." To recover
some notion of legal objectivity without either making the ludicrous suggestion that legal texts are wholly unambiguous or simply surrendering to
subjectivism requires an examination of the ontological question which
Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics poses: how is it that the world reveals
meaning to its inhabitants? It is not necessary to fully develop an
ingly recognizing that contemporary continental thought has tremendous importance
for legal philosophy. See, e.g., Chevigny, Why the Continental Disputes are Important: A Comment on Hoy and Garet, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 199 (1985); Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Hermeneuticaland PoststructuralistPerspectives, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
135 (1985); Phelps & Pitts, Questioning the Text: The Significance of Phenomenological Hermeneutics .for Legal Interpretation, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 353 (1985); Hermann, Phenomenology, Structuralism, Hermeneutics, and Legal Study: Applications of Contemporary Continental Thought to Legal Phenomena, 36 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 379 (1982); Schiff, Phenomenology and Jurisprudence,4 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 5
(1982).
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ontology-that is a task reserved for the Heideggers of the world-but only
to bring Gadamer's ontology to bear on the problem of legal interpretation.
My thesis is that although a legal text has an objective meaning to the
extent that the reader is bound by the text -and prevented from creating a
meaning ex nihilo, any attempt to discover the meaning of a text is a
misguided project that ignores both the dynamic interaction of the reader
and the text, and the implications of the reader's finite and temporal nature.
The organizational structure of this Article is based upon two distinct projects. Part II is concerned with the philosophical writings of Hans-Georg
Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur as they bear on the discussion of humankind's
hermenetical nature, our openness to meaning. Gadamer's aesthetic theory
establishes the concept of "play" as the central feature of all interpretation
and serves as the basis for explicating both Gadamer's and Ricoeur's philosophy of the text. In light of this general framework for understanding the
interpretive act, I explore the specific problem of legal interpretation. Using
constitutional interpretation as a paradigm, I rely on Gadamer's philosophy
to discuss specific cases that pose difficult problems of interpretation. Finally, I investigate and critique modem legal theory. Using a symposium
that appeared in the Texas Law Review, I explore the current subjective/
objective dilemma facing modern legal theorists. The (intended) import of
this Article is the rejection of this dilemma as it is posed.
In Part III, I develop a model of inquiry. On a definitional level, I distinguish between a model and a methodology. On a substantive level, Part III
rescues the hermeneutics of meaning developed in Part II from relativism
and nihilism by a philosophical justification of the practice of critique.
Having shown in Part II that legal interpretation is a form of ontological play,
I examine the work of Jiirgen Habermas and Paul Ricoeur in Part III in order
to establish that although judicial interpretations of legal texts are essentially
"playful" rather than timeless and objective, it is nevertheless possible to
justify evaluating the normative status of judicial decisions. I contrast the
critical theory of Habermas with Gadamer's hermeneutical ontology and
then put both theories into perspective according to Ricoeur's critical hermeneutics. Part III presents a different approach to the problem of legal
interpretation and indicates areas in which further research would be productive. Answers to the traditional problems in legal theory are not provided
because the traditional questions are rejected as constituting an improper
inquiry.
II.
A.

HERMENEUTICS AND THE PROBLEM OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION

Philosophical Underpinnings

1. The Ontological Significance of the Concept of "Play"
Hans-Georg Gadamer begins his comprehensive study of hermeneutics in
Truth and Method5 with the assertion that "[t]he hermeneutic phenomenon
5 H.-G.

GADAMER,

TRUTH AND METHOD (1975).

This English translation of
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is basically not a problem of method at all. ' 6 As Gadamer explains, "[tihe
hermeneutics developed here is not, therefore, a methodology of the human
sciences, but an attempt to understand what the human sciences truly are,
beyond their methodological self-consciousness, and what connects them
with the totality of our experience of world." 7 Although social scientists and
natural scientists attempt to formulate and apply methodological rules that
transform discrete raw data into theoretical pictures of our interaction with
the world, the hermeneutical inquiry goes behind these cognitive strategies
and explores the immediacy of this interaction. By distinguishing between
the methodological approach of the various so-called "human sciences"
(Geisteswissenschaften) and the hermeneutical inquiry into the existential
precondition of meaning, Gadamer rescues hermeneutics from its limited
role as a tool of textual exegesis and imbues the discipline with fundamental
philosophical importance. Thus, Gadamer's purpose
is not to develop a procedure of understanding, but to clarify the
conditions in which understanding takes place. But these conditions are
not of the nature of a 'procedure' or a method, which the interpreter
must of himself bring to bear on the text, but rather they must be given.8
Gadamer's thesis is that we are all inextricably situated in an historical and
linguistic reality that shapes our Welterfahrung, or "experience of the
world." 9 However, Gadamer does not embrace an historicist view: each
apparent historical epoch is simply a different manifestation of the continuing tradition that binds the individual to a cultural heritage. Tradition is
maintained by the constancy of language and the experience of belonging to
a preexisting culture; only against this backdrop of tradition does humankind
adopt a subjective attitude toward the world. This deep-seated traditional
existence is the ground of all methodology. Yet, paradoxically, the central
metaphor of methodology-the opposition of subject and object-is disproved by this existence. Meaning is not distilled from an object by a wholly
independent subject, but rather it is a relation between an historical being
and the continually manifested being of the artifact as it is experienced
through tradition.
Warheit und Methode (2d ed. 1960) contains a second supplement not found in the
original text, a translation of Gadamer's essay, To What Extent Does Language
Preform Thought?

Id. at xi.
xiii. See also id.at 433.
' Id.at 263. See also Phelps & Pitts, supra note 4, at 353-55, 378.
9 Gadamer follows Heidegger's rejection of the superficial relationship between
the individual and the world of objects that is "present-at-hand." Scientific thought
reduces the world to its most crude manifestation, a collection of objects. Gadamer's
ontology looks to the deeper experience of the world as a disclosure of Being through
the awareness of the meaning of various beings. J. BLEICHER, CONTEMPORARY
HERMENEUTICS 119 (1980).
6

7 Id. at
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[T]he purpose of my investigation is not to offer a general theory of
interpretation and a differential account of its methods .

.

. but to

discover what is common to all modes of understanding and to show
that understanding is never subjective behaviour toward a given 'object,' but towards its effective history-the history of its influence; in
other words, understanding belongs to the being of that which is understood. 10
The truth of tradition is never purely relativistic because tradition is the
shared ground of all objective experience. Nor is twe truth of tradition
merely a subjective attitude toward a long-dead culture, because tradition
grips the individual despite his subjectivity. Gadamer analyzes this thesis
from the perspective of the "human sciences" in order to demonstrate that
their methodological self-consciousness obscures the way in which human
beings actually come to understand the truths that speak through artifacts of
the past.
Dividing his analysis between the study of art, history, and linguistics,
Gadamer seeks to uncover the aesthetic, historical, and communicative
modalities of being that make these academic fields possible." Gadamer's
purpose is to show that these modalities are part of our relation to the world,
12
a relation that subtends all methodology.
The understanding and the interpretation of texts is not merely a concern of science, but is obviously part of the total human experience of
the world.
10 H.-G. GADAMER, supra
"

note 5, at xix.
Truth and Method is divided into three parts: The Question of Truth as it

Emerges in the Experience of Art, The Extension of the Question of Truth to
Understanding in the Human Sciences, and The Ontological Shift of Hermeneutics
Guided by Language.
12 A student of Heidegger, Gadamer readily challenges the fundamental Cartesian
assumption, the subject/object dichotomy. For Gadamer, the hermeneutical experi-

ence is the constitutive reality in human existence, a claim developed at length in his

discussion of language. See H.-G. GADAMER, supra note 5, at 345-447. As hermeneutical beings we always belong to and are involved in a tradition, thereby
precluding the ideal of objective scientific knowledge. Meaning is only possible

because there is an ontological openness to the world that brings the prejudiced
horizons of individuals together in a playful loss of subjectivity. Knowledge, therefore, is seated in a precognitive dimension of experience. Maurice Merleau-Ponty
offers a paradigmatic assault on Cartesian intellectualism by emphasizing the

phenomenological and hermeneutical world that is lived-through:
To return to the things themselves is to return to that world which precedes
knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which every

scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the countryside in which we have learnt beforehand what a
forest, a prairie or a river is.
M. MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION, supra

phasis in original). Cf. infra note 184.
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• . .If we make understanding the object of our reflection, the aim is
not an art or technique of understanding, as traditional literary and
theological hermeneutics sought to be. Such an art or technique would
fail to recognise that, in view of the truth that speaks to us out of
tradition, the formalism of artistic ability would arrogate to itself a false

superiority

13

Gadamer begins his inquiry with a discussion of aesthetics, for "the
experience of art issues the most pressing challenge to the scientific consciousness to acknowledge its own limits." 14 Artistic truth is neither capable
of being posited nor is it cumulative, rather it is part of a pervasive presence
in the world that underlies all science, including the "science of artistic
meaning."' 1 Thus, Gadamer's aesthetics deals with the artistic truth that is
independent of rationalist methodologies, thereby establishing the tension
that the title, Truth and Method, implies.
To understand Gadamer's aesthetic theory, it is essential to appreciate his
break from the rationalist theory of art found in Kant's Critique of Judgement. 1 6 Kant justified aesthetic judgment at the expense of delegitimizing
philosophy of art. 17 That is, Gadamer contends that Kant rendered artistic
truth impossible by viewing aesthetics as a wholly subjective enterprise."
According to Kant, the artist uses "genius" to communicate his aesthetic
insight; 19 the interpreter, in turn, uses his own "genius" to decode the work
of art and revive the aesthetic response. 0 Kant's "genius" theory denies
that such responses are knowledge; instead, the critic's interpretive genius is
the result of an a priori feeling of pleasure that is independent of scientific
truth . 2 Kant differentiates the results of this subjective application of
"genius" from the knowledge of the work of art that is the product of a
methodology modeled on the natural sciences. In contrast to subjectivism,
the scientific methodology attempts to remove the impact of the investigator
by ignoring the subjective qualities of "genius." 22 The purpose of methodology is to deliver up objective data about a work of art rather than engendering an empathetic response.
13 H.-G. GADAMER, supra note

5, at xi-xiii.
1'Id. at xiii.
15Gadamer uses the term "aesthetic differentiation" to refer to the "process of
abstraction" by which an individual displaces a work of art from its original contexts
and functions in an attempt to secure objective knowledge about the work of art.
Id. at 76.
16

I.KANT,

CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT

(N. Smith trans. 1965).

17 Id.

at 51.
"8See id. at 39-72.
19Id. at 49.
20 "Genius in understanding corresponds to genius in creation."
Id. at 52.
21 Id. at 40.
12 "The scientific nature of modem science consists precisely in the fact that it
makes tradition objective and methodically eliminates any influence of the interpreter
on understanding." H.-G. GADAMER, supra note 5, at 297.
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This bifurcation of the subjective aspects of aesthetics and the bbjective
qualities of the artwork directly contradicts our experience of art. Consequently, Gadamer critiques Kant by examining the way in which we are
aesthetic beings. Going beyond and behind the positivist methodologies of
determining objective truth-content in art, Gadamer demonstrates that the
experience of art is philosophically important because it asserts the truth of
itself "against all reasoning." 2 3 Gadamer focuses on this problem of aesthetics because he sees Kant's contention that aesthetic appreciation is merely
subjective as symptomatic of the ascendance of the scientific method as the
paradigm of all knowledge. 24 Gadamer insists on the importance of the truth
that is beyond scientific methodology, the truth of a tradition that is meaningful to its participants.
The radical subjectivisation involved in Kant's new basis for aesthetics
was a completely new departure. In discrediting any kind of theoretical
knowledge apart from that of natural science, it compelled the human
sciences to rely on the methodology of the natural sciences in selfanalysis....
If we want to show the inadequacies of this kind of self-interpretation
on the part of the human sciences and open up more appropriate5
possibilities, we shall have to proceed with the problem of aesthetics.1
Gadamer uses the concept of Spiel, or "play," to express the mode-ofbeing of the work of art, and he investigates this ontological dimension of all
aesthetic experience as a manifestation of the mode of being-in-the-world
that he explores with his general hermeneutical theory.26 The proposition
that an individual is "at play" with a work of art is not as innocuous as it
may appear, for it takes issue with the Western philosophical tradition and
its central belief in the subject/object dichotomy.2 7 Gadamer contends that a
work of art is not something that a viewer makes sense of by organizing his
subjective feelings or by ingeniously decoding the meaning created by the
artist. Nor does the work of art stand as a distinct object that admits of
empirical verification and logical consistency. 28 To be at play with a work of
Id. at xiii.
"The shift of the ontological definition of the aesthetic to the sphere of aesthetic
appearance has its theoretical basis in the fact that the domination of the scientific
epistemological model leads to the discrediting of all the possibilities of knowing that
lie outside this new method." Id. at 75.
25 Id. at 39. Gadamer's project does not "ask the experience of art to tell us how it
thinks of itself, but what it is in truth and what its truth is, even if it does not know
what it is and cannot say what it knows-just so Heidegger has asked what
metaphysics is, in contrast to what it thinks itself to be." Id. at 89.
23
24

26 See id. at 91-119.
27

See supra note 12.

Gadamer thus rejects the intellectualist-empiricist debate. Each "side" is really
propounding a misconceived inquiry that is ultimately reducible to the univocal view
of an explicit "world-in-itself." See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
28
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art is to relinquish the pretense of subjectivity and to follow the possibilities

offered by the work, without losing one's individuality or perspective (an
impossibility!) or wholly subordinating the meaning of the artifact to one's
creative powers. The work of art has an autonomous existence apart from
the viewer's subjective aims, and like two dancers who are given over to the
dance, 2 9 the artwork and the individual each make claims of meaning upon
the other.
Gadamer's point is conveyed more readily through an example. The game
of "patty cake" takes both players beyond their individual intentions;
neither person is able to assert herself as the "player" and make the other a
mere "playee." There is a degree to which each player is outside herself in
the communion of playing with another, and the coordination of their clapping is akin to a dance. It is neither trite nor imprecise to say that our ability
to play patty cake is the sine qua non of our ability to appreciate and
understand art, for it is this mode of being-our givenness to play-that
characterizes the aesthetic experience. 30 It is important to recognize, however, that "the mode of being of play is not such that there must be a subject
who takes up a playing attitude in order that the game may be played." 31 An
individual neither induces nor creates play, rather it occurs "not only without goal or purpose but also without effort. It happens, as it were, by
itself. ' 32 In short, human beings are ontologically playful.
29 See P. RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 186 (J. Thompson
trans. & ed. 1981) ("Play is thereby close to dance, which is a movement that carries
away the dancer.").
30 I am indebted to Professor William H. Poteat of Duke University's Department
of Religion for this example.
31 H.-G. GADAMER, supra note 5, at 93. Before the viewer is conscious of the
possibilities of the artwork he has already engaged in play. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty
shows that perception itself is an antepredicative play with the world of meaning and
therefore that the hermeneutical inquiry is radically ontological.
[A] sensible datum which is on the point of being felt sets a kind of muddled
problem for my body to solve. I must find the attitude which will provide it with
the means of becoming determinate, of showing up as blue; I must find the reply
to a question which is obscurely expressed. And yet I do so only when I am
invited by it, my attitude is never sufficient to make me really see blue or really
touch a hard surface.
M. MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION, supra note 1, at 214 (emphasis in original). Merleau-Ponty contends that to hallucinate is to get a grip on the
world in a new way, to playfully take up the possibilities of pre-cognitive reality. He
concludes that "hallucination and perception are modalities of one single primordial
function," id. at 342, and therefore that "to have hallucinations and more generally
to imagine, is to exploit this tolerance on the part of the antepredicative world, and
our bewildering proximity to the whole of being in syncretic experience." Id. at 343.
32 H.-G. GADAMER, supra note 5, at 94. Gadamer also succinctly states that
"[p]lay is more than the consciousness of the player; and so it is more than a
subjective attitude .... This is what may be described as an experience of the
subject and has nothing to do with 'mythology' or 'mystification'." Id. at xxiv
(footnote omitted).
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Yet this playfulness is not unsituated. It takes place within the parameters
of a structure that the participants establish; there are "rules" to the game
that constitute a setting or context for play. 33 Art is play that has been
transformed into a particular structure-a painting, sculpture, or sym34
phony-that engages the spectator with each viewing or presentation.
Because of the nature of play, the artist can never concretize a single given
meaning, nor can the spectator freely ascribe any meaning to the artifact.
The play is beyond both the creator and the interpreter; through its structured presentation "what is emerges."13 5 Though works of art lack any
timeless, objective meaning, play does culminate in an answer to its implicitly posed question: one recognizes and appreciates the dramatic contrasts of a painting, or the subtle nuances of a symphony.
[O]ne fails to appreciate the compelling quality of the work of art if one
regards the variations possible in the representation as free and optional. In fact, they are all subject to the supreme criterion of the 'right'
representation.
...Thus we do not allow the interpretation of a piece of music or a
drama the freedom to take the fixed 'text' as a basis for a lot of ad-lib
effects, and yet we would regard the cannonisation of a particular
interpretation
... as a failure to understand the actual task of interpre36
tation.
The to-and-fro that characterizes play reveals our ontological openness to
the world. Just as Gadamer uses this concept in his investigations of the
hermeneutical dimension of art and the human sciences, this Article analyzes the way in which we interpret legal texts by reference to the play
between the interpreter and the text.
2.

What is a Text?

If a reader and a text are at play during reading, the recovery of the
author's intended meaning can never be the goal of the hermeneutical act.
"Not occasionally only, but always, the meaning of a text goes beyond its
author. ' 37 The interpretive interaction occurs between the reader and the
text rather than between the reader and the author. Consequently, "understanding is not merely a reproductive, but always a productive attitude as
well. ' 3 The words on the page invite the attention of the reader, and as
' In the Third Part of Truth and Method, Gadamer argues that all human experience is ontologically structured through language (both verbal and potentially verbal). Language is not a tool for consciousness to exploit but is a lived-through reality
that structures our playful existence. Id. at 404.
See id. at 99.
35Id. at 101.
36 Id. at 106-07.
37Id. at 264.
31 Id. See also id. at 356.

HeinOnline -- 68 B.U. L. Rev. 533 1988

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68: 523

meaning begins to coalesce in response to this invitation, interpretation
occurs. 3 9

Gadamer finds the dialectic of question and answer to be an implicit
structure of all human experience. 40 As a result, he views textual interpretation as a dialogue (Gesprdch) wherein the text "speaks.' ' 4 1 This dialogue
does not begin when the reader formulates explicit questions to ask of the
text; on the contrary, the text engages the reader's horizon before the reader
is able to question consciously. The interpreter comes to the text with his
own horizon, or "forestructure of meaning, ' 42 which is a "meaning and a
possibility that one brings into play and puts at risk" 43 before the horizon of
meaning that is the text. Reading involves the fusion of these indeterminate
horizons (Horizontverschmelzung) and approaches "the full realisation of
conversation, in which something is expressed that is not only mine or my
author's, but common. ' 44 That common something is the meaning of the
text.
31 Jacques

Derrida has also recognized the text as a source of meaning independent

of its author.
One of the most important ideas that Derrida's work demonstrates is that if(as
everyone thinks) we mean more than we say, we also say more than we mean.
Our words seem to perform tricks that we had not intended, establish connections that we had not considered, lead to conclusions that were not present to
our minds when we spoke or wrote .... This curious habit of our words to burst

the seams of our intentions and to produce their own kind of logic is what
Derrida labels the free "play" of text.
Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96

YALE

L.J. 743, 777 (1987)

(footnote omitted).
40 H.-G. GADAMER, supra note 5, at 325. See Phelps & Pitts, supra note 4, at
365-68.
"' H.-G. GADAMER, supra note 5, at 340 (noting that " 'making the text speak ,' is
not an arbitrary procedure that we undertake on our own initiative but that, as a
question, it is related to the answer that is expected in the text").
42 Here Gadamer invokes Heidegger's notion of a "forestructure" of understanding that is always engaged in the interpretive act. Because we are finite and temporal
beings, it is futile to attempt a truly "objective" inquiry; the Enlightenment's glorification of such a goal projects an envy of god-like qualities. It is imperative to see
that "interpretation begins with fore-conceptions that are replaced by more suitable
ones" as the reader encounters the text in play. Id. at 236. This forestructure that
each interpreter brings to the text is not chosen arbitrarily by the interpreter. Rather,
it is given by his historical situation; it is a non-optional dimension of his being.
' Id. at 350. The interpreter's horizon is put at risk because the meaning of the text
may cause him to reassess his traditional beliefs. A reader is thus always at risk in
reading because he cannot insulate his prejudiced "forestructure of meaning" from
the power of the text. The "questioning interpreter allows his own opinions to be
undercut by the questions the text poses. The dialectic [play] confuses the interpreter's opinions and presuppositions and thereby clarifies meaning, 'for it opens one's
eyes to the thing.' " Phelps & Pitts, supra note 4, at 381 (quoting H.-G. GADAMER,
supra note 5, at 422) (footnotes omitted).
" H.-G. GADAMER, supra note 5, at 350.
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The central task of the interpreter is to find the question to which a
text presents the answer; to understand a text is to understand the
question. At the same time, a text only becomes an object of interpretation by presenting the interpreter with a question. In this logic of
question and answer a text is drawn into an event by being actualized in
understanding which itself represents an historic possibility. The horizon of meaning is consequently unlimited, and the openness of both text
and interpreter constitutes a structural element in the fusion of horizons 45
Gadamer chose the term "horizon" carefully. The image of a horizon
implies the limited perspective of the reader. No one can arrive at a detached, timeless vantage point from which to view the world: there is always
something beyond one's horizon, including the past and the future. At the
same time, a horizon is not a fixed boundary but rather is open to expansion
and contraction in response to the positioning of the individual. The forestructure of meaning that an individual embodies is ontologically open to the
world of meaning that he encounters and thus does not form a determinate,
concretized subjectivity so much as an habitual nexus of past interpretations.
The nature of the individual's forestructure or horizon of meaning is best
captured by Gadamer's use of the terms "pre-judgments" or "prejudices"
(Vorteilsstruktur).4 6 The interpreter is always situated and therefore always
has a personal history (biases, experiences, expectations) that is distinct
from the traditional questions posed by the text. Through the dialogical
relationship of play, the horizons of both are fused in understanding.
The interpreter is, therefore, first aware of a distance between the text
and his own horizon which leads, in the process of understanding, to a
new, comprehensive horizon transcending the initial question and prejudices. The experience he makes in the course that leads to a new
understanding is a hermeneutic one . . .4
The reader's prejudices shape what Gadamer calls the effective-history
(Wirkungsgeschichte) of the text. 4' No text has an essential meaning; inBLEICHER, supra note 9, at 114.
Prejudices compose the reader's horizon or forestructure of meaning and define
that reader's openness to interpretation and appropriation (as prejudices are borne
out or not). Prejudices make the attempt to bridge time and seize the author's
meaning, or the meaning of the "text itself," an impossible task. Gadamer's philosophy is a revolt against the Enlightenment and its fundamental prejudice, "the prejudice against prejudice itself, which deprives tradition of its power." H.-G.
GADAMER, supra note 5, at 240. See generally id. at 235-74.
41 J. BLEICHER, supra note 9, at 112-13.
48 See generally H.-G. GADAMER, supra note 5, at 258-74. Because there is no
univocal, objective meaning disclosed by the text, the interpreter has no choice but to
"let[] the text become present." Phelps & Pitts, supra note 4, at 364 (emphasis
omitted). Gadamer terms this phenomenon "effective-history." The text's meaning
45

J.

46
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stead, the text is appropriated continually by historically situated readers.
As a result, the meaning of the text can never be determined by its placement
in a supposedly closed and objective culture in the past; the text is always
involved in a dialogue with a prejudiced reader. The text's tradition is not
limited or absolute, but effective-historical. "Just as the individual is never
simply an individual, because he is always involved with others, so too the
closed horizon that is supposed to enclose a culture [in the past] is an
abstraction." 4 9
Thus,
if we are trying to understand a historical phenomenon from the historical distance that is characteristic of our hermeneutical situation, we are
always subject to the effects of effective-history. It determines in advance both what seems to us worth enquiring about and what will
appear as an object of investigation .... 50
It is important to remember that neither the interpreter's prejudices nor the
effective-history of the text are incorrigible: interpretation is neither a clash
of these forestructures nor a mere amalgamation of them. Instead, the
give-and-take of play resides at the heart of the hermeneutical experience, so
that interpretation is literally a "hermeneutical circle."
The process of interpretation itself has a hypothetical and circular
character. From the perspectives available to him, the interpreter
makes a preliminary projection [Vorentwurf] of the sense of the text as a
whole. With further penetration into the details of his material, the
preliminary projection is revised, alternative proposals are considered,
and new projections are tested."
As the text becomes present, the reader also undergoes a transformation: his
initial prejudices are revised in light of the pull of the text.
It is only by virtue of this limited horizon that an individual can make
sense of history. The constitutive feature of humankind's historical nature is
that the past is understood only in terms of the play begun with one's
prejudiced horizon. The individual is enmeshed in the undulating flux of a
hermeneutical horizon that is constantly exposed to the effects of tradition
and that constantly adapts to, and appropriates meaning from, the past.
In our continually manifested attitude to the past, the main feature is
not, at any rate, a distancing and freeing of ourselves from what has
been transmitted. Rather, we stand always within tradition, and this is
no objectifying process, ie [sic] we do not conceive of what tradition
says as something other, something alien. It is always part of us, a
is nothing more than the tradition of meaning it held for previous interpreters in play
with a modem reader.
49 H.-G. GADAMER, supra note 5, at 271.
0 Id. at 267-68.
51 T. MCCARTHY, THE CRITICAL THEORY OF JORGEN HABERMAS 172 (1978).
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model or exemplar, a recognition of ourselves which our later historical
judgment would hardly see as a kind of knowledge, but as the simplest
52
preservation of tradition.
In other words, "[t]o stand within a tradition does not limit the freedom of
knowledge but makes it possible. ' 53 Without this indeterminate openness,
the individual-even a "genius" -could never bridge the gulf of historical
distance.
The confrontation between one's traditional horizon and the hermeneutical demands of the present constantly forges a new tradition. A written text
from the past is made new again by speaking to a modem interpreter's
horizon, which has evolved from the same tradition as the text; the reader's
traditional horizon thereby "anticipates meaning" in the text.
The anticipation of meaning that governs our understanding of a text is
not an act of subjectivity, but proceeds from the communality that binds
us to the tradition. But this is contained in our relation to tradition, in
the processs [sic] of education. Tradition is not simply a precondition
into which we come, but we produce it ourselves, inasmuch as we
understand, participate in the evolution of tradition and hence further
determine it ourselves.54
Although there is a temporal gap between the reader's horizon and the
creation of the text, this does not preclude understanding. Historical distance is bridged by the experience of tradition in the interpretive act. Meaning is established in the playful encounter of a present horizon and the
effective-history of the text. The notion of a "temporal gap" that is
"bridged" by a "playful encounter" reaffirms the substantive circular structure of appropriation. As a result, the reader's
interpretation is itself a reappropriation, a further development of the
very tradition to which both he and his object belong. In Gadamer's
view, this substantive circle has a positive significance, for it ensures
that there is some common ground between the interpreter's horizon of
expectations and the material that he is studying, that his points of
reference for understanding the tradition have a basis in that tradition
itself.15
A text, then, must be regarded as a potential meaning offered to any of a
number of anonymous future readers who bring to the conversation their
own prejudiced horizons. At a precognitive level, there is a playful reading
wherein the reader and the text address each other. A preliminary level of
meaning is established in the form of further, explicit questions that the
reader asks of the text. Interpretation has occurred on an ontological plane
H.-G. GADAMER, supra note 5, at 250.
Id. at 324.
,4 Id. at 261.
55T. MCCARTHY, supra note 51, at 175.

52

53
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before the reader is sure of what the text means; even when a reader is
entirely confused after reading a text, the reality of his interpretation is
revealed in the fact that he is confused about something. That inanimate
words on a page can spring to life and puzzle a reader is possible only
because the horizons of both have met in play and drawn upon a common
tradition. In the "deciphering and interpretation [of a text] a miracle takes
place: the transformation of something strange and dead into a total simul'56
taneity and familiarity.
As hermeneutical beings, we are always interpreting, even in so-called
pure perception. 57 The sophisticated cognitive processes involved in making
the text fully coherent are premised on a long interpretive relation with the
text that has determined the possibilities open to this process of rationalization. Meaning "charms" us in a pre-rational way, whether it is the meaning
of a text or a work of art. By the time that reader brings rational analysis to
bear on the text, the important work has already been playfully accomplished.
When we understand a text, what is meaningful in it charms us just as
the beautiful charms us. It has asserted itself and charmed us before we
can come to ourselves and be in a position to test the claim to meaning
that it makes. What we encounter in the experience of the beautiful and
in understanding the meaning of tradition has effectively something
about it of the truth of play. In understanding we are drawn into an
event of truth and arrive, as it were, too late, if we want to know what
we ought to believe.-"
Paul Ricoeur develops this notion of the text as potential meaning in some
detail. Like Gadamer, Ricoeur regards the text as an artifact that is distinct
from the subjective intentions of its author. Recognizing the distanciatien of
the text from the author is not a methodological move to aid interpretation,
"and hence something superfluous and parasitical; rather it is constitutive of
the phenomenon of the text as writing. ' 59 The author's discourse has been
"fixed" by his act of writing his words down; 60 as such, the matter of the
text 61 supersedes the author's intention.
Bringing a text to language is always something other than hearing
someone and listening to his speech. Reading resembles instead the
performance of a musical piece regulated by the written notations of the
H.-G. GADAMER, supra note 5, at 145.
See supra note 31. "Pure seeing and pure hearing are dogmatic abstractions
which artificially reduce phenomena. Perception always includes meaning." H.-G.
GADAMER, supra note 5, at 82. The "idea of pure perception as a response to a
stimulus" is an "epistemological dogmatism." Id. at 81 (footnote omitted).
56

57

Id. at 446.
59 P. RiCOEUR, supra note 29, at 139.
60 Id.
61 Id.

at 145.
at 111.
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score. For the text is an autonomous space of meaning which is no
longer animated by the intention of its author; the autonomy of the text,
deprived of this essential 6support,
hands writing over to the sole in2
terpretation of the reader.
Although the reader, and not the author, is wholly responsible for the
interpretation, Ricoeur joins with Gadamer and rejects the notion that the
reader discovers meaning by applying his subjective virtuosities to a passive
text (Kant's "genius" theory). Instead, Ricoeur sees the text as the forum
for the presentation of "proposed worlds" that are offered for the reader's
appropriation and that actively guide the reader's formulation of meaning.
"Interpretation thus becomes the apprehension of the proposed worlds
which are opened up by the non-ostensive references of the text."' 63 The
reader's subjective aims are as unrealizable as the author's aims, for there is
a playing during which the reader tests the "worlds" proposed by the text
before formulating a self-understanding that renders the meaning of the text
cognizable .64
To understand oneself in front of a text is quite the contrary of projecting oneself and one's own beliefs and prejudices; it is to let the work and
its world enlarge the horizon of the understanding which I have of
myself ....

[This places the act of understanding on] an ontological

plane .65
The ontological dimension of interpretation is the play that makes possible
the eventual appropriation of the text by the reader. To assume that the
reader alone creates meaning is to abstract from the ontological reality of the
individual's finite, situated and temporal existence characterized by the term
"belonging.' 66 No reader can exercise complete control over the meaning of
a text because the act of reading entails a fusion of horizons. The play that
produces such a fusion involves equal partners, each unable to render the
other subservient, but this play is finally resolved in an articulation from the
reader's perspective as proffered meanings of the text are "appropriated."
The key is to remember that "[a]ppropriation loses its arbitrariness insofar
67
as it is the recovery of that which is at work, in labour, within the text. '
Id. at 174.
6IId. at 177.
64 Id. at 142-44.
65 Id. at 178.
66 [Our] ontological condition can be expressed as finitude. This is not, however,
the concept that I shall regard as primary; for it designates, in negative terms, an
entirely positive condition which would be better expressed by the concept of
belonging. The latter directly designates the unsurpassable condition of any
enterprise of justification and foundation, namely that it is always preceded by a
relation which supports it.
Id. at 105.
67 Id. at 164.
62
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The Exemplary Status of Legal Hermeneutics

Legal interpretation is the clearest manifestation of the hermeneutical
reality that allows texts to speak to the present in a meaningful way.6
Because it is necessary for judges to decide specific cases, there is little
threat that legal adjudication will degenerate into a methodology detached
from the practical goal of reaching a decision. Whereas literary and theological hermeneutics have often adopted the posture of methodologies in their
search for the original, objective meaning of given texts, a judge must
understand the text only in relation to the case at hand. As Justice Brennan
recently noted,
constitutional interpretation for a federal judge is, for the most part,
obligatory. When litigants approach the bar of court to adjudicate a
constitutional dispute, they may justifiably demand an answer. Judges
cannot avoid a definitive interpretation because they feel unable to, or
would prefer not to, penetrate to the full meaning of the Constitution's
provisions. Unlike literary critics, judges cannot merely savor the tensions or revel in the ambiguities inherent in the text-judges must
resolve them. 69
This is precisely the point that Gadamer takes to be fundamental:
The interpreter dealing with a traditional text seeks to apply it to
himself. But this does not mean that the text is given for him as
something universal, that he understands it as such and only afterwards
uses it for particular applications. Rather, the interpreter seeks no more
than to understand this universal thing, the text; ie [sic] to understand
what this piece of tradition says, what constitutes the meaning and
importance of the text. In order to understand that, he must not seek to
disregard himself and his particular hermeneutical situation. He must
relate the text to this situation, if he wants to understand at all. 0
Clearly, the institutional practice of legal hermeneutics conforms to the
operative hermeneutical reality that makes all texts meaningful.71 In con6 See H.-G. GADAMER, supra note 5, at 289-305. Gadamer's point is that, because
of the pragmatic interest of law, "[l]egal hermeneutics is able to point out what the
real procedure of the human sciences is." Id. at 292. Gadamer realizes that the model
of legal hermeneutics is useful to his general theory because "[w]hen ajudge regards
himself as entitled to supplement the original meaning of the text of a law, he is doing
exactly what takes place in all other understanding." Id. at 305. Cf. Dworkin, Law as
Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527, 529 (1982) ("[L]awyers must not treat legal
interpretation as an activity sui generis. We must study interpretation as a general
activity, as a mode of knowledge, by attending to other contexts of that activity.").
69 Address by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., "The Constitution of the United
States: Contemporary Ratification," Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown
University (Oct. 12, 1985), at 2, reprinted in 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433 (1986).
70 H.-G. GADAMER, supra note 5, at 289.
71 The critical word in this sentence is "practice."
Judges often explain their
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trast, the legal historian (or philosopher) who is discharged from the practical constraints of judicial decisionmaking often follows the path of some
literary critics by attempting to explicate the meaning of "the law" outside
72
of any practical context.
Because the law is composed of written texts, it is possible for Gadamer to
extend his general philosophical discussion of interpretation to reach some
important conclusions about the legal system. To believe that a law's "legal
meaning is clear and that the legal practice of the present simply follows the
original meaning ' 7 3 is to subscribe to a "legally untenable fiction. '

74

The

normative content of a statute or constitution is revealed only when the
horizon of a situated interpreter confronts the effective-history of the legal
text. Thus, an "originalist" methodology is inappropriate: the text as written
in the past no longer exists but rather is part of a legal tradition that is linked
to the present. 75 Similarly, there is no unbiased observer who can say whal
the author's original intent was, for interpretation is always informed by the
limited horizon of the interpreter. Yet neither is the law whatever a judge
wishes it to be:
decisionmaking in the language of legal or political theorists, removed from the
reality of adjudication. An examination of what judges actually do, apart from their
theoretical self-understanding, underscores the need for a model of inquiry that
incorporates the ontological basis of legal hermeneutics. See infra notes 82-137 and
accompanying text.
72 Gadamer asserts that the movement away from commissioned art only superficially liberated artists. In fact, this historical development uprooted both artists
and their artifacts from their dogmatic context. "Thus, through 'aesthetic differentiation' the work loses its place and the world to which it belongs insofar as it belongs to
aesthetic consciousness ....
[T]his is paralleled by the artist also losing his place in
the world." H.-G. GADAMER, supra note 5, at 78. Legal hermeneutics avoids the
mistaken attempt by literary and theological hermeneutics to disavow their dogmatic
purposes and to follow the historical method. Id. at 290. Gadamer argues against the
historicist approach to law because it ignores practical application, which makes the
text meaningful. This is not a critique of legal historians per se, however. Quite the
contrary, Gadamer urges a reexamination of the historical method and a reformulation of the historian's task according to hermeneutical principles. Id. at 302-04.
71 H.-G. GADAMER, supra note 5, at 291.
74 Id.
15

TICE

Id. See H.

FINK

&

M. TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRAC-

vii (1984):

The words of article III, providing for the jurisdiction of the federal courts, are
opaque-the meaning that has been given to them by the courts and by Congress
is not the only possible one. Understanding of the implications of article III and
the jurisdictional statutes Congress has enacted will not, in our opinion, be found
through a search in history for a "true meaning." Rather, the search is for the
choices that were open to the drafters of the Constitution and the Judiciary Act
of 1789 and for the changes in the interpretations given to the written language.
Our history could have been different, our future can be different, depending on
the interplay of the courts and Congress, the judicial and the political processes.
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The judge who adapts the transmitted law to the needs of the present is
undoubtedly seeking to perform a practical task, but his interpretation
of the law is by no means on that account an arbitrary re-interpretation.
Here again, to understand and to -interpret means to discover and
recognise a valid meaning. He seeks to discover the "legal idea" of a
law by linking it with the present. 6
The canons of legal interpretation that erect a methodology of discovering
the intent of Congress or of the framers require special attention. Although
the goal of discerning the framers' intent is unattainable, this methodology of
interpretive inquiry has dominated American jurisprudence for two centuries. Indeed, advocates of this method voice one prevalent criticism of the
hermeneutical ontology outlined in this Article. Put simply, they contend
that legal interpretation is not a playful encounter but rather an attempt to
understand what the author of a given legal text intended. There are two
responses to this criticism. First, the "feeling" that we recover the author's
intended meaning points to an essential feature of what actually happens in
interpretation (and thus is a harmless misunderstanding most of the time).
Second, an examination of problematic issues in legal interpretation quickly
reveals the limitations of the originalist project. In practice, legal interpretation is not confined to the elusive intent of a particular document's author
because this pure intent can never be recovered; instead, judges seek to
articulate what the document means.
Judges resolve many legal problems by looking to the legislative history or
to past decisions construing the same textual passage. As a result of this
methodology of legal decisionmaking, it appears that a judge is able to
recover successfully the author's intended meaning. This misconception of
the act of interpretation occurs as a result of the "fusion of horizons," the
constitutive feature of all interpretation. The legal text forms a part of the
tradition that the judge embodies, and so the reliance on previous interpretations of the text is a recognition that the interpreter cannot stand outside of,
his limited, traditional horizon.7 7 An interpretive appropriation of a text
further develops the tradition that grips the interpreter. The continuity of the
legal system, as expressed by the desire to recover the original meaning of
legal texts, is possible only because the interpreter stands within the same
tradition as the text.
Applying Gadamer's hermeneutical approach, conventional methods of
legal decisionmaking are revealed to be appropriate attitudes toward the
text. Stare decisis is the formalized recognition that the tradition that the
interpreter brings to the text is of utmost importance. The Constitution is
never read anew but is always read within the context of its legal history.
Similarly, the non-binding status of judicial dictum is the institutionalized
attempt to retain the dogmatic quality of law, as well as the recognition that
76

H.-G.

77

T.

supra note 5, at 292-93.
supra note 51, at 179.

GADAMER,

MCCARTHY,
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the decision made about the case at hand is more important than the analysis
offered by a particular judge.
Common Law is founded on precedent. In deciding a case today the
Courts will follow the example of other courts which have decided
similar cases in the past, for in these actions they see embodied the rules
of the law. This procedure recognizes the principle of all traditionalism
that practical wisdom is more truly embodied in action than expressed
in rules of action. Accordingly, the Common Law allows for the possibility that a judge may interpret his own action mistakenly. The judicial
maxim which sometimes goes by the name of the "doctrine of the
dictum" lays it down that a precedent is constituted by the decision of a
court, irrespective of its interpretation implied in any obiter dicta of the
judge who made the decision. The judge's action is considered more
authentic than what he said he was doing.78
Stare decisis, then, countenances the judgments of the past as traditional
activities but accords little weight to the theoretical orjustificatory passages
of an opinion. Though judges often find that a precedent is a suitable
articulation of the answer to the case at hand,7 9 the meaning of a legal text is
never bounded completely by previous interpretations, even when the previous interpretation is that of the text's author.8 0 A developing tradition at
play with the text can inspire new "worlds" of meaning. Legal change
occurs when the tradition brought before the text is no longer similar to the
tradition at the time of the precedent, when the fusion of horizons opens up
new "worlds" proposed by the text. The embeddedness in tradition that
allows meaning to emerge, however, may convince legal scholars that they
can know the past unambiguously and that judges merely restate the meaning intended by the authors. Because the force of tradition is strong, this
mistaken view of legal interpretation is often harmless. When legal change
occurs, however, the text's meaning no longer coincides with past interpretations. "The essence of the practice of professional competence is conformity with a tradition of behavior. It is nevertheless inevitable that as the full
implications of that tradition are revealed, the members' own sense of what

" M. POLANYI,
PHY 54 (1958)
79 Gadamer

PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSO-

(footnote omitted).

recognizes that judges will properly rely on the legal tradition in many
situations, but he emphasizes that judges "cannot let [themselves] be tied by what,
say, an account of the parliamentary proceedings tells [them] about the intentions of
those who first worked out the law." H.-G. GADAMER, supra note 5, at 291.
s" "[T]he idea of a perfect legal dogmatics, which would make every judgment a
mere act of subsumption, is untenable." Id. at 294. See also Ockelton, How to be
Convinced, 2 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 65 (1980) (arguing that it is impossible to design a
computer such that a future legal proceeding might involve nothing more than
inputting the facts of a case and waiting for a computer-generated judgment).
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that tradition entails will change.""' When this occurs, the limited relevance
of the originalist theory of meaning becomes quite evident.
A recent Supreme Court case, Smith v. Wade,82 illustrates the breakdown
of originalist methodology that occurs when a Justice finds that she cannot
reconcile the meaning of a statute with any clear "original meaning." In
Wade, the Court held that punitive damages are recoverable against a state
employee in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.83 Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, noted that punitive damages were generally available as a tort remedy at the time of the statute's enactment and
concluded that such damages were therefore contemplated as a potential
remedy by Congress.84 In dissent, Justice Rehnquist engaged in an equal
display of "admirable skills in legal research and analysis of great numbers
of musty cases" 85 to reach the conclusion that punitive damages were not
widely allowed at common law in 1871.86 In response to these hopeless
attempts to decipher the feelings of the 42nd Congress toward punitive
damages, Justice O'Connor filed a stinging dissent in which she abruptly
asserted that "[o]nce it is established that the common law of 1871 provides
us with no real guidance on this question, we should turn to the policies
underlying § 1983 to determine which rule best accords with those policies. ' 87 Although Justice O'Connor continued to support the originalist
approach to interpreting § 1983, she recognized that such a methodology was
useless for interpreting the statute in the case at hand:
In interpreting § 1983, we have often looked to the common law as it
existed in 1871, in the belief that, when Congress was silent on a point, it
intended to adopt the principles of the common law with which it was
familiar .... But when a significant split in authority existed, it strains
credulity to argue that Congress simply assumed that one view rather
than the other would govern .... The battle of the string citations can
have no winner. 8
8 Abraham, Three Fallacies of Interpretation: A Comment on Precedent and

Judicial Decision, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 771, 783 (1981).
82 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
83 42 U.S.C. § 1983, derived from Section 1of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, reads in
relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
84 Wade, 461 U.S. at 34-38.
85 Id. at 92 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (referring specifically to Justices Brennan
and Rehnquist).
86 Id. at 78-84 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
87 Id. at 93 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 92-93 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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The importance of Justice O'Connor's opinion is easily underestimated.
Her actual decision-that the incremental deterrence value punitive damages might provide in these cases is outweighed by the chilling effect such
damages would have on public officials in the performance of their
duties 89-explicitly seeks the meaning of § 1983 for the present. Her decision in Wade thereby undercuts her own originalist methodology. The doctrine of stare decisis and the notion of dictum conjoin to emphasize the
importance of the tradition that subtends a present appropriation. Similarly,
Justice O'Connor's dissent recognizes that while preexisting tradition will
settle many legal issues, some issues invite an application of the text that has
not been contemplated in this tradition and therefore leads to a creative
development of the constantly growing tradition.
Though Smith v. Wade is a useful example of the inability of the originalist
methodology to produce satisfactory resolutions of difficult issues, the failure of the originalist methodology is even more evident in constitutional
interpretation. The texture of constitutional language is on the whole more
open than statutory language, and its interpretation is more prone to result in
new "worlds" of meaning proposed by the text. The words have remained
the same, but even a superficial survey of legal history reveals that the
meaning of various constitutional provisions has changed over time. The
originalist methodology is unable to provide a rational explanation for this
change, and its proponents are forced to argue against the interpretive reality
from their abstract-and untenable-conceptions of interpretation. 90 The
hermeneutical perspective developed in this Article justifies judicial restraint
by recognizing the force of tradition, but it also recognizes that meaning
emerges from a dynamic interaction that is beyond the control of the author's intentions. Constitutional adjudication is philosophically justified
rather than simply dismissed as "politics."
1
The momentous decision in Brown v. Board of Education"
provides an

'9 Id. at 93 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
9 The most frequently cited defense of originalism is R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
But see Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 569-71, 597-602 (1985) (arguing that
originalism is not the most appropriate approach to legal interpretation but recognizing in an appendix that "Originalism Is a Real Option") (emphasis in original). In
contrast, several commentators agree with Gadamer and reject originalism as a
methodology that is in principle unworkable. See, e.g., Richards, Interpretationand
Historiography, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 489, 512 (1985) (recognizing that history must be
taken seriously but contending that Berger "distorts the historian's task" because he
"asks the wrong questions in ways that disable the historian from assisting the legal
interpreter in understanding the meaning of his legal tradition"): Bennett, The Mission of Moral Reasoning in Constitutional Law, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 647, 648 (1985)
("Originalism is, if not exactly incoherent, an utterly impoverished way of thinking
about constitutional law.").
91 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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excellent example. Brown has been the focus of a great deal of legal philosophy, and this Article reaffirms that case's theoretical significance. Chief
Justice Warren's relatively short opinion is a triumph of honest judicial
craftsmanship. The hermeneutical basis of the decision is fully revealed in a
manner that validates the foregoing discussion. Brown exemplifies the true
nature of the hermeneutical act because the Court was faced with a situation
in which the originalist methodology probably would have led to a result in
dramatic conflict with the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. Brown is a
key to interpretive practice because, as Gadamer recognizes, " [i]n situations
the conditions of all
in which understanding is disrupted or made difficult,
' 92
clarity.
greatest
the
with
emerge
understanding
The plaintiffs in Brown invoked the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment9 3 in an effort to secure admission "to the public schools
of their community on a nonsegregated basis."4 The case was first argued in
the 1952 Term, but the Justices set the case for reargument and directed both
sides to address the question of what the framers had intended the fourteenth
amendment's impact to be on segregated schools. 95 Upon review of these
arguments, Chief Justice Warren concluded that although the proffered
the
historical sources do "cast some light, [they are] not enough to resolve
96
inconclusive."
are
they
best,
At
faced.
problem with which we are
In short, the Court determined the meaning of the text in regard to the
question presented, rather than trying to elucidate what the text in itself
meant by investigating its authors' intentions. The text, no longer an object
to be examined, became a source of meaning at play with the Justices as they
sought to make a practical judgment. It was this posture that allowed the
Court to tackle Plessy v. Ferguson97 directly and avoid the distinctions made
in the graduate school segregation cases.99 In Gadamer's terms, the fourteenth amendment is meaningless without a reader whose situated interests
playfully engage the amendment's language, bridging the expanse of time as
the fusion of horizons make the text meaningful to the present. Chief Justice
Warren recognized this interpretive reality:
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868
when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v.
Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of
H.-G. GADAMER, supra note 5, at 346. Gadamer makes this point as a preface to
his analysis of the translation of foreign languages.
92

9 "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
9 Brown, 347 U.S. at 487.

95Brown v. Board of Education, 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
96

Brown, 347 U.S. at 489.

163 U.S. 537 (1896). Plessy held that Louisiana could statutorily require segregated railway cars so long as the separate accommodations were "equal." Id. at
548-52.
97

98 See

Brown, 347 U.S. at 491-93.
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its full development and its present place in American life throughout
the Nation. 9a
The "beautiful" language of the amendment had "charmed" ' 0 the
Justices-clearly, segregated schools violated the guarantee of equal protection laws. The opinion does not speak of the essence of the Constitution but
only of the meaning that the Constitution had for the case the Court was
addressing. As Chief Justice Warren stated, the Plessy formulation no longer
comported with the amendment's meaning: "in the field of public education
the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal."'' 1 Yet the Plessy rule was not objectively
wrong. The text embodies different proposed worlds for different readers,
and it is clear that the horizon or forestructure of meaning that the Warren
Court put at risk in playfully reading the amendment was vastly different
from that of the Plessy Court sixty years earlier. 10 2 Chief Justice Warren's
prose succinctly expressed the hermeneutical situation: we simply cannot
turn the clock back-meaning, as the force of tradition speaking to a contemporary reader, is for the present.
Brown has been sharply criticized for initiating what has been termed an
activist jurisprudence of the fourteenth amendment.1 0 3 Interestingly, Chief
Justice Warren's opinion is labeled an "activist" opinion not because of its
method of decision but because of the outcome of the case. Critics may
argue that Warren looked beyond the constitutional text and used social
science to buttress the implementation of a public policy to his liking rather
than following the framers' intentions. Yet the Supreme Court had drawn
upon the prevailing social science in the years before Brown, albeit upon an
unenlightened and racist social science. Thus, the Warren Court did not
effect a radical break with tradition by drawing upon contemporary social
science but merely decided Brown in the context in which it was presented.
[T]he law of race relations during [the pre-Brown] period was a product
of the period's social science, just as the law of race relations developed
by the Warren Court during the Brown era was a product of the social
science of that period. More importantly, the dramatic revolution in the
law of race relations that culminated in the Brown decision was caused
by an equally dramatic revolution in American social science.
...In few areas of the law has the Court responded more quickly and

99 Id. at 492-93.
100 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
"I,Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
102 See Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 386 (1982) ("One no
longer would say, for example, that Dred Scott or Lochner v. New York, or any other
case, was 'wrongly' decided, for that use of language presupposes belief in the
knowability of constitutional essence.").
103

See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 90, at 166-92.
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decisively to a radical and controversial transformation in the social
sciences.104
Indeed, Brown was decided in the same way as Plessy. Plessy is ostensibly
irreconcilable with the Brown analysis because it held that Louisiana's
statutory requirement that railroads provide "separate but equal" traveling
accommodations did not violate the equal protection clause. 10 5 Moreover,
the Plessy Court reached this decision by analogizing the challenged statute
to the long recognized right of the states to maintain segregated public
schools." °" But Plessy was not premised on the framers' intent. Instead, the
court drew upon the legal tradition (precedent) 1 7 and upon its own view of
what constituted sound public policy. The only difference between Plessy
and Brown was that the Plessy Court's social policy required no deviation
from tradition. The reliance upon conceptions of social dynamics is evident
in the language of the Plessy majority opinion:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to
consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races
stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not
by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored
race chooses to put that construction upon it .... The argument also
assumes that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and that
equal rights cannot be secured to the negro except by an enforced
commingling of the two races. We cannot accept this proposition. If the
two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result
of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits and a
08
voluntary consent of individuals.
The Brown decision merely reflects a reformation of these wrong-headed
notions of equality and social reality. Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy was a
prescient intimation of the decision that was ultimately handed down in
Brown. Justice Harlan did not propose a different way of deciding the
dispute but rather concentrated on the fallacies inherent in the majority's
reasoning. According to Harlan, "The arbitrary separation of citizens, on
the basis of race, while they are on a public highway, is a badge of servitude
wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the law
established by the Constitution. It cannot be justified upon any legal
grounds."' 1 9 Thus, it is difficult to construe the Brown decision as a radical
departure in the manner of judicial decisionmaking, because the case was
decided in precisely the same manner as Plessy. The effective-history of the
10 Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985
624, 627, 672 (footnotes omitted).
105Plessy, 163 U.S. at 548-52.
106 See id. at 544-45.
107 See id. at 544-48.
108 Id. at 551.
109 Id. at 562.(Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Constitution is always informed by the conceptions of the day: the difference
between Plessy and Brown is merely a difference as to what equality means
in light of these conceptions. Chief Justice Warren could not help but
conclude that segregated school facilities were inherently unequal, given the
more enlightened perspective of his day.
The undaunted originalist, however, may still argue that regardless of
whether the Plessy Court also decided that case for the wrong reasons,
Brown is still starkly opposed to what the framers of the fourteenth amendment intended. In his critique of originalist jurisprudence, Mark Tushnet
articulates the problem that Brown admittedly poses for originalists:
As Michael Perry puts it, "segregated public schooling was present to
the minds of the Framers; they did not intend that the [equal protection]
clause prohibit it; and no historical evidence suggests that they meant to
leave open the question whether the clause should be deemed to prohibit the practice." If noninterpretivist [non-originalist] constitutional
interpretation must rest on an irterpretive warrant, then Brown v. Board
of Education seems unjustifiable.' 10
Thus, Brown presents a more difficult problem than Wade because the
intention of the framers is not a matter of pure speculation. An historical
inquiry suggests that the fourteenth amendment was written by men who did
not believe that their action required the desegregation of public schools."'
But there is a straightforward way out of this dilemma: regardless of what
the amendment's framers believed about the impact of their amendment on
segregated public schools, the equal protection clause means that states may
not brutally stigmatize their young citizens. The framers are held to their
words, not to their intentions. As Justice Holmes noted some time ago,
when we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the
Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called
into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen
completely by the most gifted of its begetters

....

The case before us

"0 Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L, REV. 781, 790 (1983) (quoting Perry, Interpretivism,
Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 261, 281 (1981)). See
Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MicH. L. REV. 165, 173 & n.44 (1985) (arguing

that the principle of Brown is one of the admirable values attributed to the Constitution that is "exceedingly difficult to trace convincingly to its text").
"I In a recent article, Raoul Berger characterizes the reaction to his argument in
Government by Judiciary, supra note 90, that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended neither to extend equal voting rights to blacks nor to end segregation:
"there is no 'tremendous controversy' as to my central thesis but rather an admission
of the historical facts I collated." Berger, Lawyering vs. Philosophizing: Facts or
Fancies, 9 U. DAYTON L. REV. 171, 178 (1984). Berger rails against the "philoso-

phers" who fail to take notice of this "fact" as they struggle to justify Brown's
ideologically desirable outcome. See infra note 115.
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and not merely
must be considered in the light of our whole experience
112
in that of what was said a hundred years ago.
When pressed on this point, the intellectually honest originalist will agree
that a modem reader would accept the Brown Court's interpretation of what
the Constitution means. But the originalist will argue further
that present meanings of constitutional terms are irrelevant, that the
established rule requires that those words be given the meaning they
had for those who used them. Because the meaning of words may
it does not follow that we may saddle the framers
change over the years,
1
with our meanings . 13
The appeal to "the established rule" is political in nature. Abandoning the
philosophical premise that a reader passively extracts from a text meanings
that are placed there by the author, the last line of defense for the originalist
is to argue that it is better to administer the fundamental law of the land
according to outmoded and no longer meaningful traditions than to risk
judicial tyranny. "Linkage of the present with the past is a sugar-coated
device for devolving upon the Court the task of keeping the Constitution in
"I
tune with changing times ....
Refuting the originalists' political theory is beyond the scope of this
Article, but there are obvious problems with an offhand dismissal of "meaning" as a "linkage of the present with the past."'" 5 Because such linkages
v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). Does one look to the intent of
those in Congress who wrote the amendment, those who voted on it in committee, or
those who adopted it, or does one look to the intent of the various state legislatures
112 Missouri

that ratified it? White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60
TEX. L. REV. 415, 418 (1982).
"I Berger, Mark Tushnet's Critique of Interpretivism, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV.

532, 544 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
114

Id. at 547-48 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted).

My hope is that this analysis will inspire an attack on the originalist political
argument against meaning. Berger incisively describes Tushnet's failure to confront
the real issue: "The fourteenth amendment's history dispels any indeterminacy about
the framers' meaning respecting their clear intent to exclude suffrage and segregation
from the amendment's coverage; and it is a grave flaw in Tushnet's philosophizing
that he never really comes to grips with this problem." Id. at 545 n. 114. To overcome
this "flaw," one must first develop a coherent theory of meaning and a philosophical
justification of critical inquiry into what constitutes meaning. This Article is a first
step toward this goal. But one must also show that the adjudicative goal should be to
elucidate and enforce what the law means, not what the authors of a particular legal
text intended the provision to mean. Although this second issue is really subsumed
by the first-because a coherent theory of meaning establishes that the author's
intention is unknowable in principle-the inveterate originalist will argue for the
political wisdom of ignoring meaning by rejecting the need for a general theory of
115

interpretation. See Berger, Lawyering vs. Philosophizing, supra note 111, at 173.

Thus, the battle against originalist theory must be waged on this second front as well.
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are constitutive of meaning, that is, ontological and therefore unavoidable, a
prudent political system would empower judges to enforce the Constitution' s meaning. Rather than requiring a plethora of amendments to deal with
the results of the framers' unavoidably limited foresight, it is sensible to
reserve the amendment process for those rare instances when the Constitution's meaning is no longer desirable. The Constitution has meaning only for
the contemporary reader, and so the political supremacy of meaning will
minimize the number of structural changes required to keep the Constitution
current.
To advocate a political system that respects the framers' intent, even
while admitting that the Constitution's meaning is at odds with this intent, is
to succumb to the grossest form of conservatism: a blind adherence to a
tradition that is no longer meaningful. More importantly, determining the
framers' intent is itself a hermeneutical activity. Twentieth-century judges
are in principle unable to determine what a text meant to past generations;
they can only assess what the text means in the context of the present.
Originalism, however, was not put to rest by Brown. Chief Justice Warren, like Justice O'Connor in Wade, explicitly accepted the originalist methodology in Brown but decided that an inquiry into the authors' intentions
would prove fruitless in the case confronting him. As a result, Brown is open
to criticism by scholars who persuasively demonstrate that a careful application of the originalist methodology would have resulted in the case being
decided the other way. Because scholars do still seriously question Brown,
an explicit and formal recognition of the ontological basis of legal hermeneutics is essential; Brown exemplifies legal hermeneutics in practice, but it
remains theoretically indefensible.11 6 Both the majority opinion and Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Wade, written thirty years after Brown, continue to
adhere to an originalist methodology that only obscures their real decision:
an interpretation of the damages allowable under § 1983. Only Justice
O'Connor's dissent gives an explanation and justification for her decision.
The ontological basis of hermeneutics is not merely a possible theory of
interpretation-human beings are condemned to the dynamic relation of
meaning captured by the phrase "fusion of horizons" notwithstanding their
mistaken understanding of how they acquire meaning. In the interest of
clarity, precision, and honesty in judicial decisionmaking, actual practice
should be reflected in the theoretical model.
Chief Justice Warren did display a sophisticated understanding of the
hermeneutical basis of meaning when he interpreted the "cruel and unLaurence Tribe argues that "it may be possible to justify constitutional adjudication not by its method, but by its results. Decisions are legitimate, on this view,
because they are right." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 52 (1978).
Although Tribe is correct in his assessment that Brown is legitimized "in fact" rather
than as "a product of method," id., it is vitally important to demonstrate why
methodologies are inadequate to explain why Brown is right.
116
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usual" standard of punishment in the eighth amendment. 1 7 Just three years
after his opinion for the unanimous Court in Brown, Warren authored a
plurality opinion in Trop v. Dulles: " 8
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less
than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the
Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the
limits of civilized standards ....

The Court recognized in [Weems v.

United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)] that the words of the Amendment
are not precise, and that their scope is not static. The Amendment must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society." 9
With this statement, Warren abandoned an originalist pretense in favor of an
intuitive recognition of the hermeneutical circle as the true source of meaning. As a result, subsequent adjudication of eighth amendment claims has
avoided the originalist quagmire that inspired Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Wade by focusing on the eighth amendment's meaning rather than on what
the framers intended it to mean.
The controversial death penalty case, Gregg v. Georgia,120 illustrates the
"I "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Berger vilifies the

Court's interpretation of the "cruel and unusual punishment" standard in recent
cases testing the constitutionality of the death penalty. Berger's strict originalist view
leads him to conclude that the eighth amendment does not bar the imposition of the
death penalty. See R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE (1982).
118 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (holding that forfeiture of citizenship for military desertion is

a penalty that, even if within the powers of the government to impose, is unconstitutional because it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
119Id. at 100-01 (footnote omitted). Cf. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966) (holding that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment forbids the states from mandating payment of a state tax as a prerequisite to
voting). Harper quoted Brown in deciding that
the Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular
era. In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have
never been confined to historic notions of equality, any more than we have
restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a given time deemed to
be the limits of fundamental rights. Notions of what constitutes equal treatment
for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change.
Our conclusion ... is founded not on what we think governmental policy
should be, but on what the Equal Protection Clause requires.
Harper, 383 U.S. at 669-70 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Accord, Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 1972) (insisting that "constitutional
concepts of equal protection are not immutably frozen like insects trapped in Devonian amber").
120 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding that the imposition of the death penalty for murder
does not violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment in
every circumstance).
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degree to which the Court has internalized Chief Justice Warren's insight.
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion cites the language from Trop v. Dulles
quoted above and reinforces the idea that the amendment must comport with
both the evolving, contemporary values in society and the inherent dignity of
all individuals. 12 I The concurring opinions did not challenge these premises.12 2 The plurality opinion examined the tradition of eighth amendment
jurisprudence 123 but did not accept precedent and history as the ultimate
guides to answering the question of whether the death penalty is in all cases
unconstitutional. Although Justice Brennan dissented, he began with the
same point as the plurality: "This Court inescapably has the duty, as the
ultimate arbiter of the meaning of our Constitution, to say whether ... the
law has progressed to the point where we should declare that the punishment
of death ... is no longer morally tolerable in our civilized society."1 24 The
fractured majority and the dissenters do not engage in a meaningless battle of
string citations; instead, each side draws upon the legal tradition to answer
the problem presented by the case at hand. For this reason, Gregg v.
Georgia is indicative of how cases would be decided if the members of the
12
Supreme Court were consciously attentive to the reality of interpretation. 5
A perceptive critic might rely on Gadamer to challenge my argument that
judges should eschew the originalist methodology.1 26 Gadamer contends that
even an incorrect methodology is unable to corrupt the ontological relation
of meaning. As such, it is not immediately apparent why the originalist
methodology is undesirable. What concern is it of the philosophical community if judges don't understand what they are doing? Or, more importantly,
even if the philosophical community does have a legitimate concern, does
this philosophical issue have any impact on the activity of judging?
Stanley Fish has voiced this critique for a number of years .127 Essentially,
Fish argues that judges can neither choose nor change their hermeneutical
horizons.1 28 That is, no theory of legal hermeneutics can influence the activId. at 173.
See id. at 207-26 (White, J., concurring) (finding that the statutory criteria
provided by the Georgia legislature adequately prevented the wanton or freakish
imposition of the death penalty); id. at 230 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that
"[t]he calculated killing of a human being by the State involves, by its very nature, a
denial of the executed person's humanity").
121 Id. at 176-78.
124 Id. at 229 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
125 For further discussion of the importance of Gregg, see infra notes 342-86 and
accompanying text.
126 See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
127 See, e.g., Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773
(1987); Fish, Consequences, in AGAINST THEORY (W.J.T. Mitchell ed. 1985); Fish,
Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1347 (1984) (concluding that whether he or Fiss
has the fight theory of interpretation "has no consequences for the process [they] are
both trying to describe").
128 Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, supra note 127, at 1796.
121
122
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ity of judging, which is always an expression of the judge's hermeneutical
horizon. Fish's response to the ontological basis of legal hermeneutics is one
of complete reverence, and his devotion leads him to promote a legal theory
that denies the practical usefulness of legal theory. Fish suggests that
because we are unable to alter the ontological situatedness of the judge, we
should field the best team available and simply let them play to the best of
their abilities. Although his analogy to pitching in the major leagues is quite
entertaining, it is unacceptable. In reality, Fish is arguing against the meth129
odological aims of legal theory, in accord with the thesis of this Article.
But Fish's position does not render legal theory moot. Would a judge have
decided a case in the same way had he never developed a legal theory, never
attended law school, or never even attended college? Clearly, the hermeneutical horizons of judges encompass their approach to interpreting
texts, even though such horizons can never provide a formula for reaching a
particular decision. By emphasizing the importance of hermeneutics to the
legal culture, the legal tradition is both continued and supplemented, and this
activity can affect future cases.130
As this section of the Article has indicated, there are important reasons for
"trashing '1 31 originalist methodology. First, there is a need to protect the
Constitution from cynical judges who will disregard its meaning in order to
obtain inconsistent political goals. To ensure that judges are constrained by
the text's meaning, the legal system should require judges to justify their
decisions explicitly with reference to their actual hermeneutical activity
rather than masking the reality of their decision with an abstract formalism.
Originalist legal theory is "abstract" in the sense of that word's etymological
root, abstrahere ("to draw away");132 the methodology of determining the
meaning of a legal text by recovering the author's intended meaning draws
away from the playful engagement of interpretation. As long as judges may
justify their decisions without exposing their hermeneutical basis, there is

For example, Fish's argument against a "general hermeneutics" is actually an
argument against methodological hermeneutics. See Fish, Consequences, supra note
127, at 110.
130 Laycock, Constitutional Theory Matters, 65 TEX. L. REV. 767 (1987). Laycock
points out that the dramatic shift in legal theory in 1937 produced "fundamentally
different results in real cases ..... Id. at 770 & n. 17. He further notes that Justice
Brennan is explicitly guided by a group of legal theorists when he confronts issues
before the Court. Id. at 771 & n.20.
131 Cf. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 293 (1984) (describing the
technique of trashing legal texts or theories as examining "specific arguments very
129

seriously in their own terms; discover[ing] they are actually foolish . . .and then
look[ing] for some . . .order (not the germ of truth) in the internally contradictory,

incoherent chaos" excavated by such examination) (emphasis in original).
132 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 8 (Unabridged 1976).
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room for political manipulation of cases by judges who choose to ignore
3
meaning. 13
There is also a great deal at stake at the theoretical (academic) level. When
scholars conclude that the current practice of the Supreme Court is unprincipled and that reference to the discipline "constitutional law" is "sheer
habit and is perhaps self-deceptive," 31 there is cause for alarm. Within such
a framework, the goal of discovering the correct rule is replaced by attempts
to secure partisan victories for one's chosen ideology. Once scholars believe
that the Supreme Court is unconstrained, they too are freed from the duty to
critically assess the Court's actions. Paul Brest has embraced this condition
openly, arguing that constitutional scholars prepare their manuscripts not as
"political theory but advocacy scholarship-amicus briefs ultimately designed to persuade the Court to adopt [their] various notions of the public
good." 135 This denigration of constitutional scholarship results from the
inability of legal scholars to come to grips with the true nature of interpretation and can be remedied by a return to the fundamental issue of legal
hermeneutics: how legal texts convey meaning. The importance of legal
theory cannot be overemphasized because it is the forum for a great deal of
constitutional critique, a practice that is legitimized in Part III below.
Finally, fundamental legal landmarks like Brown must be justified if the
recent legal past is to be fully accepted into the evolving legal tradition.
Present practice is destabilized to the extent that this tradition is viewed as
illegitimate.1 31 Put simply, judges who believe that they need justify their
133 Of course, even if judges base their decisions on the meaning of
particular legal
texts, political considerations will still impact on the enforcement of these judicial
decisions. The famous "with all deliberate speed" mandate of Brown v. Board of
Education (Brown 1!), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955), certainly reflects an awareness by the
Court that the reaction in the South to its decision would be volatile, but this has no
bearing on a determination of what the law is, or what the Constitution means. This
Article is concerned with an ontology of meaning rather than a political theory of
legal reform. Cf. Graff, "Keep off the Grass," "Drop Dead," and Other Indeterminacies: A Response to Sanford Levinson, 60 TEX. L. REV. 405, 412 (1982). "In any
case, the special problems occasioned by legal interpretation in the area of application are essentially, as I have said, problems of ethical and political application. They
are not epistemological problems, problems of how we are able to determine what
texts mean." Id. at 412 (emphasis supplied).
134 Gangi, The Supreme Court: An Intentionist's Critique of Non-Interpretive
Review, 28 CATH. LAW. 253, 271 (1983) (footnote omitted).
13' Brest, The FundamentalRights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1109 (1981).
136 Former Attorney General Edwin Meese argues that the proper role of the Court
is to "resurrect the original meaning of constitutional provisions and statutes as the
only reliable guide to judgment." Shenon, Meese and His New Vision of the Constitution, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1985, at 14, col. 3 (quoting a speech Meese delivered
on July 9, 1985). For the full text of this speech, see Meese, The Supreme Court of the
United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455 (1986).
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decisions only with reference to a presumed framers' intent can turn a deaf
ear to the hermeneutical reality presented by Brown and remain uninterested
in what the text means.
The decision in Brown is a poignant critique of the originalist model: the
hermeneutical act, no longer glossed over by conceptual justifications, is
elevated to the status of unadorned judgment. And certainly there is a great
deal to be gained by the increased use of judicial and theoretical strategies
that comport so well with our ontological openness to meaning.
American constitutional theory faces a dilemma. The United States
Supreme Court has decided a large number of cases that commentators
intuitively feel are "right," but that cannot be justified under the orthodox theory of judicial review. Either the Court's behavior or the
1 37
orthodox theory will have to change.
C. Law and Literature: The Challenge of Subjectivism
The legal academic community has not embraced the hermeneutical principles outlined above. At the same time, however, the failure of originalist
jurisprudence to avert the growing recognition that interpretation is not a
passive extraction of meaning from a text has led to a crisis of confidence in
the academy that can be overcome only by focusing on the ontological
basis of legal hermeneutics. Legal scholars have been unable to provide a
theoretically rigorous defense of legal hermeneutics because they are unable
to meet the challenge of subjectivism; there seems to be no way to escape
the idea that once the originalist methodology is debunked, interpreters can
make the text mean what they want it to mean. Under this view, Justices
Justice Brennan, widely regarded as a judicial "activist," responded with a public
speech deriding the originalist conception of interpretation. See Taylor, Brennan
Opposes Legal View Urged by Administration, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, at 1, col.

1. Brennan eloquently noted the hermeneutical reality that renders the originalist's
project futile:
We current Justices read the constitution in the only way that we can: as 20th
century Americans. We look to the history of the time of framing and to the
intervening history of interpretation. But the ultimate question must be, what do
the words of the text mean in our time.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, at 20, col. 3 (quoting Brennan, supra note 69, at 7.)
Such a profound ideological clash is bound to draw others into the fray, resulting in
a fragmented consensus as to the locus and legitimacy of judicial authority. See, e.g.,
Taylor, Justice Stevens in Rare Criticism, Disputes Meese on Constitution, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 26, 1985, at 1, col. 1. As long as this debate challenges the theoretical
underpinnings of legal hermeneutics, political instability will continue.
137 Denvir, Justice Rehnquist and ConstitutionalInterpretation, 34 HASTINGS L.J.
1011, 1011 (1983) (footnote omitted). Gadamer's philosophy inspires a new conception of constitutional interpretation because "[p]henomenological hermeneutics explains a changing Constitution without surrendering to the notion of judicial anarchy." Phelps & Pitts, supra note 4, at 382.
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Rehnquist and Brennan propose equally valid interpretations of the
Constitution-each merely creates the meaning that he wants the text to
embody. After all, critics might say, Brown would have been decided differently if the Justices on the Court at that time had been conservative, so that
in fact Brown is really no more justifiable than an interpretation of a great
novel by a literary scholar with certain predispositions and biases. Adherence to the positivist fact/value dichotomy leads scholars to believe that the
goal of legal theory is to establish law as an "objective" or "factual"
discipline. Yet each attempt to establish a science of interpretation inevitably ends with the recognition that the prejudices of the interpreter influence
interpretation. Though most scholars firmly believe that there is something

to legal interpretation beyond the implicit and explicit subjective designs of
the interpreter, there is little in the way of hard scholarship that makes good
on this belief. The threat of subjectivism is most readily acknowledged when
theorists consider the relationship and similarity of legal texts and works of
'literature.38 "If we consider law as literature, then we might better understand the malaise that afflicts all contemporary legal analysis, nowhere more
'1 39
severely than in constitutional theory.'
Sanford Levinson's Law and Literature appeared as the lead article in
a symposium devoted to examining the profound implications that follow
from the idea that legal interpretation is as subjective as literary interpretation. 14 0 Citing the "centrality to law of textual analysis," Levinson argues
that there "is less of a gap between contemporary legal theory and literature
than we might suppose .... ."a4I Levinson quickly acknowledges that the
academic legal community is increasingly rejecting originalist legal theory,
whether premised on the plain meaning of legal texts or the original meaning

138

See, e.g., Grey, The Hermeneutics File, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 211 (1985) (discuss-

ing how a valid holographic will was derived from a poem written by the decedent
Terrance Conn); Garet, The Red Bird, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 237 (1985) (offering
another reading of Conn's poem or "will"); White, The Judicial Opinion and the
Poem: Ways of Reading, Ways of Life, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1669 (1984) (emphasizing
the similarities in writing and reading poems and legal texts); Symposium: Law and
Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 373 (1982) [hereinafter Symposium]; Abraham, Statutory
Interpretationand Literary Theory: Some Common Concerns of an Unlikely Pair, 32
RUTGERS L. REV. 676 (1979) (stressing that legal and literary scholars must confront
the same problems of textual interpretation in order to best work within the limits of

their respective disciplines). The comparison of law and literature should not be
confused with articles concerning legal themes in literature or the benefits to the legal
scholar resulting from the study of literary themes. See, e.g., Symposium: Law and
Literature, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 603 (1979); Law and Literature: A Symposium, 29
RUTGERS L. REV. 223 (1976). But see Perry, supra note 90, at 561 (arguing that the
Constitution is more akin to a society's "sacred text" than to a work of literature).
139 Levinson, supra note 102, at 377 (emphasis supplied).

140 Symposium, supra note 138.
141 Levinson, supra note 102, at 377 (footnote omitted).
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as recovered through historical reconstruction. 4 2 That is, scholars now
admit that legal texts, like novels or poems, are fraught with ambiguities.
In Levinson's view, theorists who abandon originalism but remain faithful
to the goal of interpreting the text are left with two options. The "weak
textualist" argues that through a properly formulated methodology, jurists
can extract the essential meaning of a legal text even though this meaning is
neither plain on its face nor immediately comprehensible in light of historical
research.
A "weak" textualist "is just doing his best to imitate science-he wants
a method of criticism and he wants everybody to agree that he has
cracked the code. He wants all the comforts of consensus, even if only
the consensus of readers of the literary quarterlies" (or law reviews).,"
The "strong textualist" disavows this search for ultimate truth and argues
that the reader constructs a meaning that is only a temporal sense of what is
currently acceptable, rather than one that genuinely mirrors the essential
characteristics of the text being discussed. 144 The strong textualist believes
that the never-ending debate among weak textualists about the essential
meaning of the Constitution is no more subject to resolution than literary
scholars' debates about the essential meaning of Hamlet . 4 Each attempt to
crack the mysterious textual "code" is a creation rather than a discovery of

meaning. 146
Levinson reaches the troubling conclusion that regardless of which theory
is correct, both weak and strong textualism preclude the possibility of a
legitimate critique ofjudicial decisionmaking because neither theory provides
critical standards. Strong textualists are committed to the proposition that
there are no right interpretations because interpretation is a subjective and
creative activity. Weak textualists are able to criticize a scholarly article or
judicial opinion only to the extent that everyone else accepts their "solution" to the problem of what a legal rule or doctrine means.1 4 7 When multiple
interpretive strategies exist, weak textualists have no means of demonstrating the superiority of their view; they cannot "slay the nihilist dragon."' 4 8
Id. at 378-79.
Id. at 380 (quoting R. RORTY, Nineteenth-Century Idealism and TwentiethCentury Textualism, in CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 139, 152 (1982)) (emphasis
in original).
144 Levinson, supra note 102, at 381-84.
145 Id. at 391 & n.64.
146 See id. at 381-84.
147 Levinson considers Fiss's attempt to criticize Justice Rehnquist as an example
of groundless constitutional theorizing: "The inability of Fiss and his co-author to
mount a persuasive attack on Justice Rehnquist in anything other than political terms
reveals the parlous state of contemporary constitutional discourse. The united interpretive community that is necessary to Fiss' own argument simply does not
exist." Id. at 401 (emphasis omitted).
148 Id. at 396 (footnote omitted).
142

143
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It would obviously be nice to believe that my Constitution is the true
one and, therefore, that my opponents' versions are fraudulent, but that
is precisely the belief that becomes steadily harder to maintain. They
are simply different Constitutions. There are as many plausible readings
of the United States Constitution as there are versions of Hamlet, even
though each interpreter, like each director, might genuinely believe that
he or she has stumbled onto the one best answer to the conundrums of
149
the texts.
Levinson appears willing to allow literary criticism to remain this indeterminate, but he emphasizes that because of the coercive impact it has on the
lives of people, the legal order should not be equated with a free-flowing
"conversation" that has no fight answers. 150 Levinson is unable to provide a
solution, however. The strong textualist has openly embraced the subjectivist thesis. The weak textualist proffers theories with the hope that they
will provide the methodological key to unlock the Constitution's meaning,
only to find that the fragmented community of interpreters becomes even
more polarized as a result. After setting up the problem properly, Levinson's
article concludes with an anguished tone. All that is left is to think, to write,
and to hope that the future will provide a "common language of constitutional discourse ....
Levinson indicates the fundamental challenge to legal theory that subjectivism poses: if interpretation is nothing more than the expression of an
interpreter's personal biases, the legal system is inherently arbitrary and
.capricious. However, his thesis misses the mark because he takes the
subjectivist critique as an indictment of the nature of law rather than of the
subject/object framework. Other participants in the symposium acknowledge the force of the subjectivist critique but argue that Levinson fails to see
that subjectivism is a threat only if one wants to sustain law as an objective
activity. The answer to the subjectivist challenge that Levinson strugglesunsuccessfully-to formulate is to recognize that interpretation is neither
subjective nor objective; legal scholars must radically reorient the terminology of the discussion so that it is compatible with the reality of interpretation.
For G. Edward White, Levinson's conclusions are the results of "epistemological overkill."" 2 According to White, Levinson properly recognizes
that the Constitution is not a set of unambiguous and timeless meanings but
forgets that judges engaged in constitutional analysis attempt to ascertain the

149Id. at 391 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
150 "As Chairman Mao pointed out, a revolution is not a tea

party, and the massive
disruption in lives that can be triggered by a legal case is not a conversation." Id. at
386.
11 Id. at 402-03.
152 White, The Text, Interpretation, and Critical Standards, 60 TEX. L. REV. 569,
573 (1982).
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meaning that the text of the Constitution holds for the particular case. 15 3
Similarly, Gerald Graff argues that Levinson's alternatives are "misleadingly formulated" and a-.ise from the mistaken assumption that a legal text
cannot be deciphered if there is no universally accepted method for recon54
structing the original meaning.
Levinson has merely inverted the gesture of the interpretive absolutist,
who insists that there is One True Meaning and that he alone possesses
it. Levinson turns this absolutism up.§ide-down and comes out with an
equally prescriptive No True Meaning. The alternatives he gives are
simply unreal. 5'
In this way, "Levinson actually makes the same mistake committed by
15 6
those whom he is attacking."'
Stanley Fish reiterates this theme but also contends that the activity of
interpretation can be understood affirmatively rather than just negatively (as
in the case when one says that interpretation is not objective and not
subjective).
[I]t is neither the case that interpretation is constrained by what is
obviously and unproblematically "there," nor the case that interpreters, in the absence of such constraints, are free to read into a text
whatever they like .... Interpreters are constrained by their tacit
awareness of what is possible and not possible to do, what is and is not a
reasonable thing to say, what will and will not be heard as evidence, in a
given enterprise; and it is within those same constraints that they. see
and bring others to see the shape of the documents to whose interpreta5 7
tion they are committed.
White, Graff, and Fish all insist that Levinson's failure to free himself
from the grip of his subject/object perspective is what leaves him without a
response to subjectivism. Two other contributors to the symposium also
register their dissatisfaction with the either/or approach adopted by Levinson in a manner that is clearly reminiscent of the hermeneutical ontology
developed above. James Boyd White argues that legal scholarship is not
condemned to the same "subjective" status that literary scholarship allegedly, exemplifies. Only when law and literature are viewed within the
context of the subject/object differentiation does this wrong-headed notion
arise:
The view that the legal text ought to have a clear and restatable meaning, and the subsequent collapse into nihilism or "legal realism" upon
See id. at 572-73.
supra note 133, at 407.
15 1d. at 410-11.
156 Id. at 406. See also Fish, Interpretationand the Pluralist Vision, 60 TEX.
L.
REV. 495, 495 (1982) (quoting Graff).
17 Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60
TEX. L. REV. 551, 562 (1982).
'

154Graff,
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the discovery that it does not, arises from a mistaken attitude about law
that resembles the mistaken158attitude underlying the similar response
among readers of literature.
For White, understanding interpretation requires a recognition that "[o]ne
can neither disregard the independent force of the text, nor assume that all
one's questions are unambiguously answered within it."' 159 Indeed, "it is
always the meaning of the document, not our wishes or preferences, that we
are determining. ''160 White cites the dogmatic application of legal texts in
specific cases as an example of this tension between reader and text: "The
traditional conception of the judiciary as working from case to case (rather
than legislatively) can be seen as a method by which the past is regularly
tested against the present, the inherited language against the demands of
actual circumstance, and intelligent change made possible."" 6 ' This analysis
is really a paraphrasing of Gadamer's emphasis on the dogmatic nature of
legal interpretation.
William Nelson also advocates the abandonment of the subjective/objective debate. Urging legal scholars "to construct new thought patterns to
replace the notion of objectivity,""16 Nelson borrows from the work of
sociologist-philosopher Jiirgen Habermas and linquist-philosopher Ludwig
Wittgenstein to construct his legal theory. 163 Interpretation, says Nelson,
occurs only within the context of a linguistic community, and meaning is
experienced as a linguistic relation rather than as an objective entity. 64 Like
White, Nelson points to a new view of legal interpretation that focuses on
the play between a text and a reader, play that is situated in a linguistic and
historical setting.
That Levinson's article catalyzed these anti-Cartesian views is hardly
surprising. The symposium's "law and literature" theme focused attention
on the real problems of legal interpretation and prevented the authors from
falling back on political or historical arguments about the legal system as an
institution. Kenneth Abraham has also used this productive comparison of
legal and literary interpretation quite successfully.1 65 In a now familiar fashion, Abraham explores the failure of the Cartesian tradition of objective
inquiry and rejects both objectivism and subjectivism:
15

White, Reading Law and Reading Literature, supra note 112, at 436. See R.

BERNSTEIN,

BEYOND

OBJECTIVISM

AND RELATIVISM:

SCIENCE,

HERMENEUTICS,

AND PRAXIS 19 (1983) ("Only if we implicitly accept some version of Cartesianism
does the exclusive disjunction of objectivism or relativism become intelligible .... ").
159 White, Reading Law and Reading Literature, supra note 112, at 417.
160 Id. at 440.
161 Id. at 444.
162 Nelson, Standards of Criticism, 60 TEX. L. REV. 447, 448 (1982).
163 See id. at 478 n.141.
164

Id. at 478.

165 Abraham, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 138, at 679.
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[T]hose who suggest that a text is an object entirely independent of its
readers are ignoring the sense in which the bedrock beliefs of its readers
actually constitute the text. Those, however, who suggest that reading
is an individual, subjective activity equally ignore the idea that the
reader is always within a community of interpretation, the acceptance of
whose beliefs affects the meaning he attributes to a text. Our very
selves, then, are the product of shared understandings. Under this view
the notion
of individual subjectivity in interpretation would become
1 66
empty.
Although interpretation can never be wholly objective, the shared interpretations of a cultural tradition lend validity to the search for the correct
interpretation. As Abraham puts it, interpreters
encounter the text in a situation, which unavoidably includes the beliefs
that the reader holds. When the interpreter has these beliefs in common
with others, then they are, for that community, "facts." These facts are
not immutable, as the objectivist would have it, nor individual or arbitrary in the sense that the subjectivist or radical realist might suggest.
They do provide objectivity, however, within
a community of interpre1 67
tation where they need not be questioned.
Abraham answers the subjectivist challenge by agreeing that interpretation
is never objective-even in so-called "easy cases"1-but arguing further
that reading a text according to one's own prejudices is not really "subjective" in the way that the subjectivists maintain. 69 The prejudices of readers
are always informed by the tradition of which they are a part and which they
share with others in their linguistic community. By focusing strictly on the
fundamental similarities of law and literature, radical conclusions about the
nature of interpretation are unavoidable. On the other hand, a perfunctory
acknowledgment that interpretation is not susceptible to categorization in
the traditional subject/object paradigm, together with an attempt to demonstrate that legal interpretation is still somehow different from literary interpretation, will inevitably result in a reconstitution of the subject/object
framework.
Owen Fiss's Objectivity and Interpretation'0 exemplifies the theoretical

backslide that occurs when one harbors a secret belief that legal texts have
objective meanings. Fiss begins his article by purportedly rejecting the
subject/object framework. Fiss tells us that "[aIdjudication is interpretation," that in turn "is neither a wholly discretionary nor a wholly mechanical activity. It is a dynamic interaction between reader and text, and
meaning[,] the product of that interaction."1 '' Like the contributors to the
Id. at 686.
Id. at 688.
11 See Abraham, Three Fallacies, supra note 81, at 772.
169 Id. at 777.
0 Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
171Id. at 739.
166
167

HeinOnline -- 68 B.U. L. Rev. 562 1988

19881

LEGAL HERMENEUTICS

Texas law and literature symposium discussed above, Fiss wants to respond
to the subjectivist critique of interpretation.' 2 For Fiss, "the question is
whether any judicial interpretation can achieve the measure of objectivity
required by the idea of law. ' 1 73 Fiss believes that legal interpretation is
objective to a much greater extent than literary interpretation, primarily
because of the institutional hierarchy of the decisionmaking process and the
binding force of interpretive rules.
Judges do not belong to an interpretive community as a result of shared
views about particular issues or interpretations, but belong by virtue of
a commitment to uphold and advance the rule of law itself. They belong
by virtue of their office. There can be many schools of literary interpretation, but as Jordan Flyer put it, in legal interpretation there is only one
school and attendance is mandatory.
...The presence of. . .procedures and a hierarchy of authority for
resolving disputes that could potentially divide or destroy an interpretive community
is one of the distinctive features of legal interpreta74
tion.1
Critics have charged that Fiss is really nothing more than an objectivist
who looks to the structure of legal decisionmaking as the source of objectivity in law. 175 In his response to Fiss, Paul Brest contends that Fiss's desire to
combat nihilism has led him to seek "to insulate the legal culture against the
radical attacks on conventional notions of understanding and interpretation."' 76 Brest suggests that this line-drawing is a political move to reaffirm
the legitimacy of "our law" rather than "the rule of law"' 7 7 and goes on to
expose Fiss's misguided attempt to keep law "objective" while claiming to
discard traditional objectivity.' 78 Stanley Fish also attacks Fiss's notion of
objective adjudication. Fish makes the useful observation that rules of
interpretation cannot provide the external constraint on subjective interpretation that Fiss desires because these rules would have to be reinterpreted
with each application, as would any text.' 7 9 A rule cannot tell a judge how to
decide a particular case any better than the "plain meaning" of the ConstituId. at 740-41.
Id. at 744 (emphasis in original).
'74 Id. at 746-47.
'75 See, e.g., Patterson, Interpretation in Law-Toward a Reconstruction
of the
Current Debate, 29 VILL. L. REV. 671, 672-82 (1984) (contrasting Levinson's nihilistic view of interpretation against Fiss's theory of"bounded objectivity," or certainty
within an interpretive communityl.
176 Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765, 766 (1982).
"77 Id. at 772.
178 Id. at 772-73.
'79
Fish, Fish v. Fiss, supra note 127, at 1326-32. See Abraham, Three Fallacies,
supra note 81, at 779-80 (noting that rules are always ambiguous in the abstract and
acquire meaning only with regard to the case at hand).
172

173
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tion;judges must interpret rules as well as relevant legal texts. Nevertheless,
says Fish, the reality of interpretation stands as its own critique of subjectivism. Fiss's attempt to render adjudication objective by reference to hypothesized rules of interpretation is not only unwarranted but also reverts
back to the inadequate distinction between subjects and objects.
All of which is to say that, while I stand with Fiss in his desire to
defend adjudication in the face of "nihilist" and "subjectivist" arguments, I do not believe that this defense need take the form of asserting
a set of external constraints, because the necessary constraints are
always already in place. 180
Subjectivism poses no serious problem in law because the conditions necessary to make subjectivism a reality-the "condition of free subjectivity, of
'naturally' indeterminate texts, of unprincipled authority-could never obtain . ...''ll
Paradoxically, then, the only way to overcome the challenge of subjectivism is to concede that the traditional model of "objective" interpretation
is indefensible. Attempts to reformulate the objective status of legal interpretation fail to defuse nihilism. Faced with the reality that the Constitution is
not a repository from which meanings may be withdrawn for use by the
Supreme Court, constitutional scholars must explore the activity of interpretation in order to understand how we encounter meaning. Legal theorists
who admit that we interpret legal and non-legal texts in the same way have
contributed the most to the philosophical effort to deny the validity of
subjectivism." 2
Following Gadamer, legal scholars should recognize that the theoretical
and abstract notions of "objective texts" and "subjective interpreters"
must be replaced with a more accurate account of the playful relation
between humankind and the world. In this Article, I examine the relevance
and limitations of ontological hermeneutics for developing satisfactory and
legitimate ways of talking about our hermeneutical nature and its relation to
law. Consequently, this Article provides a second-order account of the
"80 Fish, Fish v. Fiss, supra note 127, at 1345.
181

Id.

As a result of this ground-breaking scholarship, several legal theorists have
recently focused on Gadamer's ontological hermeneutics. See, e.g., Phelps & Pitts,
supra note 4 (contrasting Gadamer's hermeneutics with current theories of legal
interpretation). Simeon McIntosh has written a useful piece on legal hermeneutics in
which he develops Gadamer's thesis at some length, but McIntosh displays a narrow
understanding of Gadamer's radical claims, especially when discussing the importance of an author's intent. See McIntosh, Legal Hermeneutics: A Philosophical
Critique, 35 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 36 (1982). Finally, Dennis Patterson applies Wittgenstein's later philosophy to the problem of legal interpretation. See Patterson, supra
note 175, at 682-88 (using Wittgenstein's theory of meaning as an analytical framework for the nihilist-objectivist debate).
182
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capacity for interpretation that we use every day. Ontological hermeneutics
does not tell the reader how to read. Reading occurs with or without an
explanatory hypothesis of how the reader interprets texts. Nevertheless, this
second-order account is important, for it offers a way out of the subjectivist
dilemma and serves as a guide to judicial decisionmaking.
III.
A.

A

PROPOSED MODEL OF INQUIRY

The Function of a Model

In Part Two, the ontological basis of hermeneutics was revealed: interpretation is a mode of existence rather than a conceptual exercise. It is our
openness to meaning, through which our horizons fuse with those of the
text, that dispels all subjectivist theories of interpretation. The failure to
acknowledge this reality has resulted in fundamentally distorted views of
how judges decide cases and how scholars evaluate judicial decisions. The
purpose of Part Three of this Article is to provide a model of contemporary
legal hermeneutics that allows the development of critical standards for
assessing judicial decisionmaking.
It is important to distinguish a model of legal hermeneutics from a methodology for acquiring legal knowledge. A methodology is a conceptual
strategy designed to facilitate the subject's efforts to decode a given object
and thus is intimately tied to the now discredited subject/object differentiation. Hermeneutics depends on no such methodology; the hermeneutical act
occurs without an all-powerful subject or an incorrigible, unambiguous text.
Unlike a methodology, the following model is not offered as a formula for
scholars-no formula would ever work to establish the "proper" way to
interpret. 8 3 Rather, I suggest that scholars adopt the following model as an
attitude that they should bring to bear on their evaluations of law and
judicial decisionmaking.
The starting point for constructing a model of legal interpretation must be
'
the hermeneutical act. As we have seen, that act is ontological in nature. 84
Gadamer's hermeneutics explores what actually (phenomenologically) occurs in interpretation rather than what ought to occur through the proper
183

This point has been repeatedly emphasized by Stanley Fish, most recently in

Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, supra note 127, at 1778 (recognizing that

"no one follows or consults his formal model of the skill he is exercising in order to
properly exercise it").

184 Cartesian Rationalism is evident in all theories of methodological hermeneutics:
the underlying assumption is that an objective meaning is expressed through the
non-substantive medium of language in the form of an autonomous text and is
received in its objective entirety by an ahistorical and value-free interpreter. Phelps
& Pitts, supra note 4, at 356-57. To counter this metaphysical system of assumptions,
Gadamer performs an "ontology of the event of understanding." Id. at 363. Cf. supra
note 12.
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application of a methodology. "The main concern of hermeneutics, [which]
Truth and Method affirms, is 'not what we do or what we ought to do, but
what happens to us, over and above our wanting and doing .... "185 The
same hermeneutical reality is operative whether a federal judge reads a
detective novel or a provision of the Constitution. Ontological hermeneutics
turns the fear of legal scholars on its head: law is not as subjective as
literature, but rather literature is as objective as law. It is only when legal
historians and legal philosophers begin the hopeless quest for the meaning of
"the law" that their discourse takes on the appearance of subjective opinion, just as a purely abstract treatment of a novel or poem is nothing more
than an opinion about a hopelessly ambiguous entity. Such legal theorists fail
to understand that interpretation is only possible from the limited perspective of a reader. Rather than fearing the degeneration of law into literature,
philosophers of interpretation should work to restore the explicit pragmatic
aims of literary hermeneutics, thereby reinvigorating a discipline that has
186
long suffered the problems now facing legal theorists.
Acceding to the ontological character of the hermeneutical act does not
demonstrate a naivete about political aims in the interpretation of texts.1 8 7 A
judge may disregard the meaning of a text so as to achieve subjective
political goals. Nevertheless, prior to any such political decision, meaning is
made known to the judge by his interaction with the text. Moreover,
Gadamer's perspective brings a judge's prejudices to the forefront of discussion more explicitly than any formalist or traditional theory of interpretation.
It is a prerequisite of legal meaning that judges have particular political
values, for it is only in the interaction with a situated, prejudiced and
dogmatic horizon that the text can "speak." The Englightenment's glorification of the completely value-free interpreter is an absurd fantasy. Not only
are the necessary conditions for obtaining objective knowledge absent, they
would actually render the acquisition of meaning impossible. A text is not
meaningful in itself; to acquire meaning, words must speak to something or
someone.
Gadamer's discussion of "play" captures the pre-predicative, pre-cognitive character of interpretation. Because an individual is not free to create
'

185

F.

DALLMAYR,

TWILIGHT OF SUBJECTIVITY:

INDIVIDUALIST THEORY OF POLITICS

CONTRIBUTIONS TO A POST-

289 (1981) (quoting H.-G.

GADAMER,

supra

note 5, at 173).
186 See, e.g., Abraham, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 138, at 690-94.
Gadamer considers legal hermeneutics exemplary because it continues to recognize
application "as an integral element of all understanding." H.-G. GADAMER, supra
note 5, at 275. Literary hermeneutics became "detached" from this recognition when
it established itself "as the methodology for research in the human sciences." Id.
Gadamer is not content to demonstrate the basis of legal hermeneutics; his project
works to reintegrate literary hermeneutics with legal hermeneutics, thereby overcoming the methodological schism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Id.
187 See supra note 133.
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the meaning of a text but rather is open to the possibilities of meaning that
the text proposes, subjectivism is an untenable thesis. However, this model
of legal interpretation also discredits the belief that texts have unambiguous,
fixed meanings, and thus raises the question of whether there is any guarantee that each individual who encounters the text will discover a meaning that
is equally valid for other individuals. Gadamer's theory must be defended
against the inevitable charge that his theory is reducible to "nihilism" or
"relativism." The hermeneutical model of legal interpretation must confront
the challenge of delineating critical standards of legal interpretation that can
ensure judicial compliance with the meaning of legal texts.
B.

Critical Standards of Legal Interpretation
1. The Purpose of and Need for Critique

Gadamer recognizes that the experience of legal certainty and the criterion
of legal truth both derive from the existence of an interpretive community of
similarly situated communicative beings. This objectivity, of course, is not
the timeless objectivity mistakenly ascribed to the natural sciences and
unsuccessfully applied by the positivists to the social studies. Instead, objectivity is a lived reality occurring within a particular historical situation. The
tradition that links each person to the past also horizontally links each
person to his contemporaries. The bonds that are necessary for the existence
of a communicative community serve as implicit, fundamental bridges between each situated horizon. Judges decide particular cases by bringing the
shared legal tradition that they embody into play with the relevant legal
texts.
But Gadamer's account of shared meaning is open to criticism on several
levels. Admittedly, there are tremendous communal ties that guarantee to
some extent that legal meaning will be intersubjective. Nevertheless, judges
continue to dispute the meaning of legal texts. Justices Rehnquist and
Brennan are contemporaries, both intelligent and well-versed in the American legal tradition, and yet they sharply disagree about the Constitution's
meaning. 188 Assuming that neither Justice is being dishonest in his account of
example, in the 1984-85 term, Justices Brennan and Rehnquist wrote or
adopted conflicting opinions in nine instances. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402 (1985) (construing the first amendment establishment clause); Grand Rapids
School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (same); NLRB v. Longshoreman's
Assoc., 473 U.S. 61 (1985) (interpreting the National Labor Relations Act); Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (addressing first
amendment freedom of speech); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) (addressing
fourteenth amendment due process clause); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985)
(treating jury selection in capital cases); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985)
(considering fourteenth amendment due process right to effective counself on appeal).
188 For
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meaning-for politically motivated reasons, for example-each reads the
relevant legal text with his own forestructure of meaning and thus encounters a different "world" of meaning proposed by the text. Gadamer fails to
tell us whether one of these interpreters is "right," whether the "right"
meaning is merely the interpretation that rings true for at least four other
Justices, or whether there is no "right" interpretation. It is imperative that a
modem model of legal hermeneutics grapple with the intersubjective dimension of meaning.
Even more troubling is the possibility that the interpretive community is
held captive by a defective tradition that continually distorts interpretive
efforts. Although Gadamer emphasizes the positive significance of prejudices as the traditional force of "pre-judgments," he provides no adequate
standard for determining when "prejudices" in the negative sense of the
word-irrational ideology-exist. The conservative implications of
Gadamer's thesis result from his focus on the transmission of tradition
through history without the possibility of critique.8 9 As Fred Dallmayr puts
it, "Compared with a rootless rationalism, Gadamer's outlook clearly
proves itself superior to his detractors. However, the question remains
whether his argument makes sufficient room or provides criteria for critique,
that is, for the differentiation between prejudgments and corrigible prej' 1 90
udices, or between legitimate authority and repression.
The sociologist-philosopher Jurgen Habermas has explored in depth the
question of whether critique may be justified philosophically. Though his
work presents a complex array of ideas and jargon, his philosophy is a
necessary starting point for understanding the legitimacy of the critique of
any interpretation of a text. Habermas does not focus on the particular
problem of legal hermeneutics, but Gadamer's theory makes it clear that the
nature of interpretation is not parochial but ontological. Consequently, any
resolution of the issue of the legitimacy of critique is equally valid in
assessing judges' interpretations of law as well as political philosophers'
interpretations of social reality. 191
2. Jiurgen Habermas and Critical Theory
Jurgen Habermas pursues an ambitious goal: the development of a philosophically defensible critical theory of society that can identify the need for
189
190

9

T. MCCARTHY, supra note 51, at 170.
F. DALLMAYR, TWILIGHT OF SUBJECTIVITY, supra note 185, at 288.
Though Habermas never explicitly discusses the problem of legal interpreta-

tion, universal pragmatics pertains to all communicative action, including that of
interpreting a written text. See J. HABERMAS, What is Universal Pragmatics?, in
COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 1, Ii (T. McCarthy trans. 1979).

When he discusses the distinction between deep and surface structures of meaning,
Habermas lists the various domains in which this is evident: "the meaning of a
written sentence, action, gesture, work of art, tool, theory, commodity, transmitted
document, and so on ....
. Id.
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and guide political change. Habermas's position has developed and changed
a great deal during the last twenty years. Early in his career, he developed
his theory of human interests and concentrated on justifying critical theory
as knowledge. 19a Habermas's attention then turned to the problem of finding
a normative foundation for critical theory. Working from a theory of universal pragmatics, Habermas developed the notion of "ideal speech" and
attempted to draw the outlines of a rational critique of society. 193 Habermas's latest work, however, retreats from many of his earlier positions and
sets forth a theory of communicative action as the framework for' social
critique. 19

Although Habermas now rejects a significant portion of his earlier writings, this section of the Article provides a comprehensive account of his
philosophy by" tracing the stages of his development. There are two justifications for this approach. First, many legal theorists are unfamiliar with
Habermas's work. Consequently, it is necessary to provide a general description of his thought and to clarify the developmental stages of his
program so that they are not simplistically reduced and thereby misunderstood. In addition, a comprehensive treatment is pedagogically justified:
the recent developments in Habermas's philosophy constitute a response to
his recognition that Gadamer's radically ontological perspective is an appropriate challenge to all theoretical perspectives. Habermas demonstrates that
critical theory is unavoidable, but the failure of his initial formulations
illustrates the limitations of critical theory.
(a) The Theory of Human Interests. In Knowledge and Human Inter-

ests,' 9 5 Habermas justifies critical theory by reformulating the foundations of
all knowledge. Responding to the failure of modem thought to sustain an
adequate epistemology, Habermas argues that "a radical critique of knowledge is possible only as social theory"' 196 Habermas begins his critique by
postulating the existence of three cognitive interests, each with its own
"logical-methodological rules" that underlie knowledge: "The approach of
the empirical-analytic sciences incorporates a technical cognitive interest;
that of the historical-hermeneutical sciences incorporates a practical one;
and the approach of critically oriented sciences incorporates the emancipatory cognitive interest .... ,,197 These "interests" correspond to "the basic
infra notes 196-205 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 206-56 and accompanying text.
I" See infra notes 287-92 and accompanying text.
192 See
193

195 J. HABERMAS,

KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS (J.

Shapiro ed. 1971)

(originally published in 1968 as Erkenntnis und Interesse).
196 Id. at vii.
197

Frankfurt Inaugural Address by Jfirgen Habermas (June, 1965). The address is

published as an appendix to J.

HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS,

supra note 195, at 301, 308. Habermas summarizes his argument in J. HABERMAS,
THEORY AND PRACTICE 7-10 (J. Viertel trans. 1973) (translation of Theorie und Praxis
(4th ed. 1971)). For an excellent discussion of Habermas's theory of human interests,
see T. MCCARTHY, supra note 51, at 53-125.
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orientations rooted in specific fundamental conditions of the possible reproduction and self-constitution of the human species . . . . "19 That is, our
need to adapt in order to survive forces us to orient our existence according
to these three cognitive interests. Habermas asserts that these human interests have "quasi-transcendental" status; they are the presupposed conditions of objective experience, and yet they are rooted in man's empirical
existence. "Although the sciences must preserve their objectivity in the face
of particular interests, the conditions of possibility of the very objectivity
that they seek to preserve includefundamental cognitive interests."199 Epistemology is thus a social theory because knowledge can be traced to primordial interests that are manifested in our struggle to live in the human and
200
natural environment in which we find ourselves.
Habermas, like Gadamer, is committed to preserving the status of hermeneutics as knowledge, albeit knowledge that is guided by a, different
human interest than that of the empirical sciences. 20 1 In his earlier works,
note

at 196.

198

J. HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS, supra

199

T. MCCARTHY, supra note 51, at 58. Habermas discusses his use of the term

195,

"quasi-transcendental"

in Theory and Practice, supra note 197, at 14.
200 Dallmayr, Reason and Emancipation:Notes on Habermas, 5 MAN & WORLD
79, 99-100 (1972).
101 Habermas does not criticize or denigrate the knowledge of empirical-analytical
sciences.

On the contrary, insofar as he claims that it is grounded in the dimension of
human life that involves human survival, he is stressing its importance and its
basic quality for any social life. Habermas' primary object of attack is the
ideological claim that this is the only type of legitimate knowledge, or the
standard by which all knowledge is to be measured.
R. BERNSTEIN, THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 194 (1978)

(emphasis in original). Habermas argues against the superiority of the empiricalanalytical methodology asserted by positivists. Positivism denigrates all knowledge
that is not the product of the technical interest and legitimates philosophy only to the
extent necessary to carry out this program. See id. at 197. Habermas draws inspiration from Kant's transcendental inquiry into the grounds of knowledge, for in Kant's
theory, philosophical reason retained its independent validity: "science was to be
comprehended epistemologically as one category of possible knowledge." T.
MCCARTHY, supra note 51, at 41. Habermas wants to "restore the notions of a
comprehensive reason and an interest of reason in human emancipation," id. at 84,
and he does so by "undertaking a historically oriented attempt to reconstruct the
prehistory of modern positivism with the systematic intention of analyzing the
connections between knowledge and human interests." J. HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE
AND HUMAN INTERESTS, supra note 195, at vii. For a brief sketch of the positivist
influence, see R. BERNSTEIN, supra, at 4-7.
Gadamer is motivated by similar concerns. "The hermeneutic consciousness,
which must be awakened and kept awake, recognized that in the age of science the
claim of superiority made by philosophical thought has something vague and unreal
about it." H.-G. GADAMER, supra note 5, at xxv-xxvi. Gadamer, therefore, does not
reject the scientific consciousness of positivism, even as it impinges upon social
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Habermas believed that the search for the cognitive interest underlying
hermeneutical knowledge revealed no standards by which to adjudicate
among competing interpretations. 02 In contrast to Gadamer, however,
Habermas posits the existence of an emancipatory interest subtending critical knowledge. The process of reflection, through which we discover our
cognitive orientations, is itself rooted in a knowledge-constitutive interest.
"In self-reflection, knowledge for the sake of knowledge comes to coincide
with the interest in autonomy and responsibility ....
We can say that
[reason] obeys an emancipatorycognitive interest, which aims at the pursuit
of reflection. ' 2 0 3 By postulating a tripartite structure of human interests,
Habermas legitimizes rational critique above and beyond the knowledge
generated by either empirical science or social studies. This structure marks
a significant break with Gadamer's conception of dual realms of knowledge
supported by the unified, ontological condition of existence, and Gadamer
participated in a lively debate with Habermas over the legitimacy of rational
critique as knowledge. 204 "Gadamer's universalization of hermeneutics rests

on a logical argument against the possibility of methodologically transcending the hermeneutical point of view: any attempt to do so is inconsistent with
the very conditions of possibility of understanding: the linguisticality and
historicity of human existence. 2 0 5 It is in the fires of this fundamental
debate with Gadamer that Habermas forges his critical theory.
(b) The Theory of Universal Pragmatics. Habermas reformulated his position in a way that directly challenges Gadamer's assumptions. Responding
to criticism that the emancipatory interest lacked any discernible normative
standards, Habermas took a "linguistic turn. ' 20 6 While retaining the emaninquiry, but instead seeks to show that all knowledge-including the "truth" of
hermeneutics-is made possible by our openness to meaning.
The methodical spirit of science permeates everywhere. Therefore I did not
remotely intend to deny the necessity of methodical work within the human
sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). Nor did I propose to revive the ancient dispute on method between the natural and the human sciences. It is hardly a
question of a contrast of methods

....

The difference that confronts us is not in

the method, but in the objectives of knowledge. The question I have asked seeks
to discover and bring into consciousness something that methodological dispute
serves only to conceal and neglect, something that does not so much confine or
limit modern science as precede it and make it possible....

...[The following investigation] asks (to put it in Kantian terms): How is
understanding possible?
Id. at xvii-xviii (emphasis supplied).
202 R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 201, at 209.
203 J. HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS, supra note 195, at 197-98
(emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
204

See generally Hoy, supra note 4, at 153-64 (summarizing the Habermas-

Gadamer debate); T. MCCARTHY, supra note 51, at 415 n.50 (listing sources of
written arguments and replies between Gadamer and Habermas).
205 T. MCCARTHY, supra note 51, at 193.
206 R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 201, at 206.
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cipatory interest's distinct status as a cognitive pursuit, Habermas attempted
to locate the substantive and normative standards of the emancipatory
critique within the practical interest of the historical-hermeneutical sci-

ences. 207
Drawing on the Hegelian and Marxian insight that norms are inextricably
bound up with the empirical reality of what is, "Habermas argues that
human discourse or speech-even in its systematically distorted formsboth presupposes and anticipates an ideal speech situation in which both the
theoretical and practical conditions exist for unrestrained communication
and dialogue. ' 20 8 Because the standards and grounds of rational critique are
found in the act of communication, Gadamer's hermeneutical inquiry must
be supplemented by a "depth hermeneutic" that is designed to uncover the
universal structure of speech and the normative implications of that structure. Habermas characterizes this program of research as a theory of "uni20 9
versal pragmatics."
Habermas succinctly states that the "task of universal pragmatics is to
identify and reconstruct universal conditions of possible understanding.' '210
Because he considers "the type of action aimed at reaching understanding to
be fundamental," '' he eschews the epistemological limitations placed on
formal linguistic theory by the logical empiricists. These limitations have
served only to insulate important linguistic issues from rational investiga2 12

tion.

The logical analysis of language ... delimits its object domain by first
abstracting from the pragmatic properties of language .. . . This
abstraction of language from the use of language in speech ...is not
of language
sufficient reason for the view that the pragmatic dimension
213
from which one abstracts is beyond formal analysis.
T. MCCARTHY, supra note 51, at 27. After this "linguistic turn," the foundation
of a normative basis of critical theory "was to be recast in communications-theoretic
terms." Id.
208 R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 201, at 210 (emphasis in original). "Habermas's
argument is, simply, that the goal of critical theory-a form of life free from unnecessary domination in all its forms-is inherent in the notion of truth; it is anticipated in
every act of communication." T. MCCARTHY, supra note 51, at 233.
207

209 J. HABERMAS,

EvoLUTION

What is Unviersal Pragmatics?,in

OF SOCIETY,

COMMUNICATION AND THE

supra note 191.

Id. at 1 (footnote omitted).
Id.
212 T. MCCARTHY, supra note 51, at 273-74. Cf. P. RICOEUR, Structure, Word,
Event, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR 109 (C. Reagan & D. Stewart eds.
1978). Ricoeur argues that the bifurcation of speech from language-and more
generally of action from system-is an intellectual fiction. Ricoeur recognizes the
potential of Chomsky's theory of "generative grammar" to correct the structuralist.
attempt to dissect communication into empirical and non-empirical quafities. Id. at
116-17.
213 J.HABERMAS, What is Universal Pragmatics?, in COMMUNICATION AND THE
EvOLUTION OF SOCIETY, supra note 191, at 5-6 (emphasis in original).
210
211
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It is epistemologically legitimate to reconstruct the conditions of understanding because universal pragmatics is a project of the emancipatory interest.
Whereas logical empiricism limits rationality to what Habermas terms the
technical interest, Habermas argues that he can scientifically reconstruct
communicative action so as to reveal a normative standard for assessing all
interpersonal relationships.
The research program of universal pragmatics is premised on the belief
that the conditions of understanding are "general and unavoidable," that all
speakers must, at least implicitly, raise certain "universal validity claims"
and suppose that either the communicative act itself or subsequent discourse
will vindicate those claims.2 14 Speech acts have a two-tiered structure: at the
deep level there are the universal conditions of all understanding, while at
the surface the speaker conveys the variable meanings that are understood
by the participants. Consequently, the philosopher can adopt two different
attitudes toward communicative action. Because Gadamer focuses on the
interpretive act of recovering meaning from the text (surface structure), he is
content to merely identify our ontological openness (or intuitive capacity).
As a result, Gadamer has no way to critically analyze the surface structure of
meaning and adjudicate between competing meanings. Habermas, on the
other hand, "tries not only to apply this intuitive knowledge but to reconstruct it."' 2 15 Though he appreciates Gadamer's contribution to hermeneutics, Habermas wants to distinguish between practical know-how, the ability
of an interpreter to understand a text, and know-that, the explicit knowledge
of how it is that the interpreter reaches such understanding. 216 Hermeneutical know-how is guided by the practical interest in intersubjective (speaker/
listener, text/interpreter) understanding, whereas theoretical know-that is
guided by the emancipatory interest in removing all obstacles to individual
freedom and dignity.
Habermas's goal is to provide an epistemological justification for social
at 2. Habermas uses the term "discourse" to signify the "argumentative
speech" that would be used to identify problematic validity claims in any speech
situation where 'the validity claims of the speaker are not accepted. Id. at 2-3.
See R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 201, at 212. For a discussion of Habermas's approach
to "discourse," see T. MCCARTHY, supra note 51, at 291-310.
215 J.HABERMAS, What is UniversalPragmatics?, in COMMUNICATION AND THE
EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY, supra note 191, at 12 (emphasis in original). Habermas
wants to go behind the meaning of the social situation to a rational critique and
demystification of the distorted communicative exchange. T. MCCARTHY, supra note
51, at 183.
216 J.HABERMAS, What is Universal Pragmatics?, in COMMUNICATION AND THE
EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY, supra note 191, at 12. Universal pragmatics is a research
program aimed at uncovering the universal conditions of the pragmatic use of language. "Its goal is not a paraphrase or a translation of an originally unclear meaning,
but an explicit knowledge of rules and structures, the mastery of which underlies the
competence of a subject to generate meaningful expressions." T. MCCARTHY, supra
note 51, at 277 (footnote omitted).
214Id.
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critique by demonstrating that meaning is revealed on both of these levels.
While Gadamer emphasizes the way in which tradition is meaningful for the
people who inherit and continue it, Habermas asserts that tradition is also
meaningful to the extent that it is subject to critique rather than blind
adherence. For example, a cultural tradition of denigrating black citizens
may be hermeneutically appropriated by a society to the extent that it is
understood from generation to generation, but the deeper meaning offered
by the tradition is that the society exhibits a pattern of power and domination.
[Clritical sociology guards itself against reducing the meaning complexes objectified within social systems to the contents of cultural
tradition. Critical of ideology, it asks what lies behind the consensus,
presented as a fact, that supports the dominant tradition of the time, and
does so with a view to the relations of power surreptitiously incorporated in the symbolic structures of the systems of speech and action.217
Habermas's radical claim is that universal pragmatics reveals the existence
of an intersubjective relationship that anticipates an ideal speech situation,
and that this relationship provides a normative ground for philosophical
critique.2 1 Underlying communicative action is the presupposition of an
ideal speech situation. "Habermas thinks that such an ideal is presupposed
and anticipated in all inquiry-even deformed inquiry-and that it serves as
the critical standard for any given inquiry. ' 219 An interpretation of human
rights and the political program that it generates are subject to criticism to
the extent that they conflict with the human dignity and interpersonal relationships that Habermas envisions as the ideal speech situation.
With the groundwork laid, it is now possible to sharpen the focus on the
central elements of Habermas's provocative thesis: the substantive character of ideal speech and the scientific status of universal pragmatics. Clearly,
if Habermas is able to sustain his thesis against the fundamental objections
raised by philosophers such as Gadamer, his work will have important
ramifications for legal hermeneutics.
J.HABERMAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 197, at 11-12.
[Universal pragmatics] raises the claim to reconstruct the ability of adult
speakers to embed sentences in relations to reality in such a way that they can
take on the general pragmatic functions of representation, expression, and
establishing legitimate interpersonal relations. This communicative competence
is indicated by those accomplishments that hermeneutics stylizes to an art,
namely paraphrasing utterances by means of context-similar utterances of the
same language or translating them into context-comparable utterances in a
foreign language.
J. HABERMAS, What is Universal Pragmatics?,in COMMUNICATION AND THE EvoLUTION OF SOCIETY, supra note 191, at 32-33. This intersubjective relationship is
established even if an interpreter is "actually alone with a book, a document, or a
work of art." Id. at 9.
219 R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 201, at 212 (emphasis in original).
217
218
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Habermas contends that communicative action 220 raises precisely four
"validity claims" that are universally presupposed: that the utterance is
comprehensible, that the utterance is true, that the speaker is truthful, and
that the utterance is the right one for the situation.22 ' These inescapable
validity claims constitute a relationship between the communicants that,
although not fully realized in practice, serves as a binding standard for all
interaction. 22 "Ideal speech" refers to the communicative interactions that
would ensue if this interpersonal relationship were fully realized; the "ideal
speech situation" refers to the mutual respect and attentiveness that allows
ideal speech.

To claim that "the design of an ideal speech situation is necessarily
implied in the structure of potential speech," is to claim that every
speech act implicitly makes a claim to validity-a claim which can be
rationally assessed in ideal speech.
...Ideal speech is that form of discourse in which there is no other
compulsion but the compulsion of argumentation itself; where there is a
genuine symmetry among the participants involved, allowing a univer-

220 Habermas recognizes that some speech situations, such as when someone is
lying in order to manipulate another individual, do not presuppose an ideal speech
situation. Habermas would characterize these situations as strategic action, or
"modes of action that correspond to the utilitarian model of purposive-rational
action," rather than communicative action involving validity claims. J. HABERMAS,

What is UniversalPragmatics?,in

COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCI-

supra note 191, at 41. This linguistically-mediated strategic action is derivative
of communicative action or "action oriented to reaching understanding." Id. at 1.
That judges may disregard meaning does not discredit thefact of meaning. Similarly,
the rejection of communicative action in favor of strategic action does not render
insignificant the normative implications of communicative action. See supra text at
note 187. Habermas's analysis is confined to those situations in which communicative action is present.
Since I have restricted my examination from the outset to communicative
action-that is, action oriented to reaching understanding-a speech act counts
as acceptable only if the speaker not merely feigns but sincerely makes a serious
offer. A serious offer demands a certain engagement on the part of the speaker.
J. HABERMAS, What is Universal Pragmatics?, in COMMUNICATION AND THE EvoLUTION OF SOCIETY, supra note 191, at 59-60.
221 Id. at 2-3.
222 Id. at 34-35. "To be understood in a given situation, every utterance must, at
least implicitly, establish and bring to expression a certain relation between the
speaker and his counterpart." Id. at 34. Habermas goes beyond traditional speech act
theory by recognizing not only that the hearer engages in a relationship with the
speaker as a result of the illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects of the speech act
but also that the speaker's utterances demonstrate an engagement with the hearer
that underlies the acceptability of his utterance. Id. at 61.
ETY,
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sat interchangeability
of dialogue roles; where no form of domination
22 3
exists.
The ideal speech situation is a formal ideal insofar as it is a framework for
undistorted communication rather than a substantive theory of what the
communicants would come to know in such dialogue. Nevertheless, the
theoretical positing of the ideal speech situation does have the practical
effect of implicating a substantive social ideal. Consequently, Habermas
rejects a sharp distinction between theory and practice. The ideal speech
situation presupposes a congenial matrix of institutional and normative
realities; ideal speech is possible only in an ideal social structure. It is this
"practical turn in Habermas's grand argument" that injects substance into
224
the regulative ideal of communication without distortion or domination.
Although critical theorists cannot determine the content of ideal speech,
they may critique the social order by testing whether its institutions and
norms inhibit the realization of ideal speech. The critical theorists' task is to
demonstrate that a social norm is wrong because it systematically distorts
communication between citizens. 2 5 Simply put, Habermas argues that intersubjective reasons must replace unacknowledged relations of domination as
the foundation ,for the development of social norms and that this goal is the
basis for a philosophically rigorous critique of society.
Having explored Habermas's conception of the ideal speech situation, it is
223 R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 201, at 212 (quoting Habermas, Towards a Theory
of Communicative Competence, 13 INQUIRY 372 (1970)) (emphasis in original).
.224 R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 201, at 212. Habermas borrows from Austin's
critique of the "descriptive fallacy" to establish the substantive relationship produced through communication. Austin contends that the premise that language does
nothing more than impart meaning by describing things is a fallacy. See Austin, How
to Do Things With Words, in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 560, 563
(J.Rosenberg & C. Travis eds. 1971). Habermas rejects the common but mistaken
view that "communication processes take place at a single level, namely that of
transmitting content (i.e., information)." J. HABERMAS, What is Universal Pragma-

tics?, in

COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY,

supra note 191, at 43.

Instead, Habermas sets the task of universal pragmatics as "the rational reconstruction of the double structure of speech." Id. at 44. The double structure of speech is
expressed by distinguishing 'between "(1) the level of intersubjectivity on which
speaker and hearer, through illocutionary acts, establish the relations that permit

them to come to an understanding with one another, and (2) the level of propositional
content which is communicated." Id. at 42 (emphasis in original).
225

Habermas's later political writings include: J. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION
(T. McCarthy trans. 1975); J. HABERMAS, Historical Materialism and the

CRISIS

Development of Normative Structures, Towarda Reconstruction of HistoricalMate-

rialism, and Legitimation Problems in the Modern State,'in COMMUNICATION AND
THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 95, 130, 178 (T. McCarthy trans. 1979). See also
Lichterman, Social Movements and Legal Elites: Some Notes From the Margin on
REV. 1035 (analyzing
Habermas's writings on political action).

The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique, 1984 Wis. L.
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necessary to assess the way in which his theory of universal pragmatics
delivers theoretical knowledge about this ideal practical situation. To secure
the foundation of his research program against charges of arbitrariness,
Habermas adopts a weak Kantian perspective that he guardedly admits
could be termed transcendental. 226 Noting that the theory of language has
not found its Kant, 27 Habermas models his approach on Noam Chomsky's
attempt to reconstruct the implicit, universal rule-consciousness that is
manifested by each individual's ability to employ grammar creatively. 228
Universal pragmatics, which investigates the deep structure of communication, cannot be reduced to an empirical-analytic science; its program of
looking behind everyday dialogue (empirical surface structure) in order to
reconstruct the conditions of meaningful communication has a quasitranscendental status. "The aim of rational reconstruction is precisely to
render explicit, in 'categorical' terms, the structure and elements of such
'practically mastered, pretheoretical' know-how. ' 22 9 Yet universal pragmatics is clearly intended to participate in the modem break with epistemological rationalism. Reconstructive sciences reject the Kantian categorical
distinction between theoretical a priori knowledge and empirical a posteriori
knowledge. "On the one hand, the rule consciousness of competent speakers is for them an a priori knowledge; on the other hand, the reconstruction
of this knowledge calls for inquiries undertaken with empirical speakers' 2 30
the linguist procures for himself a knowledge a posteriori.
Just as Gadamer argues that hermeneutics imparts knowledge despite its
incongruity with empirical methodology, Habermas demonstrates that the
task of rational reconstruction is "scientific" despite its differences with
empirical-analytic science. "[R]econstructive procedures are not characteristic of sciences that develop nomological hypotheses about domains of
observable events; rather, these procedures are characteristic of sciences
that systematically reconstruct the intuitive knowledge of competent sub-

jects." 3 ' Distancing himself from the rationalist model of scientific inquiry,
Habermas does not propose to remove himself methodologically from the
experience of communicative competence in order to seize its essential
226

J.

HABERMAS,

What is Universal Pragmatics?, in

EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY,

278-79.
227 J.

HABERMAS,

Id. at 14.
T.

MCCARTHY,

230 J. HABERMAS,

MCCARTHY,

What is Universal Pragmatics?, in

EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY,
228
229

supra note 191, at 21-23; T.

COMMUNICATION AND THE

supra note 51, at

COMMUNICATION AND THE

supra note 191, at 21.

supra note 51, at 276.
What is Universal Pragmatics?, in

COMMUNICATION AND THE

supra note 191, at 24-25. "Kant drew a sharp distinction
between transcendental and empirical analysis. Rational reconstruction, by contrast,
is dependent on a posteriori knowledge ....
T. MCCARTHY, supra note 51, at 279.
"I J. HABERMAS, What is Universal Pragmatics?, in COMMUNICATION AND THE
EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY, supra note 191, at 9 (emphasis in original).
EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY,
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objectivity. A program of rational reconstruction tacitly accepts that communication is a lived-through, pretheoretical reality that is beyond the ken of
a scientific method. This is why a reconstructive effort "can represent
pretheoretical knowledge more or less explicitly and adequately, but can
never falsify it." 23 2 Reconstruction requires a rigorous science because the
descriptive account must "correspond precisely to the rules that are operatively effective in the object domain-that is, to the rules that actually
determine the production of surface structures. ' 23 3 When Habermas claims
that universal, intersubjective validity claims have a "rational basis" and are
therefore "cognitively testable," he invokes a model of scientific inquiry
that remains attentive to the prelogical status of communication as a creative
activity but that also recognizes the proper role of reason in pursuing the
emancipatory interest in self-knowledge.
In Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas uses Freud's psychology
as a model of reconstructive science.2 34 Freud's concept of a hermeneutical
psychology exemplifies the project of the emancipatory interest because it,
"unlike the cultural sciences, aims not at the understanding of symbolic
structures in general. Rather the act of understanding to which it leads is
self-reflection ."235 Like Marx, however, Freud displays a positivistic misunderstanding of his own insight into the emancipatory interest, and so the
"language of the theory is narrower than the language in which the technique was described. ' 236 Ironically, then, "the structural model denies the
origins of its own categories in a process of enlightenment. ' 237 Thus, to
understand the nature of the reconstructive sciences, the practice of
psychoanalysis is more relevant than the theory. Psychologists never dominate their patients like a scientist dominates the world of objects, nor do they
initiate recovery according to a predetermined logos. Instead, therapists
remain open to their patients in order to diagnose their problems properly.
Therapists then help patients'reconstruct the distorted development of their
personalities, so that the patients recover a previously hidden sphere of
personal autonomy through self-reflection.
Following Freud, Habermas seeks to ground such reconstructive therapy
in a universal dimension of experience. In this way he is able to put forth a
reconstruction and critique of false consciousness. Critical theory is
legitimized by the emancipatory interest in self-reflection that lies at th
heart of psychoanalytic therapy.
From this perspective, critical social theory can be seen to belong
232

Id. at 16.

233

Id. (footnote omitted).

234

J.HABERMAS,

301.

KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS,

236

Id. at 228 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 245 (emphasis in original).

237

Id.

235

supra note 195, at 214-
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essentially to the self-formative process on which it reflects .... In
unmasking the institutionally anchored distortions of communication
that prevent the organization of human relations on the basis of unconstrained intersubjectivity, the subject of critical theory does not take up
a contemplative or scientistic stance above the historical process of
human development. Knowing himself to be involved in this development, to be a result of the "history of consciousness in its manifestations" on which he reflects, he must direct the critique of ideology at
himself. In this way critical theory pursues self-reflection out of an

interest in self-emancipation

.238

Even after his "linguistic turn," this model of psychoanalytic therapy remains central to Habermas's conception of a reconstructive science designated to promote emancipation.
When psychoanalysis is interpreted as a form of language analysis, its
normative meaning is exhibited in the fact that the structural model of
ego, id, and superego presupposes unconstrained, pathologically undistorted communication. In psychoanalytic literature these normative
implications are, of course, usually rendered explicit in connection with
the therapeutic goals of analytic treatment.23 9
Of course, Habermas recognizes that a theoretical reconstructive science
modeled on Freud's psychoanalytic techniques is in itself insufficient to rid
society of its pathologies. While a theorist may be able to reconstruct the
implicit rule system governing communication, thereby raising an implicit
universal competence to the level of consciousness, "this theoretical knowledge has no practical consequences. '241 1 A carefully worked out theory of
universal pragmatics can no more point the way to rational social organization than a psychological theory can cure a patient. Psychoanalysis is not
just the act of using theory to decode the patient's neuroses; therapists use
their theoretical insights to draw patients into an emancipatory dialogue.
Because therapists have reconstructive knowledge of each patient's situation that that patient may lack, the psychoanalytic dialogue is not one of
equal participation. Nevertheless, therapists guide patients to recovery by
suggesting a discourse of self-reflection. 241 Thus, psychoanalysis is really
two distinct projects: the scientific formulation of a theoretical understanding of the patient's problems and the emancipatory application of the theory
through teaching. This framework subtends all of Habermas's writings.
I can apply theories such as psychoanalysis ... in order to guide
processes of reflection and to dissolve barriers to communication; the
238

T.

MCCARTHY,

supra note 51, at 88. See J.

THOMPSON, CRITICAL HERMENEU-

TICS 83 (1981).
239

J.HABERMAS, Moral Development and Ego Identity, in COMMUNICATION AND
1979) (footnote omitted).
197, at 23.
Id. at 23-24.

THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 69, 70 (T.McCarthy trans.
240 J.HABERMAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note
241
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authenticity of the recipient in his relations with himself and with others
is an indicator of the truth of the interpretation which the analyst...
has suggested. But I can also use this same theory to derive an
explanatory hypothesis, without having (or taking) the opportunity of
initiating communication with those actually concerned, and thus
confirm my interpretation by their processes of reflection.242
Hence, the truth of critique is exhibited in the practical effects it has in aiding
emancipation, but the theory is also subject to validation at a theoretical
level by scientific reasoning.
Yet Habermas is not so naive as to equate his project with a notion of
ultimate truth. Because universal pragmatics is validated only by the emancipatory interest that subtends it, Habermas claims no more than interestrelative truth for his theory. For Habermas, truth is not encountered at the
level of constituted reality (the explication of quasi-transcendental categories) but rather is exhibited by the manner in which interest-relative knowledge is redeemed in theoretical discourse .243 Because truth is one of the four
validity claims underlying communicative action, the discourse that occurs
when the claim to truth is put into issue is itself the realization of truth.
The logic of theoretical discourse is an analysis of the structure and
conditions of that form of communication in which (hypothetical) truth
claims are argumentatively examined and rejected, revised, or accepted. As such it is a "logic of truth," an244examination of how claims
about the world can be rationally settled.
Truth claims cannot be settled by a direct appeal to sense certainty; there is
always linguistic mediation wherever there is a "claim." As such, Habermas
concludes "that ultimately there can be no separation of the criteria for truth
from the criteria for the argumentative settlement of truth claims." 2 45 Truth
becomes possible only in the ideal speech situation, where theoretical discourse is structured to permit argumentative justifications of repeatedly
246
reflected truth claims.
The consensual theory of truth developed by Habermas in connection
Id. at 30-31.
T. MCCARTHY, supra note 51, at 293. Even though Habermas connects all
forms of knowledge to a set of "deep-seated imperatives" of human existence, this
does not negate the unconditional character of truth associated with claims to truth.
Hence, although
the basic categories and principles through which [any given object] is
formed-and thus the fundamental truth claims referring to it, do indeed reflect
an underlying cognitive interest, the testing of these claims in argumentative
discourse warrants attaching to those that emerge unscathed the honorifics:
"true," "objective," "valid," and so forth.
Id. at 293-94.
244 Id. at 299.
245 Id. at 303.
246 Id. at 308.
242

243
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with his discussion of theoretical discourse has substantive implications.
"[N]ot only is an account of theoretical discourse itself a sine qua non of an
adequate theory of truth, but it provides important clues to the structure of
practical discourse." 47 In theoretical discourse, the truth-claim under question is the claim that a theory is a true representation (reconstruction) of the
natural or social world. Pragmatic discourse, on the other hand, concerns
moral-political norms and the "rightness" and "propriety" of particular
actions. 248 Yet, because both theoretical and practical discourse share the
same pattern of justification and legitimation, Habermas asserts that moral
and political disputes, as well as "scientific" issues, "can be decided 'with
reason,' through the force of the better argument." 4 9
In the context of [practical] interaction, challenges to the rightness or
appropriateness of a given speech act can be met by indicating the
relevant norms, by clarifying misunderstandings in respect to accepted
conventions, in short, by providing a justification for one's actions
within an established normative framework. If the disturbance persists,
if the legitimacy of norms invoked is itself called into question, we are
faced with the familiar alternative of breaking off communication,
switching over to various forms of strategic interaction, or attempting to
continue interaction on a consensual basis by entering into a critical
discussion for the purpose of arriving at rational agreement. Adopting
this last option involves-as in the case of theoretical discourse-a
willingness to put out of play all forces except the force of the better
argument and all motives except the cooperative search for the "right"
solution. The aim of practical discourse is to come to a rationally
motivated agreement about problematic rightness claims, an agreement
that is not a product of external or internal constraints
on discussion but
250
solely of the weight of evidence and argument.
Practical as well as theoretical discourse embodies communicative rationality.
Truth is arrived at in practical discourse through the intersubjective
grounding of claims to rightness. The encounter with truth is a dialogical
praxis (phronesis) rather than the result of a theoretical (episteme) or poietic
(techne) attitude. Putting one's normative claims before the community and
into unfettered discourse, rather than masking them with strategies of deceit
251
and domination, is a risk that has'no parallel in a monological rationality.
Id. at 293.
Id. at 314.
249 Id. at 311. For a discussion of Habermas's attempt to expand the notion of
communicative rationality beyond the cognitive-instrumental realm of theoretical
discourse, see R. RODERICK, HABERMAS AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF CRITICAL
THEORY 112-23 (1986).
250 T. MCCARTHY, supra note 51, at 312.
251 A monological rationality'is the rationality of theory, where there need be only
a single theorist to think through the answers. In contrast, communicative rationality
247
248
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Therefore, practical discourse is the sole mode for arriving at legitimate
social norms.
Practical discourse directed toward political action cannot be reduced to
technical control or the technical application of theoretical knowledge,
for this distorts human social life and the medium of communicative
action. All the lines of Habermas's investigations converge in emphasizing that the most urgent practical problem of our time is to oppose all
those intellectual and material tendencies that undermine or suppress
practical discourse, and to work toward the achievement of those objective institutions in which such practical discourse can be concretely
realized 252
In theoretical discourse, the right answer will emerge when a consensus
develops that a particular theory reflects reality. In contrast, practical discourse has no referent. The participants are creating, through their discourse, their normative reality.25 The only guide is the fulfillment of the
standards of communicative rationality that are implied in all communicative
actions; within this framework the play of pragmatic discourse follows its
own dynamic.
Unlike its propositional or transcendental counterpart, the logic of
discourse is a pragmatic logic. It rejects the assumption that argumentation consists in the provision of a sequence of statements which can be
formally deduced from one another. On the contrary, it regards an
argument as a series of speech-acts, and it fully accepts that "the
transition between these pragmatic units of speech can neither be
grounded entirely logically ... nor can [they] be grounded empiri-

cally.'

'214

The relationship of the truth arrived at in theoretical discourse with the
truth arrived at in practical discourse has always been a central concern for
Habermas. In Theory and Practice, Habermas concedes that the truth of
critical theory
can be verified only in the successful process of enlightenment, and that
means: in the practical discourse of those concerned. Critique renounces the contemplative claims of theories constructed in monologic
form, and in addition, discerns that all philosophy up till now, in spite of
all its claims, also only presumes to have such a contemplative character. 255
is a pragmatic rationality that can be developed only through intersubjective
dialogue.
252 R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 201, at 219.
253T. MCCARTHY, supra note 51, at 314. Habermas directly challenges Kant's
view, asserting that a "rational will is not something that can be certified and secured
privatim; it is inextricably bound to communication processes in which a common
will is both 'discovered' and 'formed'." Id. at 326-27.
254J. THOMPSON, supra note 238, at 88 (quotation omitted).
255 J.HABERMAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 197, at 2 (footnote omitted).
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Developing a critique that explains our social world is altogether different
from enlightening others and formulating a strategy for political action.
"Decisions for the political struggle cannot at the outset be justified theoretically and then be carried out organizationally. The sole possible justification

at this level is consensus, aimed at in practical discourse ..

256

"..

The

theory of universal pragmatics, even if it is successfully defended in theoretical discourse as a true reconstruction of communicative action, will never
make practical discourse unnecessary or superfluous. Just as the
psychoanalyst cannot provide ready-made answers to the patient but can
only facilitate a therapeutic dialogue, Habermas recognizes that the theory
of universal pragmatics will never provide a blueprint for the perfectly
rational society. Critique, never possible from a theoretical perspective, is
always the by-product of an unfettered dialogue.
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is possible to summarize the critical
theory of Jiurgen Habermas. Communicative action is a dynamic interpersonal
relationship that girds the surface structure of meaning. These reciprocal
bonds have a rational basis; as a consequence, the hermeneuticist's concern
with meaning must be supplemented by a reconstructive science. Universal
pragmatics reconstructs the validity claims that are implicitly made by every
competent speaker and examines the normative implications of those claims
for social critique as well as the theoretical implications for truth. The
validity claims underlying speech acts presuppose an ideal speech situation,
in which every act of communication approximates a condition of equality
between the communicants. In ideal speech, no form of socio-political
domination (ideology) warps the participants' discussion, speakers are always prepared to justify their claims to validity by unrestrained argumentative discourse. 25 71 At the practical level, ideal speech anticipates an ideal life
form-the goal of the "good life." At the theoretical level, ideal speech
anticipates the attainment of truth through argument resulting in consensus.
As a project of the emancipatory interest, universal pragmatics explores this
inherent connection between truth and politics without attempting to subject
it to an external, reified logic. Universal pragmatics, as a reconstructive
science, is not grounded in the technical or practical interests and therefore
is not oriented toward the manipulation of nature or the explication of
meaning. Rather, Habermas legitimates universal pragmatics as an expression of the emancipatory interest in self-understanding and thus imbues it
with a cognitive status equal to that of the natural sciences. The relationship
between critical theory and pragmatic issues of social organization is not
reducible to the scientism of Marxist-Leninism, but the insights of critical
theory do hold substantive significance for practical discourse.
This comprehensive yet intricate philosophical project has clearly established Habermas as one of the most important living political philosophers.
256

Id. at 33.
R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 201, at 210-11.

27 See
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Disregarding the narrow parochialism that increasingly characterizes
academia, his wide-ranging inquiry has captured the imagination of intellectuals concerned about human beings and their place in the world. Consequently, Habermas's work provides assistance in confronting the problems
facing Gadamer, justifying the intersubjectivity of knowledge and developing a defensible critique of irrational tradition (prejudices).
Before hurrying to appropriate Habermas into the problematic of legal
interpretation, however, it is important to understand the nature and extent
of Gadamer's disagreement with Habermas's conception of critical theory.
In the following analysis, I will suggest that although Habermas has been
overly ambitious in his attempt to locate the foundations for a rational
critique, he has succeeded in avoiding the limited and conservative selfunderstanding that Gadamer's theory engenders. By synthesizing the work
of Gadamer, Habermas, and Paul Ricoeur, I will develop at least a tentative
model of legal interpretation.
(c) The Gadamer-HabermasDebate. Thomas McCarthy succinctly sum-

marized Gadamer's opposition to critical theory with his statement that, for
Gadamer, "[r]eflection is no less historically situated, context-dependent,
than other modes of thought. In challenging a cultural heritage one presupposes and continues it. ' ' 258 In Gadamer's view, the promise held out by the
concept of "ideal speech" is illusory if the theorist proposes to adjudicate
"objectively" among competing interpretations; because the adjudication is
itself an interpretation of the tradition and each of the competing claims, it
necessarily suffers from the same infirmities as the interpretations that are
being assessed. Put simply, Gadamer doubts "our capacity for openness to a
reality which does not correspond to our opinions, our fabrications, our
previous expectations." 25 9 Hence, Gadamer deems futile the attempt to step
outside of the context of competing interpretations in order to demonstrate
that the dialogue is "systematically distorted." Gadamer's philosophical
importance lies in his radicalization of the historical trend toward deregionalization in hermeneutics; he moves from a universal (epistemological)
perspective to a fundamental (ontological) perspective.260 Habermas agrees
with Gadamer's critiques of positivism 61 and the pluralist/relativist implications of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language,262 but the core of Habermas's philosophy is the rejection of Gadamer's assertion that ontological

258

T.

259

H.-G.

MCCARTHY,

supra note 51, at 188.

GADAMER, supra

note 5, at 491.

260 P. RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES,

supra note 29, at 44.

"The presupposition of hermeneutics construed as epistemology is precisely what
Heidegger and Gadamer place in question." Id. at 53.
261 McCarthy, Rationality and Relativism: Habermas's "Overcoming" oQf Hermeneutics, in HABERMAS: CRITICAL DEBATES 58-59 (J. Thompson & D. Held eds.
1982).
262 J. THOMPSON, supra note 238, at 81-82.
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reality consists of situated belonging that admits of no critique. 263 In re-

sponse, Gadamer steadfastly maintains that the truth of his ontological
theory requires us to discard our rationalist belief in the possibility of
"objective" critique. "Akin in this respect to existentialism (and to some of
Marcuse's arguments), [Gadamer's] ontological or anti-Cartesian turn has
meant primarily the abandonment of cognitive subjectivity and a focus on
evolving life-contexts as experienced by concrete-historical or embodied
subjects.' '264
In Truth and Method, Gadamer directly criticized the development by
Dilthey and Schleiermacher of a universally valid methodology of hermeneutics.

26 5

Habermas's attempt to decode play and render it cognizable in terms

of universal categories is no less subject to this critique. Habermas, however, is sophisticated enough to avoid the methodological model of the
empirical-analytic sciences that dominated hermeneutics in the nineteenth
century. His program of emancipation is rational, yet it implicates none of
the gross objectifications of the natural sciences. His reconstructive science
is epistemologically distinct from the natural and human sciences because it
does not work to obscure our pretheoretical existence. Whereas natural
science empties perceptual experience of its tension and replaces it with an
abstract theory of "objective" reality, reconstructive science recognizes the
givenness of our pretheoretical life and concedes that radical "openness"
cannot be falsified by reason. A reconstructive science can help to liberate

Habermas recognizes the force of Gadamer's argument and readily concedes
that empiricism delivers only an abstract account of reality. J. HABERMAS, Legitima263

tion Problems in the Modern State, in COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF
SOCIETY, supra note 225, at 204. While Gadamer's neo-Aristotelean position upholds
an "unchangeable core of substantial morality," it does so only to the extent that it is

practically mastered and known in "prudent application." Id. at 202. Habermas
demands a reconstructive approach after rejecting Gadamer's metaphysical argument as "untenable." Id. at 204. "[I]f philosophical ethics and political theory can
know nothing more than what is anyhow contained in the everyday norm consciousness of different populations, and if it cannot even know this in a different way, it
cannot then rationally distinguish legitimate from illegitimate domination." Id. at
202. Thus, Habermas eschews the radical situatedness espoused by Gadamer and
finds the standards for reason lodged in historically developed communicative competences that always anticipate ideal speech. This is where Habermas errs. Conceding that critical insight is gained only through prudent application does not preclude
making a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate prejudices; critical inquiry is
made possible only because legitimate prejudices are always already distinguished
from illegitimate prejudices in play. See infra notes 300, 310-14 and accompanying

text.
264

265

F. DALLMAYR, TWILIGHT OF SUBJECTIVITY, supra note 185, at 289.
H.-G. GADAMER, supra note 5, at 164. See generally id. at 162-73 (discussing

Schleiermacher's project of a universal hermeneutics); id. at 192-214 (discussing
Dilthey's inability to overcome the impasses of historicism).
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play from external constraints not by looking at play but looking within the
playful encounter.
Habermas, however, has failed to recognize that despite their very real
differences, reconstructive science and empirical-analytic science are both
subordinate to an ontological situatedness. In a recent essay, Habermas
addressed the subsequent revolution in the philosophy of science precipitated by scholars such as Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. 266 He first
admits that "[i]n the light of the debate set off by Kuhn and Feyerabend, I
see that I did in fact place too much confidence in the empiricist theory of
science in Knowledge and Human Interests.1 267 Having made this admission, Habermas concedes that the natural sciences are hermeneutically
mediated at the theoretical and metatheoretical levels, and thereby recognizes the insight that inspired Gadamer's "ontological turn." Still, Habermas is hesitant to surrender the fundamental status of the natural sciences.
He undoubtedly understands that if the natural sciences are wholly subordinated to ontological situatedness, then the reconstructive sciences must be
subordinated as well. As a result, Habermas argues that a radical attack on
the dualism of the natural and human sciences overshoots the mark. Although empirical-analytic sciences are hermeneutically grounded at the level
of theory and metatheory, he contends that "they do not have first to gain
access to their object domain through hermeneutical means. 268
I believe that Habermas is courting an unsatisfactory minimalist empiricist
position. Although Habermas's philosophy of science is not directly relevant
to legal hermeneutics, it does provide a concise example of how the pursuit
of methodological goals can easily derail even a brilliant philosopher
schooled in the hermeneutical tradition of Heidegger and Gadamer. Habermas is correct to point out that perceptual experience is not mediated
through other individuals. But Habermas fails to recognize that all experience, even "pure" perception, is situated, historical "play"; the hermeneutical act is only one mode of being in which this playful encounter is
experienced. In a manner that complements Gadamer's theory, Maurice
Merleau-Ponty argues compellingly that the approach now taken by Habermas is untenable because perception is interpretation.269 Empirical-analytic
science is always parasitical on perceptual play, wherein individuals find a
world and a world finds them. At the phenomenological level, an encounter
with nature is no more determinate than an encounter with a text. In the
former instance, methodological abstraction is embodied in the natural sci266

Habermas, A Reply to My Critics, in

HABERMAS:

CRITICAL DEBATES (J.

Thompson & D. Held eds. 1982). See also T. MCCARTHY, supra note 51, at 61
(discussing Habermas's views of Kuhn and Feyerabend).
267 Habermas, A Reply to My Critics, supra note 266, at 274.
268 Id. This belief is also expressed by Habermas's bifurcation of "observation"
and "understanding." See J. HABERMAS, What is Universal Pragmatics?,in COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY, supra note 191, at 9.
269 See supra notes 31, 57.
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ences; in the latter, methodological abstraction is embodied in the human
sciences.. Both kinds of "sciences" are completely derivative of a playful
encounter that Gadamer terms an ontological openness.2 7 0 Reconstructive
sciences are no less subject to this ontological condition.
Although Habermas has unambiguously rejected empiricism, his attempt
to differentiate the "interest" in the natural sciences from that in reconstructive sciences obscures the truly radical critique of classical empiricism: that
our relationship with the world is a unified, hermeneutical openness.
Habermas ostensibly disavows his empiricist past, but the retention of
epistemologically distinct "interests" as the guiding structure of his philosophy indicates his continuing belief in empiricism. As Fred Dallmayr notes,
"Habermas' outlook-as portrayed especially in more recent writingsreflects a growing fondness for a quasi-Cartesian or quasi-Kantian (though
linguistically revised) rationalism. ' 271 Habermas's recent concessions to
developments in the philosophy of science must be radicalized in order to
support more strongly both his own insightful recognition that truth claims
can never be settled by a direct appeal to perceptual certainty and his
2 72
argument for a consensual theory of truth.
Habermas is aware of the problem. In his Reply to My Critics, Habermas
states that "[p]ost-empiricist philosophy of science has provided good rea270 Gadamer anchors his discussion of ontological openness in language, arguing
that the pretheoretical creativity of communication can never be reduced to a rational
construct. Only in passing does he refer to perception as an equally unconstrained
"play." See supra note 57. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, on the other hand, is
centered on the act of perception, particularly on one's visual action with the world.

See, e.g., M. MERLEAU-PONTY, Eye and Mind, in THE PRIMACY OF PERCEPTION
AND OTHER ESSAYS 159 (J. Edie ed., C. Dallery trans. 1964) (noting that the eye "is
that which has been moved by some impact of the world, which it then restores to the

visible through the offices of an agile hand") (emphasis omitted). However, he does
recognize that language is also a "play": "In trying to describe the phenomenon of
speech and the specific act of meaning, we shall have the opportunity to leave behind
us, once and for all, the traditional subject/object dichotomy." M. MERLEAU-PONTY,
PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION, supra note 1, at 174. Merleau-Ponty and
Gadamer explore the same radical notion of an ontological openness to the world, but

each focuses on a separate modality (language/speech) in his investigation. Thus, I
suggest that a "Merleau-Ponty style" critique of Habermas's conception of the
natural sciences is a legitimate reading of Gadamer's ontology.
271 F. DALLMAYR, TWILIGHT OF SUBJECTIVITY, supra note 185, at 292. See also
Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1394-98 (1984) (arguing that

Habermas's attempt to ground rationally-based critique on his theory of common
human interests fails).
272 Cf. T. MCCARTHY, supra note 51, at 301-02 (reconciling Habermas's view that
claims founded in experience are not necessarily grounded or warranted claims with
Popper's statement that "lilt is only in the course of critical discussion that observation is called in as a witness") (quoting K. POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE 348
(1974)).
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sons for holding that the unsettled ground of rationally motivated agreement
among participants in argumentation is our only foundation-in questions of
physics no less than in those of morality." 2 73 The conclusion that theoretical
and practical discourse are both forms of communicative rationality is correct only because the "unsettled ground" is the playful interaction of beingin-the-world, which is constitutive of reflection (theory of truth) only because it is constitutive of all experience. This unity of communicative
rationality is rooted in ontological openness. Habermas's modes of knowing
can be distinguished conceptually as different interests, but such distinctions
lack the universal-epistemological significance that Habermas gives them.
Habermas's slow-moving relinquishment of his tripartite theory of interests,
even after following Gadamer's lead by locating a unified source of meaning
and truth in language, may very well reflect an attempt to secure the legitimacy of critical theory by placing it beyond the ontological limits identified
by Gadamer. In this respect, Habermas's program is as deficient as all other
methodologies of society.
Yet Habermas's philosophy is not rendered unimportant by virtue of this
deficiency. Habermas's insights, when viewed methodologically and not
universally (in quasi-transcendental terms), comport with Gadamer's ontology. 274 Indeed, "the complexity of the debate [between Gadamer and
Habermas] derives from the lack of bipolarity, from the intricate mixture of
conflict and consensus between the two contestants. ' 275 Once Habermas's
theory is reformulated in accordance with Gadamer's ontological argument,
it becomes a necessary and presupposed aspect of Gadamer's philosophy of
interpretation. Universal pragmatics is a methodology, but Gadamer's philosophy does not require a rejection of its principles any more than his
philosophy requires a rejection of empirical-analytic methodology. All that is
required is a more careful attentiveness to the limitations of all methodology.
Empirical science is derivative of and wholly subordinated to our ontological
condition; reconstructive science is similarly rooted. Habermas recognizes
this obvious fact, but it has taken some time to reform his initial unsatisfactory approach.
It is important to rework Habermas's philosophy because Gadamer's
preoccupation with combatting the Cartesian and Kantian legacy of rationalism has led him to an overly conservative emphasis on the force of
tradition. It is clear, however, that the overbearing theoretical claims of
rationalism are not the only problems confronting us. The cultural matrix in
which we are situated also affects our phenomenological existence, and the
transmission of culture through tradition is neither benign nor always benevolent. The ascendance of science as the sole mode of rationality has
denigrated our political nature, but
Habermas, A Reply to My Critics, supra note 266, at 238.
See contra T. MCCARTHY, supra note 51, at 191 (arguing that it is Gadamer who
must be viewed methodologically).
275 F. DALLMAYR, TWILIGHT OF SUBJECTIVITY, supra note 185, at 284.
273
274
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[s]cience and technology ...

are not the only factors impinging on

ordinary life; their impact is matched and perhaps overshadowed by the
chronic effects of power and domination. Far from representing a uniform natural ecology, the life-world implies vastly different experiences
for people at different levels of the social and political hierarchy. In an
age of world-wide social ferment, phenomenology [and ontological
hermeneutics] can ill afford to indulge in idyllic
portrayals and "picture
27
book" illustrations of the human conditionT.
While Gadamer's emphasis on play poses an appropriate challenge to
positivist epistemology, an idyllic portrayal of the give-and-take of interpretation would indeed offer little help in our quest to eliminate illegitimate
social power structures. Habermas emphasizes the necessity of examining
the presuppositions of unfettered play as a normative basis from which to
criticize social reality. Clearly, it would be naive for Gadamer to ignore how
interpretation is affected by social power structures. Blind acceptance of a
traditional horizon subjects readers to irrational prejudices that distort
their encounters with meaning. The real issue is not whether ideology is
undesirable and subject to critique but rather how far a methodology of
critique can go before it oversteps its mandate. When does the eradication of
structural ideology cease to be a liberation of an antepredicative mode of
being (play) and become instead a hopeless attempt to decontextualize the
interpreter and to universalize his knowledge?
Habermas attempts to do too much with his methodological investigations. The methodological goal of reconstructive science is to delve deeply
into the experience of truth that is approximated in every conversation and
in every encounter with a text. This technique is oriented toward the realization of an institutionalized discourse in which the playful practice of communication is not constrained by ideology or social hierarchy but rather is
always open to justification by the force of the better argument.2 7 However,
this methodological program is necessarily limited, for the pragmatic justification of truth claims can never be accomplished according to methodological rules. The "better argument" can never be preordained. That is,
the pragmatic nature of speech is no different than the pragmatic nature of
interpretation. Interpreters are at play with a text because they cannot
determine its meaning by the force of their subjectivity. Nor does the text
clearly establish its meaning as if it were a static object. Play is indeterminate; no hermeneutical methodology can predict the meaning that will result
from play.
Habermas concedes that ideal speech would be a pure praxis beyond the
scope of any logic or science. Reconstructive efforts are always hypothetical
and provisional because communicative action cannot be seized with theoretical certainty, even by the participants themselves.278 Consequently, any
276

F.

DALLMAYR,

BEYOND DOGMA AND DESPAIR: TOWARD A CRITICAL PHE-

NOMENOLOGY OF POLITICS 118 (1981).
277 J. HABERMAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE,

supra note 197, at 25.

271 Habermas, A Reply to My Critics, supra note 266, at 234.
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attempt to extend the rational powers of methodology to the substance of
ideal speech is as inappropriate as an attempt to rationally delineate the way
in which a text should be interpreted. Such methodological excesses serve
only to "short-circuit" the encounter with meaning and obscure the discovery of truth in pragmatic discourse. More importantly, these excessive
claims contradict humankind's situated place in history. What appears to be
the "final answer" will always be reformulated when society, according to a
wordless and pragmatic logic, outstrips the frail power of reason.
In a work on "Reason, Emancipation and Utopia," Albrecht Wellmer
criticises the short-circuiting that occurs when one ignores the mediations between the ethic of discourse and the practice of life and thinks
one can directly take from this ethic the standards for something like an
ideal form of life .... With the discourse ethic as a guiding thread, we
can indeed develop the formal idea of a society in which all potentially
important decision-making processes are linked to institutionalised
forms of discursive will-formation. This idea arose under specific historical conditions, together with the idea of bourgeois democracy. But it
would be a short-circuit of the type Wellmer criticises to think "that we
have thereby also formulated the ideal of a form of life which has
'2 7 9
become perfectly rational-there can be no such ideal.
Hence, critical theory cannot posit a timeless ideal but can only expose the
ideology at work in a particular historical situation. Although this critique is
never exhaustive, it can reveal the existence of restraints on communication
whose removal would facilitate a more genuine discourse and provide the
280
basis for a continuing radical critique.
Id. at 261-62 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
The development of economic critique clearly evidences the historical situatedness of critique. In his first book, Habermas links the development of capitalism
with the Enlightenment ideal of public discussion. See Editors' Introduction to
279

280

HABERMAS: CRITICAL DEBATES

4 (J. Thompson & D. Held eds. 1982). Habermas's

point is that the tremendous productive potential unleashed by the adoption of free
markets powerfully demonstrated that the past was little more than a conservative
obstacle to the aspirations of human progress. Free trade engendered a public sphere
of discourse that sought to topple the ideological restraints on progressive social
organization, namely the ideologies of the ancient regime, of the church, and of
hierarchical privilege. In short, Habermas argues that the eighteenth century engendered discursive justification because the validity claims of tradition were not followed blindly, just as economic principles were democratized by reliance upon the
mental arbiter of the "invisible hand."
However, the critique engendered by this radical shift in economics was ultimately
tied to a certain form of life and therefore itself subject to critique. Marx was the
presager of the modern situation. Advanced capitalism, however, no longer operates
as a progressive and liberating force. The market forces of supply and demand are
possible rules of justice, but the marketplace is not a communicative encounter
where this theory of justice is in principle subject to vindication through discourse.
The "invisible hand" has assumed the status of technocratic rationality: there is no
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We are never in a position to know with absolute certainty that critical
enlightenment has been effective-that it has liberated us from the
ideologically frozen constraints of the past, and initiated genuine selfreflection. The complexity, strength, and deviousness of the forms of
resistance; the inadequacy of mere "intellectual understanding" to effect a radical transformation; the fact that any claim to enlightened
understanding may itself be a deeper and subtler form of self-deception-these obstacles can never be completely
discounted in our evalu28 1
ation of the success or failure of critique.
Habermas's display of a lingering affinity for rationalism despite his acceptance of the historical and pragmatic qualities of communication is evi8
denced by his celebrated "as if" clause in Legitimation Crisis.11
A social theory critical of ideology can, therefore, identify the normative power built into the institutional system of a society only if it...
compares normative structures existing at a given time with the
hypothetical state of a system of norms formed ceteris paribus, discursively. Such a counterfactually projected reconstruction ... can be
guided by the question (justified, in my opinion, by considerations from
universal pragmatics): how would the members of a social system, at a
given stage in the development of productive forces, have collectively
and bindingly interpreted their needs (and which norms would they have
accepted as justified) if they could and would have decided on organization of social intercourse through discursive will-formation, with adequate knowledge of the limiting conditions and functional imperatives of
283
their society?

"good" or "bad," only "efficient" or "inefficient." Technocratic rationality insulates the logic of the market from discussion and reserves policymaking for an elite
body of experts. And only resort to political intervention-manipulation of the
not-so-invisible invisible hand-can sustain this technocratic legitimacy in the face of
economic crises. Habermas's political writings revolve around an analysis of this
transference of economic crises to the political system and the resulting challenge
to the legitimacy of the state. See J. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS, supra note
225, at 24-31; J. HABERMAS, Legitimation Problems in the Modern State, in COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY, supra note 225.
The liberating promise of eighteenth-century capitalism has become the stifling
dysfunctionalism of the modern welfare state. This dialectic is not peculiar to economics but rather is an unavoidable consequence of our historical nature. The goal is
never the critique, but only a critique. Never will the forces of liberation avoid
becoming forces of repression; never will an exhaustive critique reveal a social order
that is perfectly rational in itself.
281 R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 201, at 218-19.
212 J. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (T. McCarthy trans. 1975).
283 Id. at 113. John Thompson expresses Habermas's point perhaps more clearly:
"Habermas currently propounds the view that such relations of power may be
identified by comparing the prevailing normative structures on the one hand with the
hypothetical system of norms which would result from a discursive will formation on
the other." J. THOMPSON, supra note 238, at 95. See T. MCCARTHY, supra note 51, at
332.
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This "as if" clause suggests that the critical theorist is capable of penetrating a social system regardless of its stage of development and of delineating
the pragmatic discourse that would have occurred if the society were in the
ideal speech situation. This bold claim is problematic in two respects. First,
it ignores the careful distinctions between theory and practice that Habermas makes elsewhere. Second, it is premised on the belief that it is possible
to develop an ahistorical critical theory that may be applied trans-culturally.
If the critical theorist can predict the content of hypothetical ideal speech
by way of a counterfactually projected reconstruction, a practical discourse
need never be entered into because there would be nothing left for the
participants to establish. Issues of social and political organization would be
settled in theoretical discourse by social theorists, obviating the need for
further discussion. Yet Habermas himself precludes this possibility when he
states that
the theory that creates consciousness can bring about the conditions
under which the systematic distortions of communication are dissolved
and a practical discourse can then be conducted; but it does not contain
any information which prejudges the future action of those concerned.
The psychoanalyst does not have the right, either, to make proposals for
prospective action; the patient
must draw his own conclusions as far as
2 4
his actions are concerned. 1
To the extent that the political struggle often requires the leadership of an
insightful theorist who has penetrated the situation (Lenin is the perfect
example), Habermas admits the need for some degree of elitism. Nevertheless, he contends that there is no substitute for practical discourse. "[Tihe
vindicating superiority of those who do the enlightening over those who are
to be enlightened is theoretically unavoidable, but at the same time it is
fictive and requires self-correction: in a process of enlightenment there can
285
only be participants.1
In short, it appears that Habermas was carried away by the rationalist
tendencies of his own theory when he proposed his "as if" clause. Indeed,
Habermas recently recanted his excessive claims for the power of critical
theory, stating that "an ideal form of life" can never be deduced from the
formal idea of legal speech and that any attempt to bypass practical discourse will result in a "short-circuit. , 28 6 Moreover, Rick Roderick interprets
J. HABERMAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 197, at 38-39.
Id. at 40.
2816See supra note 279 and accompanying text. Habermas believes that political
inquiry is "short-circuited" when the theorist posits the ideal form of life that would
be arrived at through ideal speech, because the "ideal" is always limited by the
society's current stage of historical development. This inquiry, however, is also
"short-circuited" when the theorist posits an ideal speech situation as a concrete
social relation that can be known universally and applied by the all-knowing philosopher to all social systems, regardless of their development. With the adoption of the
284

285
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Habermas's latest two-volume book, Theorie des kommunikativen Handens ,287 as an explicit break with any attempt to apply substantively the
formal idea of ideal speech.
Habermas no longer claims that the ideal speech situation, or any other
feature of communicative rationality, directly represents the 'image' or
the 'anticipation' of a concrete form of life. The perfectly rational
society is an illusion .... 288
Habermas's latest attempt to provide a normative foundation for critical
theory rests on the more general concepts of "communicative action" and
"communicative rationality":
[C]ommunicative rationality represents neither a resurrected transcendental deduction of a utopian critical standard capable of judging concrete forms of life as a whole, nor a telos for a resurrected philosophy of
history. Understood formally as a procedural concept, communicative
rationality involves an attempt to characterise universal features of
communication in their structure and development that remains open to
empirical-reconstructive test and refutation .289
Once universal pragmatics is stripped of any substantive implications,
"there remains only the critique of deformations inflicted, in two ways,
on the life forms of capitalistically modernized societies, through devaluation of their traditional substance and through subjection to the
"as if" clause, Habermas aligns himself with classical Liberalism, despite his Continental roots. Cf. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 183-92 (1971) (arguing that the

political philosopher must adopt an impartial and objective approach to society in
order to determine what a just situation would entail). This more subtle short-circuiting can be avoided if Habermas accepts "play" as the universal condition of
communication. Play does not reveal an ideal speech situation that can be logically
reconstructed like a puzzle before the theorist, but it does give hints that certain
social structures are ideological impediments to free play.
A good example of such an impediment is racial prejudice. The give-and-take of
dialogue, the playful loss of subjectivity, is thwarted when one participant denigrates
the other's human qualities and speaks at him as if he were an object. A critical

theorist could legitimately argue, on the basis of his methodological inquiry, that
racial segregation and prejudices are removing the communication between members
of different races from a playful encounter. This critique has substantive implications-desegregation and equal opportunity laws, for example-but it does not
presume to know the structure that pure play would take.
287

J. HABERMAS,

THEORIE DES KOMMUNIKATIVEN

HANDELNS

(2 vols. 1981).

Volume One has appeared in English translation as J. HABERMAS, REASON AND THE
RATIONALISATION OF SOCIETY (T. McCarthy trans. 1984). It is important to re-

member that while Habermas himself has retreated from his earlier positions, the
development of his thought remains informative. See supra text accompanying notes
192-95.
288 R. RODERICK, supra note 249, at 111, 161.
289

Id. at 111-12.
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imperatives of a one-sided rationality limited to the cognitive-instrumental." Habermas attempts to provide a foundation for this more
limited conception of critique in his work on communicative action and
communicative rationality ....

290

Whether this reformulation of his theory has enabled Habermas to sustain
his critical inquiry within the limits that he himself recognizes remains to be
seen.
Habermas's ill-fated attempt to connect theory and practice more directly
with the "as if" clause was the natural result of his refusal to interpret his
program methodologically. There is some indication that Habermas is moving toward such an interpretation with the introduction of the concept of
"lifeworld" (Lebenswelt) into his theory. 291 Reminiscent of Gadamer's idea
of ontological situatedness, the lifeworld
is a resource for what goes into explicit communication which can
become subject to criticism. The lifeworld itself, however, always remains implicit, pre-reflexive and pre-critical. Its characteristics are 'certainty, background character, impossibility of being gone behind.' . . .
As the unexceedable context for co-ordinating the three 'worlds' [or
characteristics], the lifeworld supports social collectives and cultural
groups by providing a resource of meaning and situation definitions that
are drawn upon for social reproduction. Thus, for Habermas, the
lifeworld is crucial for the reproduction of culture, society and personal2 92
ity in so far as it is the carrier of personal, social and cultural tradition.
If Habermas were to extend this analysis and eschew his earlier foundationalism, his methodological program would be correctly premised on the
ontological condition that underlies it. 29a Unfortunately, Habermas has so
290

Id. at 161 (quoting J.

HABERMAS, REASON AND THE RATIONALISATION

OF

supra note 287, at 73-74).
See R. RODERICK, supra note 249, at 119-20.

SOCIETY,
291

Id. (footnote omitted).
Thomas McCarthy notes that Habermas is still directed against 'hermeneutic
idealism" (an unmistakable reference to Gadamer) and that he is intent on carrying
out a "methodological objectification" of the lifeworld. McCarthy, Translator's
Introduction to REASON AND THE RATIONALISATION OF SOCIETY, supra note 287, at
292
293

xxiv-xxvii. For Habermas, the lifeworld is an ever-shrinking pre-rational horizon that

is increasingly "colonized" by the systems of rationality. The advance of rationality
engenders dysfunctional crises, see supra note 225, but the logic of the development
of rationally motivated systems provides a basis for, and is itself a proper subject of,
critical inquiry. J. HABERMAS, REASON AND THE RATIONALISATION OF SOCIETY,
supra note 287, at 56-74. Critique tries not to liberate the lifeworld from rationalization but rather to demystify the lifeworld through a process of rational will-formation
in accordance with communicative rationality. McCarthy, Translator'sIntroduction,
supra, at xxxvii. Habermas's approach raises the question of whether one engaged in
critique is privy to a universalist conception of communicative rationality. Habermas
disavows this kind of utopian view. J. HABERMAS, REASON AND THE RATIONALISA-
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far retained his belief in the ahistorical and trans-cultural nature of the
critique. According to Habermas, the ideal speech situation, though approximated in varying degrees in different cultures, is equally presupposed by all
societies. 294 Habermas's insistence that the approximation of communicative rationality has a developmental logic that can be identified and reconstructed fuels his desire to establish a truly universal foundation for critique.
It is here that Habermas's thought takes a 'Hegelian' turn: reason
does not appear at one blow; it has a history, both in the individual and
in the species .... To put it succinctly, Habermas has to show that the
ability to act communicatively (in his strong sense) and to reason argumentatively and reflectively about disputed validity claims is a
developmental-logically advanced stage of species-wide competences,
the realisation and completion of potentialities that are universal to

humankind .295

Moreover, Habermas's effort to "reconstruct" Marx's theory of historical
materialism is motivated by his belief that there is a "developmental logic
inherent in cultural traditions and institutional change.1 2 96 The net result of
this theoretical position is the elevation of the powers of the critical theorist
above the context of ontological situatedness.
If the case could be made that the mastery of the ability to reason
argumentatively and reflectively about truth and rightness claims represents a developmental-logically advanced stage of species-wide cognitive and moral competences, then it seems that the social investigator
OF SOCIETY, supra note 287, at 73-74. Nevertheless, critique is always performed by an observer of this rationalization of worldviews and is premised on the
"formal analysis of meaning constellations that makes it possible to reconstruct the
empirical succession of worldviews as a series of steps in learning that can be
insightfully recapitulated from the perspective of a participant and can be submitted
to intersubjective tests." Id. at 66-67.
294 T. MCCARTHY, supra note 51, at 322.
TION

295 McCarthy, Rationality and Relativism, supra note 261, at 65-66. Habermas's

developmental approach preserves the universal applicability of his argument, but he
still maintains that his project is rooted in empirical reality rather than metaphysics.
By exploring communication, universal pragmatics
can locate a gentle but obstinate, a never silent although seldom redeemed claim
to reason, a claim that must be recognized de facto whenever and wherever there
is to be consensual action. If this is idealism, then idealism belongs in a most
natural way to the conditions of reproduction of a species that must preserve its
life through labor and interaction, that is, also by virtue of propositions that can
be true and norms that are in need of justification.
J. HABERMAS, Historical Materialism and the Development of Normative Structures, in COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY, supra note 225, at 97

(emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
296 Id. at 98 (emphasis in original). Unlike Marx, however, Habermas focuses on
the rangeof variationsthat are open to a given level of social organization rather than
the mechanism of development. Id.
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would be justified in applying standards of critical
rationality in inter7
preting any system of beliefs and practices.11
Habermas has continued this line of thought in his recent writings. As
Roderick points out, Habermas's lingering rationalism results in the same
problems of denigrating practical discourse and legitimizing the elitism of the
critical theorist.
To the extent that the critical standards of Habermas's theory stand
abstractly above [the] context of human social practice, they cannot
reclaim the 'practical intentions' which give critical social theory its
point. Critical standards which are 'unavoidable' cannot help but impinge on the very freedom and autonomy Habermas wants to defend. In
spite of all his precautions, Habermas's 'general and unavoidable' critical standards contain the implicit danger of being imposed upon social
actors who do not have the 'competencies' of their leaders. This is a
subtle form of the danger faced by all 'scientific' Marxism. A social
theory based on a critical appropriation of Marx escapes this danger
because internal criticism can only succeed if it clarifies to social actors
the meaning of their own critical standards, standards
which must
298
unequivocally be in social and historical reality.
Thus, the dangers posed by the more subtle implication of the "as if" clause
are just as serious as those that naturally followed from Habermas's inattentiveness to the incompetence of theory to anticipate practice.
Clearly, Habermas errs to the extent that his theory does not conform to
Gadamer's ontological premise. Nevertheless, I believe that it is not only
productive but also necessary to recast Habermas's critical theory as a
component of legal hermeneutics. Gadamer himself readily points out that
the limits of method are not limits to all inquiry: "[W]hat the tool of method
does not achieve must-and effectively can-be achieved by a discipline of
questioning and research, a discipline that guarantees truth. ' 29 9 If there is a
discipline of questioning that seeks the truth of play beyond all hermeneutical methodology, is there not also a discipline that looks within the experience of play in order to provide the kind of life-world (ideal speech situation)
in which Gadamer's questioning is more fully realized? Following Paul
Ricoeur's analysis, I will show that Gadamer's ontological position necessarily leads to Habermas's critical approach. Once Habermas's theory is revised so that it does not run afoul of ontological situatedness, it is a vital
component of the philosophical inquiry into the birth of meaning in communication.

supra note 51, at 321.
supra note 249, at 166 (emphasis in original).
H.-G. GADAMER, supra note 5, at 447.

297

T.

MCCARTHY,

298

R.

RODERICK,

299
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Paul Ricoeur and Critical Hermeneutics

Paul Ricoeur performs a vital function by mediating the GadamerHabermas dispute.3 0 0 Ricoeur contends that Gadamer's radical notion of
situatedness does not entail an acceptance of ideology as yet another unavoidable prejudice. Instead, Ricoeur argues that even under Gadamer's
theory, ideology should be viewed as an inauthentic situatedness in a distorted mode of being. But it is equally clear that Habermas's attempt to
identify and expurgate ideology should never be so vain as to aspire to
pristine pure interpretations free from any prejudices-and therefore free
from an historically situated reader. Gadamer's writings clearly demonstrate
that such a program is nothing more than the false hope of the Enlightenment, and Habermas readily acknowledges this limitation. Yet it must be
possible for readers to distance themselves from their prejudiced forestructures of meaning in order to come to grips with the effects of ideology that
threaten to render them deaf to the multiplicity of meanings offered by a
text. Although such distance can never yield a value-free appraisal of one's
prejudices, it can open up the requisite space within which to recognize the
301
manifestation of ideology in oneself. Akin to psychoanalysis in this regard,
a proper critical inquiry is directedtoward facilitating the recognition of

ideology-dysfunctional neuroses and psychoses-without purporting to
make the individual entirely "objective"-free from the common, everyday
neuroses and rationalizations.
As we have seen, Gadamer premises understanding on a deep-seated
commonality of text and reader. This shared situation is incorrigible: a
300 David Fraser's provocative attack on the institutional hierarchy of the American legal system adopts a "seemingly eclectic methodology" that blends the approaches of Gadamer and Habermas. See Fraser, Truth and Hierarchy: Will the
Circle be Unbroken?, 33 BUFFALO L. REV. 729, 731 (1984). Fraser notes that his view
on the conflict between critical theory and hermeneutics is the same view proposed
by Paul Ricoeur, "that the common ground between the two schools is greater than
the area of disagreement." Id. at 731 n.4. However, Fraser does not provide an
analysis of Ricoeur's mediative efforts, and his argument does not consider Ricoeur's
emphasis on textual interpretation. When Fraser deconstructs the Constitution, id. at
750-54, one must question whether he disregards the constitutional text in favor of an
inquiry into social and political morality:
Since there is no theoretical construct which will enable us to discover the truth,
we must resort to belief.

... Rather than worry about discovering truth and meaning in semantic
textual analysis aided by historical sources, we must constitute truth and morality in the practice of law-or, better still, in the practice of life.
The canonical text of society is society itself.
Id. at 753-54 (emphasis supplied). His position, then, may differ from the themes
developed by Ricoeur that I have emphasized in this Article.
301 See supra notes 234-42 and accompanying text.
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reader is situated by her existence, and an external ideology can never
"unsituate" her.
The struggle against methodological distanciation transforms hermeneutics into a critique of critique; it must always push the rock of Sisyphus
up again, restore the ontological ground that methodology has eroded
away. But at the same time, the critique of critique assumes a thesis
which will appear very suspect to "critical" eyes: namely that a consensus already exists, which founds the possibility of aesthetic, historical and lingual relations. To Schleiermacher, who defined hermeneutics
as the art of overcoming misunderstanding, Gadamer ripostes: "is it
not, in fact, the case that every misunderstanding presupposes a 'deep
common accord'?' 302
' 30 3
Ricoeur redesignates Gadamer's notion of consensus as "belonging.
.Because texts and readers belong to the same tradition, the two are able to
meet in a fusion of horizons. It is because readers "belong" that a consensus
already exists between them and a text. Their later efforts to come to an
understanding of what a text means are derivative of this commonality.
Ricoeur also redesignates Habermas's concept of the emancipatory interest in critique as "alienation." Critical theorists strain at the tethers of
everyday existence, seeking to free themselves from their immediate, unreflective situation so as to understand the deficiencies of their social world.
Under this view, interpretation is an act of "suspicion" that eliminates the
"illusions and lies of consciousness. "' 304 Tradition is considered a false idol
that, though it can never be entirely discarded, must be reformed by a
process of never-ending critique. Only through alienation from a defective
and ideological tradition can we come to a better understanding of ourselves
and our world.
Even if Ricoeur's contention that belonging does not rule out some degree
of alienated critique is correct, it remains true that these two conditions are
fundamentally opposed. Yet Ricoeur deems this very tension the central
hermeneutical experience:
Would it not be appropriate to shift the initial locus of the hermeneutical
question, to reformulate the question in such a way that a certain
dialectic between the experience of belonging and alienating distanciation 305
becomes the mainspring, the key to the inner life, of hermeneutics?

For Ricoeur, hermeneutics is animated by this double motivation:
willingness to suspect, willingness to listen; vow of rigor, vow of obedi302

30

104

p.

RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 29, at 77.
See supra note 66.
P. RICOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY: AN ESSAY ON INTERPRETATION 32 (D.

Savage trans. 1970).
315

P.

RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES,

supra note 29, at 90.
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ence. In our time we have not finished doing away with idols and we
have barely begun to listen to symbols. It may be that this situation, in
its apparent distress, is instructive: it may
be that extreme iconoclasm
30 6
belongs to the restoration of meaning.
Just as the artificial distinction between subject and object must be discarded
if the activity of interpretation is to be understood, so too must the falsely
conceived antinomy between belonging and alienation be overcome if the
hermeneutical act is to be fully explained. °7 One need not choose sides: the
fundamental gesture of philosophy is neither "an avowal of the historical
conditions to which all human understanding is subsumed under the reign of
finitude," nor "an act of defiance, a critical gesture, relentlessly repeated
and indefinitely turned against 'false consciousness,' against the distortions
of human communication which conceal the permanent exercise of domination and violence[.]"' 30 Both of these seemingly contradictory motivations
animate philosophy; interpretation-of a text, a society, or even of
oneself-is itself a dialectic between them. The tension between belonging
and alienation is the tension of existence: we are never slaves to the past, nor
are we ever freed from its grip.
Ricoeur's suggestion that play involves a dialectic of belonging and
alienating distanciation requires a reexamination of the concept of play.
Playful readers neither "discover" the objective meaning of texts nor "invent" wholly subjective interpretations. This model of play serves as an
effective critique of objectivist and subjectivist theories of meaning. Interpretation is premised on both the situatedness of the reader and the
reader's alienation from this situatedness.30 9 A playful encounter with the
proposed "worlds" of meaning embodied by the text transcends the prejudiced forestructure of meaning that one brings to the hermeneutical situation. In play one experiences alienated distanciation from oneself. This is the
true nature of the risk involved in remaining attentive to meaning: one may
come to see that one's prejudiced horizon is flawed, and the play may initiate
a profound reordering of one's habitual prejudices. Ideological prejudices
are not identified theoretically, by way of a critical inquiry, but rather are
identified through hermeneutical activity itself.
The distanciation inherent in interpretation is sufficient to legitimize the
critique of ideology. Because "distanciation is a moment of belonging, the
306

307

P. RICOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 304, at 27.
See J. THOMPSON, supra note 238, at 66-68 (showing how Ricoeur reaches the

conclusion that "the alleged antimony between a hermeneutics of tradition and a
critique of ideology is falsely conceived").
301 p. RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 29, at 63.
309 Ricoeur believes that the ideas of an effective-history and the fusion of horizons
imply a distance that is traveled in play. Id. at 61-62. See J. THOMPSON, supra note
238, at 52 (developing Ricoeur's concept of "distanciation," the set of characteristics
of discourse that effectively distance the text from the circumstances of speech; it is
this distance that must be traveled in play).
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critique of ideology can be incorporated, as an objective and explanatory
segment, in the project of enlarging and restoring communication and selfunderstanding." 3 10 There is no reason to universalize or give scientific status
to critical inquiry as an epistemological category unto itself. Habermas errs
because he seeks to formalize what occurs beyond methodology; he fails to
appreciate the subtle potential of justifying critique as a moment of playful
belonging. 311 Hermeneutics "can demonstrate the necessity of a critique of
ideology, even if, in virtue of the very structure of pre-understanding, this
critique can never be total. Critique rests on the moment of distanciation
which belongs to the historical connection [or, in Gadamer's words, the play
with an effective-history] as such." 31 Habermas justifiably relies on communication as the normative basis for critique, but his goal of developing a
universal reconstructive science that will expose all ideology is unfortunate.
While such a methodology may be a necessary fiction for constructing a
rationally-based political program unilaterally, 313 the truth of critique will
arise only from dialogue. Gadamer's general insight holds true for social
critique: methodology must give way to intersubjective play. Critique will be
genuine and lasting only if it is the experience of critique in dialogue rather
than a theoretical and methodological critique worked out by the archetypal
lonely philosopher.
In addition to drawing Habermas's independent critique back into the
hermeneutical experience, Ricoeur also wants to draw the moment of
critique out of Gadamer's emphasis on belonging. Hence, Ricoeur poses a
question: "[H]ow is it possible to introduce a critical instance into a consciousness of belonging which is expressly defined by the rejection of distanciation?"T3 14 As we have seen, Ricoeur overcomes this obstacle by showing
that distanciation is essential to play and therefore already presumed by
Gadamer.
Ricoeur lays down a formidable challenge to Gadamer's rejection of
critique by asserting that it is the intersubjective experience of "play" itself
that allows recourse against the situated and historical reality in which the
reader is enmeshed.3 15 To read is to place one's ego in play. Thus, Gadamer is
correct to call reading a "risk." Readers learn and grow as a result of reading
because the complex web of prejudices that they bring to a text are left
behind when they are at play 316 Likewise, the text moves beyond its original
310

Ill.
311

P.

RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note

29, at

See supra note 263.

supra note 29, at 110
(emphasis in original).
113 See supra text accompanying note 285.
314 P. RIcoEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 29, at 61.
315 Id. at 91. See also Chevigny, supra note 4, at 207 (emphasizing that through
interpretation, "we start from our own point of view, and try to step outside it").
316 P. RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 29, at 94.
312 p. RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES,
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context and meaning, leaving behind its "history" only to be reborn in terms
of an effective-history. "In short, the work decontextualises itself, from the
sociological as well as the psychological point of view, and is able to
recontextualise itself differently in the act of reading." 31 7 These corresponding transformations of text and reader are central to Gadamer' s explication
of the concept of play. As such, the foundation for critical theory lies at the
core of its opponent's thesis. Reading "is not so much an act of possession
as an act of dispossession, in which the self-understanding of the immediate
ego is replaced by a self-reflection mediated through the world of the
text.' 31 8 This dispossession or alienation "demands that the appropriation of
the proposed worlds offered by the text passes through the disappropriation
of the self. The critique of false consciousness can thus become an integral
that metapart of hermeneutics, conferring upon the critique of ideology
' 3
hermeneutical dimension which Habermas assigns to it. 19
Although Gadamer and John Thompson steadfastly maintain that this line
of thinking undermines Gadamer's ontological claim 3 20 I will show that
Ricoeur has succeeded in demonstrating that Gadamer's aversion to critical
theory has been an unwarranted and dogmatic misapplication of Gadamer's
own ontological insights. Just as Habermas's original ambitions must be
reassessed and reformulated to take into account the insights of ontological
hermeneutics, so too must Gadamer's exaggerated claims of the impossibility of critique give way to Ricoeur's more thoughtful analysis.
In Truth and Method, Gadamer recognizes that the possibilities of meaning in a text render some of the reader's prejudices impotent. 31 Gadamer

318

Id. at 91 (emphasis in original).
J. THOMPSON, supra note 238, at 55.

319

p. RiCOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES,

317

supra note 29, at

94-95 (emphasis in original).
Ricoeur likens [the] process of actualization to Gadamer's "fusion of horizons,"
in that the appropriation takes place within the common horizon of the reader
and that projected by the text. Insofar as "I" follow the sense of the text, I bring
my world to bear on the meaning; but insofar as I respond to the appearance of
the referent, the linguistic world projected by the text redetermines my own
world.
D. KLEMM, THE HERMENEUTICAL THEORY OF PAUL RICOEUR 148-49 (1983).
320 See J. THOMPSON, supra note 238, at 163. Thompson argues that Ricoeur
displaces the primordial bond between subject and object which underlies the
writings of Heidegger and Gadamer; the primitive hermeneutical phenomenon is
no longer belonging as such, but rather the interplay between participatory
belonging and alienating distanciation. However, the displacement of the
primordial bond undermines the ontological basis for Heidegger's rejection of
the quest for foundation, and for Gadamer's dissociation of method and truth.
Id. However, the primordial bond that Gadamer stresses is not an ontologically static
picture. Rather, despite himself, Gadamer is continually reminding the reader that
the ontological condition is one of dynamic playing.
321 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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then goes on to demonstrate that it is the set of illegitimate prejudices that is
abandoned in play. Of course, the "prejudices and fore-meanings in the
mind of the interpreter are not at his free disposal. He is not able to separate
in advance the productive prejudices that make understanding possible from
the prejudices that hinder understanding and lead to misunderstandings." 322
The positive force of tradition derives from its status as the living repository
of legitimate prejudices that have withstood the test of time. Tradition,
however, is far from infallible. Consequently, it is constantly put at risk and
tested by each succeeding generation and therefore is always developing.
Only temporal distance
lets the true meaning of the object emerge fully. But the discovery of the
true meaning of a text or a work of art is never finished; it is in fact an
infinite process. Not only are fresh sources of error constantly excluded, so that the true meaning has filtered out of it all kinds of things
that obscure it, but there emerge continually new sources of understanding, which reveal unsuspected elements of meaning. The temporal distance which performs the filtering process is not a closed dimension, but
is itself undergoing constant movement and extension. And with the
negative side of the filtering process brought about by temporal distance
there is also the positive side, namely the value it has for understanding.
It not only lets those prejudices that are of a particular and limited
nature die away, but causes those that bring about genuine understanding to emerge clearly as such.
It is only this temporal distance that can solve the really critical
question of hermeneutics, namely of distinguishing the true prejudices,
by which we understand, from the false ones by which we misunder-

stand .323
In this passage, Gadamer fully accepts the implications of his thesis that
Ricoeur wants to develop. Gadamer's insistence that meaning is possible
only for a historically situated reader does not mean that readers must
blindly accept traditional ideology. The truth of tradition can speak through
a text only when readers have overcome their illegitimate prejudices. Moreover, the truth of tradition is constantly made current by the interpreter's
appropriation of the most valuable world of meaning offered by the text.
Thus, the hermeneutical encounter is always already a forum for the separation of legitimate from illegitimate prejudices.
If a person is trying to understand something, he will not be able to rely
from the start on his own chance previous ideas, missing as logically and
stubbornly as possible the actual meaning of the text until the latter
becomes so persistently audible that it breaks through the imagined
understanding of it. Rather, a person trying to understand a text is
prepared for it to tell him something. That is why a hermeneutically

322
323

H.-G.

GADAMER,

Id. at 265.

supra note 5, at 263.
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trained mind must be, from the start, sensitive to the text's quality of
newness 324
In other words, "interpretation begins with fore-conceptions that are
replaced by more suitable ones. ' 3 2 With this statement, Gadamer essentially summarizes Ricoeur's thought. For Gadamer, as well as Ricoeur,
[t]he only "objectivity" [in interpretation] is the confirmation of a
fore-meaning in its being worked out. The only thing that characterises
the arbitrariness of inappropriate fore-meanings is that they come to
nothing in the working-out. But understanding achieves its full potentiality only when the fore-meanings that it uses are not arbitrary. Thus it
is quite right for the interpreter not to approach the text directly, relying
solely on the fore-meaning at once available to him, but rather to
examine explicitly the legitimacy, ie
[sic] the origin and validity, of the
326
fore-meanings present within him.
While Gadamer denies that readers can or should consciously and methodologically examine their prejudices, he believes that remaining open to the
text in the spirit of play requires readers to examine explicitly the legitimacy
of their prejudices.
This unambiguous commitment to critical distanciation in play is made
even more explicit in Gadamer's essay entitled "To What Extent Does
Language Preform Thought?" 3 7 Gadamer wrote this essay to refute Habermas's suggestion that systematically distorted communication, in which "at
least one of the participants deceives himself about the fact that the basis of
consensual action is only apparently being maintained,'"", is a social reality
that can and must be corrected through critical theory (or "depth hermeneutics' ').329 Gadamer rejects the notion that linguistic situatedness is a form of
domination-that distorted language relations preform thought and are
therefore immune to change-because it is linguistic situatedness that makes
emancipatory change possible.
The fact that it is in the midst of a linguistic world and through the
mediation of an experience pre-formed by language that we grow up in
our world, does not remove the possibilities of critique. On the contrary, the possibility of going beyond our conventions and beyond all
those experiences that are schematised in advance, opens up before us
once we find ourselves, in our conversation with others, faced with
opposed thinkers, with new critical problems, with new experiences.
Id. at 238.
Id. See supra notes 42-43.
326 Id. at 236-37.
327 Id. at 491-98 (Supplement II).
328 J. HABERMAS, What is Universal Pragmatics?, in
324
315

COMMUNICATION AND THE

EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY, supra note 191, at 210 n.2.
329 See McCarthy, Translator'sIntroduction to COMMUNICATION AND
LUTION OF SOCIETY

xii-xiii (1979).
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Fundamentally in our world the issue is always the same: the verbalisation of conventions and of social norms behind which there are always
economic and dominating interests. But our human experience of the
world, for which we rely on our faculty of judgment, consists precisely
in the possibility of our taking a critical stance with regard to every
convention. In reality, we owe this to the linguistic virtuality of our
reason and language does not, therefore, present an obstacle to reason 330
For Gadamer, language is neither a trap that ensnarls the human race in
relations of domination nor the pre-established boundary of what is possible
for a given linguistic community. Rather, "language is the single word whose
virtuality opens up the infinity of discourse, of discourse with others, and of
the freedom of 'speaking oneself' and of 'allowing oneself to be spoken.' ",331 As was the case with Habermas, Gadamer's later writings are
more aware of the real point of critique: it is legitimized in practice even if a
theoretical program is unable to define and direct it.
Without Ricoeur's idea of a "critical hermeneutics, ' 332 an idea implicitly
accepted in Gadamer's later writings, Gadamer would be unable to make
good on his claim that play resolves itself in a non-arbitrary fashion. Without
the ontological space for critique, Gadamer's claim that there is a "supreme
criterion of the 'right' representation ' 333 would lack substance. The "right
representation" is not merely the representation intended by the authorsuch a "cannonisation of a particular interpretation" 334 is impossible as well
as undesirable. As such, we must look for the criterion of the right representation in the ever-changing give-and-take of play. Appeals to this hermeneutical criterion are made whenever the validity of an interpretation is challenged. Arguments for a "better" interpretation represent critical insights
into the possibilities of meaning that best comport with the case at hand and
the natural unfolding of the text's effective history into the present. "[W]hile
H.-G. GADAMER, supra note 5, at 495-96.
Id. at 498. See also P. RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES,
supra note 29, at 97 (emphasis in original):
The task of the hermeneutics of tradition is to remind the critique of ideology
that man can project his emancipation and anticipate an unlimited and unconstrained communication only on the basis of the creative reinterpretation of
cultural heritage ....
Distortions can be criticised only in the name of a consensis which we cannot anticipate merely emptily, in the manner of a regulative
idea, unless that idea is exemplified; and one of the very places of exemplification of the ideal of communication is precisely our capacity to overcome cultural
distance in the interpretation of works received from the past. He who is unable
to reinterpret his past may also be incapable of projecting concretely his interest
in emancipation.
332 See P. RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 29, at
87.
31 See supra quotation accompanying note 36.
31 See supra quotation accompanying note 36.
330

331
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a text may allow of several interpretations, it does not follow that all of these
interpretations are of equal status; and the elimination of inferior interpretaand proof, but a rational
tions is not an empirical matter of verification
' 335
process of argumentation and debate.
But how do we evaluate and choose between competing interpretations?
Having established the possibility of critique without sacrificing the ontological foundation of hermeneutics, how do we decide which critiques are
correct? If there is to be a practice that ensures that a judge reaches the
right decision, it will require a new perspective on legal hermeneutics. In the
next section, I focus on the question of how we can determine which
interpretation of a given legal text is the "right" one.
4.

Toward a New Model of Legal Interpretation

The right interpretation can tentatively be identified as the interpretation
that allows the text to be most fully realized in the present situation. If two
readers come to different conclusions about the meaning of the text, their
discussion about which interpretation is better is really a discussion about
which interpretation freely allows the text to become what it is. Unfettered
play with a text requires alienation from one's situation and a corresponding
appropriation of the effective-history of the text. It is an act of coming to an
understanding about the text and about oneself. Hermeneutical appropriation discards some of the "worlds" of meaning proposed by the text as well
as some of the prejudices held by the reader. In interpretation both the
reader and the text become recontextualized in reference to the demands of
the case at hand: it is just as impossible for the reader to secure his prejudices against change as it is for the text always to offer the same meaning.
The metaphor of play is a powerful one. Interpretation is not of the reader or
of the text but rather is between a reader who comes to a new understanding
and a text that becomes current.
Ricoeur reformulates Habermas's critical theory to emphasize that the
play of interpretation is never a blind recovery of tradition. Judges cannot
decide cases by simply recovering "the answer" from the past, for pure
recovery is impossible without a reader who is ahistorical and emptied of all
prejudices. Instead, judges critically appropriate the legal tradition; suspicious of prejudices that are no longer useful in interpreting the text, they seek
to allow the text to speak to the legitimate prejudices of the present. Even
Gadamer admits that "[u]nderstanding certainly does not mean merely the
assimilation of traditional opinion or the acknowledgment of what tradition
has made sacred. ' 336 Thus, it would be a mistake to reduce Gadamer's
hermeneutics to the conservative recovery of tradition, and Ricoeur's focus
on the experiences of belonging and alienation corrects Gadamer's onesidedness.
3" See J.
336

H.-G.

THOMPSON, supra note 238,
GADAMER, supra note 5, at

at 53.
xxv.
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Having thus synthesized the work of Gadamer and Ricoeur, it becomes
easy to understand Plessy and Brown. Plessy demonstrates the force of
"belonging" to the tradition. The Court did not attempt to recover the
framers' intent but only to make a practical judgment that reanimated the
traditional jurisprudence of the equal protection clause. Justice Harlan's
dissent revealed his suspicion that the recovery of tradition was no longer
appropriate and suggested a better way to hear what the Constitution was
saying. In Brown, the Court decided that Harlan's dissent in Plessy was not
merely a different interpretation of the Constitution but a better one. Plessy
and the tradition it embodied were no longer worthy of being recovered. The
Constitution itself refused to let its readers make it conform to traditional
prejudices: the pull of the text was able to alienate the Justices from their
rooted belonging, thereby bringing them to a new understanding. Gadamer's
argument against the idea of one timeless interpretation supports the idea
that Plessy is not wrong in any objective ahistorical sense. But Gadamer's
argument does not lead to the nihilist position that Plessy and Brown are
equally valid interpretations for the modem reader. It is all too clear to a
modem reader that the Plessy Court was deaf to the promise of legal equality
contained in the equal protection clause. If Plessy were decided today, it
in 1896 or would be
would be wrong; whether the Plessy rationale was wrong
337
wrong in 2096 is beyond our competence to decide.
The text wields great power in interpretation. From a modem perspective,
the transition from Plessy to Brown is the result of a growing attentiveness to
what the promise of equal treatment under the law entails. In effect, the
Court slowly came to see what the Constitution meant. From this example,
one may infer that the power of the text to alienate the reader from his
situation is superior to the rooted sense of belonging that the reader brings to
the hermeneutical experience. Interpretation is never frozen in time because
the text continually challenges readers to re-examine their traditional prejudices and to come to a new understanding by way of the text. The text holds
meaning only for situated readers, but the text continually asserts the power
to bring readers to a new situation. It is no accident that great literature
never loses a sense of "newness" even after several readings. Indeed,
something is considered great literature for this very reason: the text, which
never ceases to alienate readers before its meaning is appropriated back to
their situation, draws readers to a different experience each time they read
the text.
This theory of interpretation is rather unexceptional, for it conforms to u,=
intuition that meaning is somehow "in" the text more than it is "in" the
reader. Currently, the sophisticated and intellectualized challenge of subjectivism has disputed this intuition, but the nature of the hermeneutical act is
still evident when one speaks about finding new meaning "in" a text or
coming to see what the "text really means." Of course, the reader does not
137

See supra note 102.
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passively receive the unambiguous meaning contained in the text. Rather,
the text is the focal point of interpretation only to the extent that it determines the possibilities open to a situated reader's playful encounter with it.
Although the text and the reader have the same ontological status, neither
being subservient to the other, the text nevertheless exerts the greater
influence on the resolution of meaning. The power of the text is the source of
learning. We are constantly drawn out and projected into the "world" of the
text; our situation is redefined through the act of reading.
In the final analysis, Ricoeur holds that of the two aspects involved, the
pull of the world projected by the text is dominant over the role of the
subject who runs ahead in staking out the contours of that world. For
Ricoeur, "it is not the reader who primarily projects himself," but
rather the projective power of the texts that can enlarge the reader "in
his capacity of self-projection by receiving a new mode of being from
the text itself." The primacy of the act of the emergent meaning over the
reader's projection is a theme in Gadamer's hermeneutic as well as that
of Ricoeur, and it is the trait that confers the specifically "event"
[Geschehen] nature upon appropriation. Something comes into language that has been said and assimilated in the tradition, and the reader
"suffers" the act of the Sache [saying] itself. Appropriation is an event
338
because of the passivity involved in it.
Of course, appropriation is only relatively passive. Because the text belongs
to the reader's tradition, the reader's sense of belonging is understated and
largely presumed in the form of pre-understanding (consensus). What is truly
gripping about the hermeneutical act is the alienating power of the text to
draw a subject beyond the realm of subjectivity.
A valid model of legal hermeneutics must take the preeminent status of the
text into account. The central feature of such a model, therefore, is the
attitude of listening. Listening is an attitude in a negative sense rather than a
positive sense. It is not a methodological program for extracting meaning
from the text but rather a willingness to lower one's defenses and to meet
the text in play. The text is recontextualized to one's situation only if one is
willing to listen, to put all of one's prejudices in play with the text and to
follow the possibilities of meaning. Readers must abandon their attempts to
avoid play in favor of putting their ideology at risk by allowing the hermeneutical act to occur.
The further condition of being reached by the tradition in such a way
that something new is concretized by the event of appropriation requires that the reader be capable of what Gadamer calls Hdren, an
ability to listen and to be negative to his or her immediate and surface
experience. The reader must be able to disengage his preconceptions by
338 D. KLEMM, supra note 319, at 149 (footnotes omitted). Cf. Perry, supra note
90, at 565 ("The disagreement is not whether texts constrain interpretation, but how
and to what extent.") (emphasis in original).
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allowing the ontological world to open. The event of appropriation
happens only if the text is3 9permitted to speak into the openness of the
3
reader's linguistic world.
The central issue for legal scholars must be: "Are the judges listening to the
text?"
Critical theory is necessary to resolve this issue. Put simply, critical
theory is the formalized attempt to expose the ideologies that prevent the
reader from listening to the text. This goal of demystification is modest:
critical theory can neither establish what the text means nor stand outside
the hermeneutical situation as an external critique based upon an ahistorical
logic. Rather, the alienating feature of interpretation allows the critical
theorist to discard the false ideology of subjectivism and to expose the
prejudices that hinder rather than facilitate interpretation. Ricoeur's insight
that critical theory, including Habermas's universal pragmatics, must be
drawn back into the hermeneutical act is the key to understanding how
critique is possible. While the critical theorist's task-to demystify
tradition-is ostensibly destructive, it always presupposes the affirmation of
interpretation. In a fascinating essay on religious hermeneutics entitled The
Language of Faith, Ricoeur points out that critical theory is always premised on restoring the reader's capacity to listen.
I believe that the goal-which I can only catch a glimpse of-is to attain
a point where we will understand that there is a profound unity between
destroying and interpreting. I think that any modern hermeneutics is a
hermeneutics with a double edge and a double function. It is an effort to
struggle against idols, and, consequently, it is destructive. It is a critique
of ideologies in the sense of Marx; it is a critique of all flights and
evasions into otherworlds in the sense of Nietzsche; a struggle against
childhood fables and against securing illusions in the sense of
psychoanalysis. In this sense, any hermeneutics must be disalienating,
aimed at disalienation, at demystification. Long ago this was the task of
second Isaiah when he tied the preaching of Yahweh to the fight against
the Baals, and consequently joined iconoclasm to preaching.
But we understand better that this task of destruction pertains also to
the act of listening, which is finally the positive aspect of hermeneutics.
What we wish is to hear through this destruction a more original and
primal word, that is, to let speak a language which though addressed to
us we no longer hear, which though spoken to us we can no longer
speak. It is this access to interpretation which is the driving force of

hermeneutics .340
The suspicions of critique must never become the despair of nihilism.
Critique implies the positive attitude of listening to the text, freed from the
distorting effects of ideology.
339 D. KLEMM, supra note 319, at 149.

4 P. RICOEUR, The Language of Faith, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR

223-38, 234-35 (C. Reagan & D. Stewart eds. 1978) (emphasis in original).
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The scope of hermeneutics and critical theory is not confined to issues of
legal interpretation, nor even to issues of textual interpretation. As Ricoeur
states, if "we succeed in understanding that the entirety of human existence
is a text to be read, we will be at the threshold of that general hermeneutics,
341
by means of which I have tried to define the task of the next philosophy."1
The expansive theories of Gadamer, Habermas, and Ricoeur are not only
important guides for understanding legal hermeneutics; they also underscore
the foolishness of attempting to parochialize legal hermeneutics. A new
model of legal hermeneutics must not only borrow from the latest developments in hermeneutics and critical theory but also break down the barriers
that set legal hermeneutics apart from other hermeneutical concerns. Recognizing this, scholars are beginning to study the fundamental similarities of
literary and legal hermeneutics. A new model of legal interpretation must
radicalize this initiative by confronting the issues that are common to all
hermeneutical disciplines.
The new model of legal interpretation that I am suggesting may perhaps
become clearer if I provide a working example. For this purpose, I will
return to the Supreme Court opinions in Gregg v. Georgia.342 In Gregg, the
Supreme Court faced the hermeneutical issue of whether the "cruel and
unusual punishment" clause of the eighth amendment prohibits the execu343
tion of a duly convicted murderer under Georgia's death penalty statute.
The Georgia statute was written to conform to the decision in Furman v.
Georgia 3 44 which invalidated Georgia's previous death penalty statute because of the law's serious procedural defects but did not reach the issue of
whether the death penalty itself is unconstitutional. 345 The Gregg Court
squarely confronted this emotional and politically divisive issue, and the
Justices reached profoundly different conclusions as to the meaning of cruel
and unusual punishment. 346 In contrast to the easy and therefore unanimous
decision in Brown, Gregg exemplifies how even sharply opposed textual
interpretations may all be premised on the nature of the hermeneutical act.
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion 347 clearly presents the interpretive
341

Id. at 236.

342428 U.S. 153 (1976). See supra notes
313Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162. The cruel and

120-30 and accompanying text.
unusual punishment clause of the eighth
amendment is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and is therefore a basis for invalidating state statutes. See, e.g.,
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that a California statute
criminalizing the status of being addicted to narcotics constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the eighth amendment).
344408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
345See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169.
34 The Court's inability to arrive at a majority opinion echoed its per curiam
decision in Furman, in which each Justice wrote a separate opinion. The nine
opinions totaled 243 pages. Eight of these Justices were also members of the Gregg
Court, Justice Douglas having been replaced by Justice Stevens.
31'Gregg, 428 U.S. at 158-207.
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framework that all of the Justices agreed was applicable. A detailed examination of Justice Stewart's opinion reveals that his approach to the specific
problem of interpreting the cruel and unusual punishment clause completely
and explicitly conforms to the model of ontological legal hermeneutics.
Justice Stewart dutifully inquired into the history of the clause's adoption
348
and the manner in which the clause had been applied in preceding cases.
Yet this attention to tradition and the effective-history of the text did not
represent any reliance on originalist methodology; Justice Stewart accepted
that history alone could not determine the clause's meaning. Pointing out
that the amendment's framers were primarily interested in "proscribing
'tortures' and other 'barbarous' methods of punishment," Justice Stewart
recognized that because modern conceptions of what constitutes torture or
barbarity are not confined to those that were prevalent in the eighteenth
century, historical research is an insufficient basis for decision.3 49 Thus,
Justice Stewart argued that the Supreme Court had consistently applied the
cruel and unusual punishment clause to the particular cases before it with
reference to contemporary values. 350 For Justice Stewart, those cases indicated that the substantive meaning of cruel and unusual punishment derives
from contemporary standards of decency as well as from the inherent dignity
of human life.
It is clear from the ... precedents that the Eighth Amendment has
not been regarded as a static concept .... Thus, an assessment of

contemporary values concerning the infliction of a challenged sanction
is relevant to the application of the Eighth Amendment ...this assess-

ment does not call for a subjective judgment. It requires, rather, that we
look to objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given
sanction.
But our cases also make clear that public perceptions of standards of
decency with respect to criminal sanctions are not conclusive. A penalty also must accord with 'the dignity of man,'
which is 'the basic
351
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment.'
In accordance with these standards, Justice Stewart tested the constitutionality of the death penalty by asking whether the death penalty is either "an
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" or a penalty "grossly out of
' 35 2
proportion to the severity of the crime.
Justice Stewart's opinion reflects the decision of the Court that the death
penalty is not inherently cruel and unusual. 3 5 In reaching this decision, the
Court emphasized that the wisdom or desirability of the death penalty as a
348

Id. at 169-73.

Id. at
Id. at
35,Id. at
352 Id. at
353Id. at
349

170.

350

171.
172-73.
173 (citations omitted).
168-69, 187.
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matter of public policy was not an issue-the Court was empowered to
decide only whether the death penalty could pass constitutional muster.35 In
accordance with this limitation, the Court held that the imposition of the
death penalty against petitioner Gregg was constitutional because the newly
drafted Georgia statute eradicated the procedural problems of a jury having
untrammeled discretion and of the death penalty being "wantonly and
' 3 55
freakishly imposed.
Gregg is an excellent working example of a new model of legal hermeneutics because the framework established by the plurality decision opened up
the case for a realistic discussion of meaning. Justices Brennan and Marshall
filed impassioned dissents arguing that the death penalty is inherently cruel
and unusual.35 6 Yet neither the members of the plurality nor the dissenters
cloaked their interpretations in meaningless battles of string citations or
inquiries into the intention of the framers. Instead, the competing opinions
represent an unfettered discourse in which everything is put aside except
arguments for a better interpretation. Gregg v. Georgia is therefore instructive; by following the arguments made for and against the constitutionality of
the death penalty, an operative model of legal hermeneutics is established by
example.
Gregg established two criteria for determining what constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment: the contemporary standards of decency and the inherent dignity of the person. 35 71 Justice Stewart first considered the argument
that under contemporary standards of decency any state execution would be
cruel and unusual. In Furman, Justices Brennan and Marshall had accepted
the petitioner's argument "that standards of decency had evolved to the
point where capital punishment no longer could be tolerated. ' 3 Justice
Stewart, however, points out in Gregg that the evidence of public attitudes
towards the death penalty in the years subsequent to Furman indicated that
capital punishment was not an affront to contemporary standards of decency. "The petitioners in the capital cases before the Court today renew
the 'standards of decency' argument, but developments during the four
years since Furman have undercut substantially the assumptions upon
which their argument rested." ' 5 9 Thirty-five states as well as Congress had
responded to Furman by enacting procedurally-cured death penalty statutes,
and the voters of California had "adopted a constitutional amendment that
authorized capital punishment, in effect negating a prior ruling by the Supreme Court of California." 60 Justice Stewart emphasized that these objective indicia of standards of decency were the only basis for principled
ld. at 174-76.
I3
35-Id.at 187-207.
356Id. at

227 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
151Id. at 173.
358 Id. at 179.
359 Id.
360 Id. at 181.
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constitutional decisionmaking: an assessment of contemporary values "does
not call for a subjective judgment.' '361
In dissent, Justice Marshall stated that reliance upon legislative action
alone did not undercut the position he adopted in Furman and contended
that standards of decency are not reflected accurately when particular attitudes are based on misunderstandings and misinformation. Marshall thus
framed the issue in Furman: "In other words, the question with which we
must deal is not whether a substantial proportion of American citizens would
today, if polled, opine that capital punishment is barbarously cruel, but
whether they would find it to be so in the light of all information presently
available." 362 Justice Marshall urged the Court to decide Gregg on the basis
of what an informed citizenry would regard as "shocking, just, and unacceptable" punishment, rather than on the basis of the enactment of new
death penalty statutes.?3
The Court's debate about what standards of decency require is reminiscent of Habermas's unsuccessful attempt to develop his "as if" critical
inquiry. While Justice Marshall admits that the enactment of new death
penalty statutes does have "a significant bearing on a realistic assessment of
the moral acceptability of the death penalty to the American people, ' '3" he
argues that the Court should base its decision on the public sentiment that
would exist if all the facts about the death penalty were fully understood. In
short, he proposes to regard society as if it were in a condition of perfect
information exchange and only then to reconstruct the standards of decency
as they bear on the legitimacy of capital punishment. Justice Stewart sought
to avoid the elitism implicit in Justice Marshall's position by referring to the
public discussion that had actually taken place. Wary of presuming to know
what the public really believed about the legitimacy of the death penalty,
Justice Blackmun dissented in Furman. Although he agreed that standards
of decency do evolve, he expressed concern about "the suddenness of the
Court's perception of progress in the human attitude since decisions of only
a short while ago. ' 365
Id. at 173.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 362 (Marshall, J., concurring).
363 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Furman, Justice Marshall
concluded that assuming "knowledge of all the facts presently available regarding
capital punishment, the average citizen would, in my opinion, find it shocking to his
conscience and sense of justice. For this reason alone capital punishment cannot
stand." Furman, 408 U.S. at 369 (Marshall, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
Marshall agreed with the idea "that judges are not free to strike down penalties that
they find personally offensive," but he could not accept "that the American people
have been so hardened, so embittered that they want to take the life of one who
performs even the basest criminal act knowing that the execution is nothing more
than bloodlust. This has not been my experience with any fellow citizens." Id. at 370
n.163 (Marshall, J., concurring).
3' Gregg, 428 U.S. at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
365 Furman, 408 U.S. at 410 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied).
351

362
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Even Justice Marshall's strongest supporter, Justice Brennan, conceded
in Furman that community standards of decency must be determined as
objectively as possible.3 6 6 Justice Brennan did not attempt to supplant the
expressed preferences of the public; instead, he adopted a far more subtle
critical inquiry that avoided the practical and epistemological pitfalls of
Justice Marshall's ideal of an "informed citizenry." Justice Brennan argued
in Furman that despite the widescale acceptance of capital punishment in the
abstract form of enabling legislation, juries have in practice refused to
implement the penalty with any regularity, demonstrating a disdain for the

sanction

367

When an unusually severe punishment is authorized for wide-scale
application but not, because of society's refusal, inflicted save in a few
instances, the inference is compelling that there is a deep-seated reluctance to inflict it. Indeed, the likelihood is great that the punishment is
tolerated only because of its disuse. The objective indicator of society's
view of an unusually severe punishment is what society does with it,
and today society will inflict death upon only a small sample of the
eligible criminals. Rejection could hardly be more complete without
becoming absolute. 368
Justice Brennan approached the issue with a credible, critical perspective
that investigates the deep structure of public attitudes toward capital punishment. Justice Stewart could defend the holding of Gregg only by arguing
that the hesitancy of jurors to impose the death penalty demonstrated the
sober and calculated decisionmaking that is encouraged by constitutional

considerations .369
The second criterion of cruel and unusual punishment, whether the punishment denigrates human dignity, provoked an equally pointed debate.
Justice Stewart contended that there must be some legitimate reason for
executing criminals rather than imprisoning them if the death penalty is not
to violate human dignity. That is, "the sanction imposed cannot be so totally
without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of
suffering." 370 Justice Stewart offered several reasons for his conclusion that
the death penalty is justifiable. The death penalty is not disproportionate to
the crime of murder because, as Justice Stewart noted, it "is an extreme
sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes." 371 Moreover, the plurality
could not say that the Georgia legislature's faith in the death penalty as a
more efficient deterrent than alternative means of punishment was clearly
wrong.

369

Id. at 277 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 295-99 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 300 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182.

370
311

Id. at 183 (citation omitted).
Id. at 187.

366
367

368
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Considerations of federalism, as well as respect for the ability of a
legislature to evaluate, in terms of its particular State, the moral consensus concerning the death penalty and its social utility as a sanction,
require us to conclude, in the absence of more convincing evidence, that
the infliction of death as a punishment for murder37 is
not without jus2
tification and thus is not unconsitutionally severe.
Finally, Justice Stewart articulated a retributive justification for capital
punishment, arguing that retribution is not "a forbidden objective nor one
inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of men. ' 37 3 Accordingly, the
execution of murderers is a legitimate "expression of the community's belief
that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that
34
the only adequate response may be the penalty of death.
In dissent, Justice Marshall found the retributive justification especially
troubling. He asserted that retribution does not require death as a
punishment-moral outrage is voiced just as effectively by confining convicted murderers to prison for the remainder of their lives. 37 5 Justice Marshall concluded that the retributive theory is ultimately based upon the belief
that
society's judgment that the murderer "deserves" death must be respected not simply because the preservation of order requires it, but
because it is appropriate that society make the judgment and carry it
out. It is this ... notion, in particular, that3 7I6consider to be fundamentally at odds with the Eighth Amendment.
For Justice Marshall, "the taking of life 'because the wrongdoer deserves it'
surely must fall, for such a punishment has as its very basis the total denial of
377
the wrongdoer's dignity and worth.
Justice Brennan's dissent, which summarizes his detailed analysis in Furman, augments Justice Marshall's belief that the death penalty violates
human dignity.
This court inescapably has the duty, as the ultimate arbiter of the
meaning of our Constitution, to say whether, when individuals condemned to death stand before our Bar, "moral concepts" require us to
hold that the law has progressed to the point where we should declare
that the punishment of death, like punishments on the rack, the screw,
and the wheel, is no longer morally tolerable in our civilized society. My
opinion in Furman v. Georgia concluded that our civilization and the
law had progressed to this point and that therefore the punishment of
death, for whatever crime and under all circumstances, is "cruel and
unusual" in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution. I shall not again canvass the reasons that led to that
372

Id. at 186-87.

373Id. at 183.
374Id. at 184 (footnote omitted).
375Id. at 237-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
376

Id. at 240 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

377Id.

at 240-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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conclusion. I emphasize only that foremost among the "moral concepts" recognized in our cases and inherent in the Clause is the primary
moral principle that the State, even as it punishes, must treat its citizens
in a manner consistent with their intrinsic worth as human beings-a
punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to human dignity.
A judicial determination whether the punishment of death comports
with human dignity is therefore not only permitted but compelled by the
Clause .378
Justice Brennan's opinion in Furman attempted to set out the "principles
recognized in our cases and inherent in the Clause" which could guide a
37 9
judicial determination of the meaning of the words "cruel and unusual."
Focusing on whether capital punishment degrades the dignity of human
beings, Brennan contended that the death penalty treats "members of the
human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded." 380 As
such, he concluded that capital punishment is "inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the Clause that even the vilest criminal remains a human
being possessed of common human dignity." 381 Capital punishment amounts
to a state-sanctioned, premeditated infliction of psychological trauma and
eventually severe-even if brief-physical pain and therefore violently
3 82
offends the dignity and worth of the convicted murderer.
Justice Brennan isolated three additional principles that contribute to
the determination of whether a punishment comports with human dignity.
First, he argued that "the very words 'cruel and unusual punishments' imply
condemnation of the arbitrary infliction of severe punishments," and contended that the enlightened restraint demonstrated by juries deciding
whether to apply the death penalty implicitly demonstrated a reaction
against such arbitrariness.3 83 Moreover, while the punishment cannot violate
the standards of decency held by contemporary society, the death penalty
has increasingly been rejected or limited in modem times because of its
moral repugnance. "What was once a common punishment has become, in
the context of a continuing moral debate, increasingly rare. The evolution of
this punishment evidences, not that it is an inevitable part of the American
scene, but that it has proved progressively more troublesome to the national
conscience. ' 3 84 Finally, the principle that excessive punishment constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment is particularly important when the penalty in

Id. at 229-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote and citation omitted).
Furman, 408 U.S. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring).
380 Id. at 272-73 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
381 Id. (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
382 Id. at 284-89 (Brennan, J., concurring).
383 Id. at 272 (Brennan, J., concurring). "When the punishment of death is inflicted
in a trivial number of the cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is
virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of little
more than a lottery system." Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring).
384 Id. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring).
378

379
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question is ultimate and irreversible. Because the death penalty is unnecessary to deter criminals or exact retribution, "it is nothing more than the
pointless infliction of suffering." 3 5 Justice Brennan concluded that although
the death penalty may not be so obnoxious to a single principle underlying
the concept of human dignity as to render it unconstitutional, analysis of the
way in which all of the principles implicated by the state's decision to
execute convicted murderers bear on the death penalty is sufficient to decide
38 6
that capital punishment is by definition cruel and unusual.
Regardless of whether one believes that the death penalty is unconstitutional and that the result reached in Gregg is wrong, the eighty-eight page
Gregg decision is a tribute to the type of discussion that hermeneutical
differences should encourage. The Justices moved beyond the safe harbor of
legal formalism and put their pre-understanding at risk before the alienating
force of the cruel and unusual punishment clause. An opponent of the death
penalty can take comfort from the knowledge that nothing stands between
the evolving standards of decency and the meaning of the Constitutional
text. If the clause truly means that capital punishment is unconstitutional,
the decisionmaking framework of Gregg will eventually result in a recognition of this fact. Similarly, a supporter of the constitutionality of the death
penalty is assured that no judicial sleight of hand will limit the states' power
to impose capital punishment. If the clause truly means that capital punishment is permissible, the decisionmaking framework of Gregg will ensure
compliance with this meaning. The "how" and "why" of my faith in the
power of the text is difficult to explain in precise terms. I can only say that
the Justices have not shunned the unavoidable playful encounter with the
eighth amendment but instead have openly embraced play by trying to
articulate their appropriation of words on a page into the context of a
practical decision. What is ultimately important is not which opinion in
Gregg will control in future cases but rather the implicit invitation extended
by each of the Justices: "Let's talk again, I'm willing to listen."
CONCLUSION

When all is said and done, and this Article has been carefully thought out
and written, are we any closer to understanding how legal texts convey
meaning than we are when we experience the meaning of a legal text? The
theoretical arguments of this Article pale before the unthinking, intuitive
response: "Of course the equal protection clause means that states cannot
force their citizens to remain racially segregated." This verbalization of our
intuition is closer to the precognitive play than any of the theoretical approaches to Brown v. Board of Education that have been formulated in the
past thirty years. The truth of this interpretation is not arrived at by applying
a formula or logical rule. The truth of Brown is validated by the existential
recognition that occurs when we read the case. To be a participating member
385
8I

Id. at 279, 300-05 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 281-82 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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of the American social and legal culture is to react to Brown and its promise
of legal equality in a certain way. As Merleau-Ponty concluded, "In short we
experience a participationin the world, and 'being-in-truth' is indistinguish-

able from being-in-the-world.

"387

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn brilliantly captured this situation in his masterpiece The First Circle.38 The protagonist in the story, a mathematician
named Nerzhin, is a prisoner in the Soviet gulag. Because of his intellectual
abilities, Nerzhin is sent to a research facility staffed solely by prisoners
rather than to a Siberian labor camp. Nerzhin is a true intellectual. Even in
the face of his terrible predicament he still ponders highly theoretical questions: who is to say that the Soviet method of social control is not the right
way, and what are the criteria for such a judgment? Is it really possible to
judge his jailors as evil men, or might he be mistaken about the nature of
evil?
Nerzhin goes to see his friend Spiridon, an illiterate janitor at the prison,
to discuss these matters. Spiridon's life has been unusually harsh. Caught
between the Nazi forces and the Russian troops during the war, half-blinded
by rotgut, his entire family sent to the labor camps, and his health deteriorating rapidly, Spiridon is the quintessential victim of modernity. And yet, the
intellectual issues of modem times do not trouble this uneducated farmer.
"Not one of the eternal questions about the validity of our sensory perceptions and the inadequacy of our knowledge of our inner lives tormented
Spiridon. He knew unshakably what he saw, heard, smelled, and understood." 38 9 Nevertheless, Nerzhin is convinced that Spiridon, as a representative of the "common people," will confirm Nerzhin's growing skepticism
about whether there is any standard by which to judge the meaning of life.
Spiridon's response to Nerzhin strikes home with the force of a truth that
cannot be realized through any theory. Thus, it is fitting to conclude this
Article by reproducing that response here.
"I mean, if a person can't always be sure that he is right then how can
he act? Is it conceivable that any human being on earth can really tell
who is right and who is wrong? Who can be sure about that?"
"Well, I can tell you!" Spiridon, alight with sudden understanding,
replied readily, as if he had been asked which officer would have the
morning duty. "I'll tell you: the wolfhound is right and the cannibal is
wrong!"
"What? What?" Nerzhin said, struck by the simplicity and force of
the answer.
"That's how it is," Spiridon repeated with harsh conviction, turning
directly toward Nerzhin and breathing hotly
into his face: "The wolf'390
hound is right and the cannibal is wrong.
387 M. MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION, supra note 1, at 395
(emphasis in original).
388 A. SOLZHENITSYN, THE
ed. 1968).
389

Id. at 460.

39o

Id. at 466.

FIRST CIRCLE

(T. Whitney trans., Bantam Windstone
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